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Abstract
The issue of port security raised concerns at the highest levels after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States. Security threats against
ports and vessels acquired a new perspective and in 2002 the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) adopted amendments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, introducing Chapter XI-2 - Special measures
to enhance maritime security. This set of regulations enshrines the International
Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which entered into force on 1
July 2004.
This Code establishes a set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities. It encompasses two parts. Part A establishes the mandatory provisions,
the non-mandatory (“recommended”) and part B provides guidelines about how to
comply with the obligatory requirements of part A. Together with a critical analysis
of the national legislation about the enactment of the ISPS Code into national law,
this dissertation examines the level of implementation and compliance of this
instrument in Mexico with special focus on port security. This dissertation also
provides a transparent incident-reporting instrument developed and tested through
this research effort in Mexico for reporting of port and maritime security incidents.
This tool joins three primary port/maritime security functions:
a) Reporting of port and maritime security incidents;
b) Classification and investigation of serious security incidents that require
reassessments of the Port Security Assessments, (PSA), Port Facility
Security Assessments (PFSA), and amendments to Port Security Plans
(PSP) and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and finally;
c) Collection of evidence material related to the security incident.
This instrument, combined with statistics, provides nations with crucial information,
about threats, needs and challenges for allocation of economic, material and human
resources. It also provides essential information material to set up strategies for the
development of a National Maritime Security Policy. Its flexibility and adaptability
makes possible its implementation at any State of the world.
The results of this analysis reflect the conflictive cooperation between the Secretaría
de Marina (SEMAR)1, and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, (SCT)2.
This, together with the ambiguities and contradictions of the National Maritime
Regime, even though the extensive reforms of 2016 limits the exercise of authority
1
2

Secretariat of the Navy, in English.
Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, in English.
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of SEMAR and the operation of the CUMAR(s), the organ responsible for
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, at all ports across the country.
This doctoral dissertation comprises six introductory chapters, which are referred to
as the kappa and five annexed papers. It aims to contribute to the maritime realm
within the area of maritime security, with special focus on port security through the
following general objectives:
•

Elaborate a critical analysis of the current port security situation of Mexico,
with special focus on implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code,
including the state of the art and harmonization of international legislation
with national law;

•

Identify the most relevant security threats to port facilities in Mexico,
including oil terminals and offshore installations;

•

Develop an analytical instrument for security incidents-reporting & incident
investigation, to strengthen the continual evolution of PSA/PFSA and
PSP/PFSP and useful for setting up the strategies of a national maritime
security policy with possibility for implementation worldwide.

The approach adopted in this study is mainly based on qualitative methods,
combined with action research and a limited use of statistics. The research
objectives call for classical documental analyses examining the elements of relevant
international legislation against its implementation into national legislation in the
referred nation-state. The methods were selected on their usefulness and efficacy
for analysis of law and policy. Action Research was used for implementation test
and improvement of the reporting incident instrument, which can also be used for
setting up the strategies for the development of a National Maritime Security Policy.
Action Research is recommended when it is intended to improve understanding,
develop his/others learning and influence other’s learning, taking action for social
improvement.
The findings related to serious deficiencies in the implementation and compliance
of the ISPS Code in Mexico, concerning reporting of security incidents and its reevaluation with the PFSA and respective amendments to PFSP, the poor exercise of
authority from the representatives of SEMAR at the CUMARs in respect of
fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities concerning port and maritime security;
and the identification of necessary legal amendments to national law, as well as the
remarkable improvement in reporting security incidents after the implementation of
the “transparent security-incident-reporting tool”, that enables port/maritime
security incident investigation and can serve to identify the problem areas;
contributing to set up the strategies for the development of a national maritime
security policy, together with the instrument itself, are some of the most relevant
contributions of this dissertation.
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Abbreviations
AIS
CCTV
CSO
CSR
CUMAR

–
–
–
–
–

DOF
DoS
EEZ
FIDENA

–
–
–

IMO
INAI

–

ISM

–

ISPS Code
ISSC
MODU
MoU
PFSA
PFSO
PFSP
PSA
PSAC
PSC
PSO
PSP
RSO

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Automatic identification System
Closed-Circuit Television
Company Security Officer
Continuous Synopsis Records
Centro Unificado para la Protección Maritíma y Portuaria and
represented with the abbreviation “CUMAR”, in Spanish
(Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security, Mexico, own
translation)
Diario Oficial de la Federación, in Spanish (Official Diary of
the Federation, in English).
Declaration of Security
Exclusive Economic Zone
Fideicomiso de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de
la Marina Mercante Nacional, in Spanish, in Mexico (Fund of
Education and Training for the National Merchant Marine, in
English, own translation)
International Maritime Organization
Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información
y Protección de Datos Personales in Spanish, and represented
with the acronym INAI (National Institute of Transparency,
Access to the Information and Protection of Personal Data, in
English).
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety
Management (ISM) Code)
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
International Ship Security Certificate
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
Memorandum of Understanding
Port Facility Security Assessment
Port Facility Security Officer
Port Facility Security Plan
Port Security Assessment
Port Security Advisory Committee
Port Security Committee
Port Security Officer
Port Security Plan
Recognized Security Organization
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SCT

–

SEMAR

–

SOC
SOLAS
SSA
SSAS
SSO
SSP
STCW

–
–
–
–
–
–
–

SUA

–

UN
UNAPROP

–
–

UNCLOS

–

WCO

–
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Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, in Spanish,
Mexico (Secretariat of Communications and Transportation)
Secretaría de Marina, in Spanish, Mexico (Secretariat of the
Navy)
Statement of Compliance
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,1974
Ship Security Assessment
Ship Security Alert System
Ship Security Officer
Ship Security Plan
International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers,1978
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf
United Nations
Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria, and represented with
the abbreviation UNAPROP, in Spanish, in Mexico (Navy
Unit for Port Protection, own translation)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982
World Customs Organization
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List of papers included in this dissertation
The list of papers and respective presentation of articles does not follow a
chronological order after the publication date (those with empirical data were
approved and published earlier than those focused on theoretical analysis). Instead,
the discussion of the papers is conducted under the approach of the background
information in relation to the development of the research topic. This, to provide a
comprehensible sequence of analysis of theory and data. Following this approach
the literature review is presented in paper 1. The justification of the problem is
presented in Paper 2, whereas the analysis of empirical data and recommendations
are presented in paper 3, 4 and 5, from different perspectives.
1) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Implementation and
compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues. TransNav, International
Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 12(2).
P.363-373. DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.02.18.
This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on
implementation and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code), for the case of Mexico. This investigation was
initially oriented solely towards Mexico, but due to the absence of research
within this subject for the referred country the review had to be done
through subcategories with the conditional connection of Mexico and
relevant issues were selected. The primary data confirmed the absence of
research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary data, is related to the
ISPS Code used for the search, and allowed for a wider geographical
coverage and expanded on general basis the scope of the analysis. Ten (10)
different academic databases were exploited. The literature review from an
author centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the basis to
further develop (and examine) the concept centric approach through eight
selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on
specific concepts allowed the identification of cross fertilisation of such
concepts in the respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts
focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security
Plan (PFSP) have an integrated perspective where the categories of
terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management
and the issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status.
The results demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in
the areas Central and South America and in relation to other parts of the
globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code
in Mexico. In the scientific contributions on the subject where Mexico is
included; it is in reference to isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs
18

organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding
the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific research on this area for the
specific country might also be related to the lack of a national maritime
security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have
pointed out in other contributions.
2) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Opening of offshore oil
business in Mexico and associated framework to cope with potential
maritime security threats. TransNav, International Journal on Marine
Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 12(1). P.173-179 DOI:
10.12716/1001.12.01.20
After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business
oil auction in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction offered 14 oil
exploration fields located on the Continental Shelf to private companies.
The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields face
significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of
hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973
million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, for the year of 2014 alone. While
productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation
systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of
policies prioritising maritime security and protection of critical offshore
infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror
attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime
security and mitigate potential security risks at sea. This could increase the
trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster
development of new exploration and production fields. While the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the
cornerstone for the construction of the port’s security program and
establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP),
including oil port facilities, has not been fully implemented in several
important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack
many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be
included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil
industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime
security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and
the protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda
which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security
domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security
policy.
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3) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2017. Enhancing maritime
security in Mexico: Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both?
In: Chaumette, P. (ed.) Economic challenge and new maritime risks
management: What blue growth? Nantes, France. P. 81-101 Gomylex.
ISBN: 9788415176862
The current analysis examines three different options/solutions that Mexico
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve
the country’s maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance
with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code):
privatization, militarization and finally, their combination. Findings of an
ongoing research effort include inconsistencies within the data of the
necessary security incident records, or even their total absence; inadequate
competence and training among the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO)
also stands out. Another important issue was the use of different procedures
among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same
security issues. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS
Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Inter American Port’s
Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), does not
comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the
lack of a national maritime security policy has resulted in a poor (maritime)
security culture, despite the severe (security) challenges that this nation is
facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is currently
reorganizing its maritime security apparatus with some positive results;
tools/recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security
operating framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential
future research.
4) Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Mexico's reorganisation
of maritime security regime: A new role for the navy and emphasis on
energy related infrastructures. In: Ölçer, A.I., Kitada, M., Dalaklis, D.,
Ballini, F. (Eds.) Trends and Challenges in Maritime Energy Management.
Springer. P. 95-108 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74576-3
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) member-States have a strong
and invested interest in securing their energy supply routes and interrelated
ports. Preventing incidents in relation to this type of infrastructure is
essential for commerce and requires careful planning and rigid actions.
Apart from ensuring the optimal use of energy resources through energy
efficiency initiatives and policies, eliminating (or, at least reduce) losses
that are related to theft and/or subversive actions associated with terrorism
is essential for national security reasons. The legal framework used by the
United Mexican States government to shift the National Maritime Authority
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from a civil institution (Secretariat of Communications and Transportation,
in English and referred to as SCT hereafter) towards a military one SEMAR
(Secretariat of the Navy, in English and referred to as SEMAR hereafter)
provides the starting point of the analysis at hand. Previous failures of the
country’s Maritime Designated Authority are associated with an extended
number of security incidents and various accidents. In an attempt to improve
the country’s maritime safety and security regimes, a relevant Presidential
Decree approved in December 2016 transferred the oversight of all Harbour
Masters from SCT to SEMAR. Research activities on the field testify that
this initiative achieved high acceptance rates between the four pillars of
representatives of authorities/institutions directly related to duties and
operations within these two important domains, a prerequisite for success.
Apart from the recent Decree, extensive reforms to several laws are still
necessary to ensure an improved maritime security apparatus. The National
Congress heavily focused on port security and rather neglected to consider
that part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code) regarding Ship Security Plans and all its related subjects to vessels
since the previous reform, in 2014. It is also noteworthy that the Decree is
unnecessarily complicating the tasks of the Maritime Authority; while it
designates the SEMAR as the National Maritime Authority, it provides the
tasks of Port Authority (including port state’s privileges and obligations) to
SCT. This could potentially impact negatively on the conduct of operations
in the future and indicates a need of improvement in the implementation
process of IMO’s instruments into national legislation. Amendments to
regulations concerning security of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
(MODUs) and other offshore installations should also be considered to be
included in the type of vessels obliged to comply with the ISPS Code, since
a poor security situation in the specific category also strongly affects the
Mexican oil energy market.
5) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Integrating the
procedures of reporting port security incidents and the follow-up
investigation to build a national maritime security policy: A case study in
Mexico. Accepted for publication by the WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs
(in press, 2018).
Developments within both the maritime and port security domains are
regulated by international standards, with the influence of the International
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) clearly standing out. The analysis at hand is
putting forward the idea to improve port security measures in developing
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countries via integrating the procedures of incident reporting and the
associated follow up investigation, hinging on the Mexican experience. The
specific research effort examined port security at Mexican ports; Harbour
Masters, Commanders of the Mexican Navy as representatives from the
CUMAR, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Port Facility Security
Officers and Port Directors were interviewed on the subject in order to
identify the challenges and opportunities for security incident reporting,
updating of security incident records and facilitation of the follow up
investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this
new framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the reassessment
of security threats through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA)
and the necessary modifications to the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP)
were all integrated. These subjects were all incorporated into a “transparent
port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was then implemented at all
ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National Maritime
Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research”, the
improvement of port security framework in the country. Measurements
were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incidentreporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a
significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase
from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success.
In addition, 56% of those reported maritime incidents were also associated
with recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and respective PFSP.
Collecting accurate and immediate information/evidence material while
reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident investigation
and continuous improvement of the PFSP.
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Other works by the respondent
1) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A., 2008. Towards a cross-border unitization
agreement between Mexico and USA for the exploitation of the common oil
reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. Master Thesis to obtain the degree of Master
of Laws in Maritime Law. University of Oslo. Norway.
2) Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Assessing the need of
ISPS Code instruments implementation to Customs Maritime Units.
Manuscript submitted for publication as a book chapter in: Il Diritto
Marittimo – Quaderni.
The analysis in hand conducts an assessment of the need of implementing
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)
instruments, from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
particularly the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and Port Facility
Security Plan (PFSP) at Customs Maritime Units. This research effort
examines the security at Mexican Customs Maritime Units’ installations at
different ports from the ISPS Code perspective. To study these phenomena,
Harbour Masters, the Commanders of the Navy, Directors of Customs
Maritime Units, Port Facility Security Officers and Port Directors from
eighth of the most important Mexican maritime ports were interviewed on
the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities for improving
maritime and port security. Additionally, the Customs Maritime Units’
installations were visited for direct observation. The results demonstrate the
negative effect of customs agents rotation between Customs Airport Units,
Customs Border Units and Customs Maritime Units, as well as the need for
the development and implementation of PFSAs and PFSPs not only at ports
and port terminals, as required by the ISPS Code; but also at the Customs
Maritime Unit’s installations, which are within the port installations. The
findings show that more than 40% of port and maritime security incidents
occurred at the Customs installations during the year of 2017, in Mexico.
The lack of security assessments and security plans at Customs Maritime
Units put at risk the whole port facility and its terminals. Therefore it is
recommended the establishment of a national department within the
Customs Authority to lead the development of security assessments and
security plans but in accordance with the specifications of the ISPS Code,
aiming for a harmonization between “Customs Security Plans” and PFSP,
in order to establish security procedures at Customs Maritime Units that are
synchronized with those from the port facility in case of serious security
incidents. Finally, it was identified the urgent need for providing maritime
and port security training related to ISPS Code requirements and procedures
to customs’ police personnel serving in Customs Maritime Units.
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Theoretical and practical implications are discussed for researchers and
practitioners in the areas of maritime security and future research directions
are provided.
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1. Introduction

“They [PFSP] may exist in paper form but are rarely pulled off the shelf to test their
effectiveness. The key to successful port security management in terms of the FSP is
to understand it as a living document. (…). The FSP should not be written as a onetime effort, but should truly be a working document that addresses the security threats
facing the port facility twenty-four hours a day, seven days at week. This means that
the FSP, like the security function itself, must be continually updated and tested to
be certain that it mitigates the threats identified is risk assessment”.
-Kenneth Christopher (2009).

Concerns about maritime security have grown heavily during last decade due to the
increase in terror attacks around the globe, as pointed out by Christopher K. (2009),
who said that “the evolution of organized security processes in the maritime sector
can be understood as a product of increasing governmental and commercial
concerns about the criminal exploitation of seaports, […] and the rising threat of
global terrorism”. Maritime and port security is a topic that has been discussed for
several decades at the International Maritime Organization (IMO)3 and that received
exceptional attention after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the
United States of America, who immediately adopted the highest security measures
to protect its ports and infrastructure.
In 2004, after the referred tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the IMO
established a set of maritime security regulations with the aim of improving
maritime and port security worldwide. These provisions are established in the new
Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention),
comprising the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Part
A of the ISPS Code establishes the mandatory provisions, while the non-mandatory
(“recommended”) part B covers guidelines about how to comply with the mandatory
requirements established in part A. However, implementation and compliance of the
ISPS Code and submission of related information is only mandatory for Contracting

3

IMO – the International Maritime Organization – “is the United Nations specialized agency with
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by
ships” (IMO official website, 2018).

25

Governments to the SOLAS 1974 Convention4. The IMO relies on market forces
and economic factors to ensure compliance of the ISPS Code and therefore, there is
no penalty mechanism for Contracting Government States that do not comply with
the ISPS Code requirements (official website IMO, SOLAS 1974). After almost 14
years of the ISPS Code implementation, market forces and economic factors have
not been sufficiently powerful to lead to full compliance in several countries around
the world. One of these is Mexico, where, at the time when this research effort was
conducted, serious deficiencies were detected.
The focus of recent research regarding maritime security has been on piracy at sea,
while port security and security of offshore installations has not received the same
attention, even when offshore installations have been defined by several researchers
as vulnerable strategic infrastructure [Lewis (2006); Espin-Digon, Burns-Herbert,
& Bateman (2008); Weinberg (2008); Christopher (2009); Schulz (2011)]. Yet,
maritime and port security has not been considered seriously enough in the national
agenda in Mexico, a country that have suffered several tragic incidents caused by
organized crime stealing oil and gas from oil installations, including oil terminals at
ports where drugs, weapons, psychotropic material and money in containers, have
illegally been transported in ships and continuously confiscated. In this nation, the
topic remains widely unexplored from the academic perspective as well, as
discussed in Paper 1 and Paper 2 of this dissertation.
Even if Mexico does not comply with the ISPS Code at a satisfactory level, a
significant improvement is recently recorded. During the course of this research
effort a lot of improvements to harmonize the maritime legislation with maritime
politics have already been carried out, including the legislative initiative presented
by the President of Mexico and approved by the National Congress to reform the
country’s maritime legal framework and allow the shift of maritime safety and
security responsibility, as well as Port State Control from a civil authority (SCT)5
towards a military one (SEMAR)6, which entered into force on 17th June, 2017.
This maritime reform was recommended by the researcher in Paper 3 prior for its
approval. The reform transferred the control of all Harbour Masters, from SCT to
SEMAR, which set the SEMAR under structural organizational changes to cope
with its new responsibilities and duties. However, as discussed in Paper 4 of this
dissertation, the international legislation concerning the ISPS Code is not fully
enacted or adopted into national law, which limits the strategies of SEMAR to cope
with maritime security threats. Despite the extensive maritime reform that enter into
4

The SOLAS Convention is usually referred to as “SOLAS, 1974, as amended”. It is addressed as the
most important of all international conventions concerning the safety of merchant ships.
5 The Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, in English, and referred to as SCT here
thereafter.
6 The Secretariat of the Navy, Secretaría de Marina (SEMAR) in Spanish, and referred to as SEMAR
here thereafter.
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force in 2017, there is still an urgent need of new reforms to national legislation in
México, to include the part of the ISPS Code related to security of vessels, like
appointing of Ship Security Officers (SSO), development and approval of Ship
Security Assessments (SSA) and implementation and compliance of Ship Security
Plans (SSP), as explained in paper 4 of this dissertation. This research contribution
not only set light on the need of adequate security training of Port Security Officers
(PSO), Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) and port security authority
representatives from the CUMAR7, but also in the poor knowledge about the
maritime domain on the part of legislation drafters and the National Congress
representatives.
The poor performance of the previous Designated Authority (SCT) to comply with
its obligations under international Conventions from the IMO was documented by
the researcher in Paper 3, 4 and 5 from various perspectives. SEMAR has been
responsible for maritime security, including implementation and compliance of the
ISPS Code since the previous maritime reform of 21st April, 2014, when the
presidency of the CUMAR was transferred from Harbour Masters to the Admirals,
Commanders of the Navy sector, zone or region for the specific port. Their duties
included inspection, revision and approval of Port Security Assessments (PSA), Port
Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), Port Security Plans (PSP), and Port Facility
Security Plans (PFSP) at the appropriate maritime security levels. Due to absence
of cooperation between SCT and SEMAR, Harbour Masters did not explain or
comment on the changes to Admirals and representatives from the CUMAR, who’s
lack of knowledge and poor training, resulted in becoming unaware of their duties
and responsibilities due to these changes. Maritime and port security were left in a
vulnerable situation for a period of almost three years from 2014 to 2017, when the
last reform entered into force. These findings as well as poor development of PSA,
PFSA and PSP, PFSP are among the findings presented in Paper 5 of this doctoral
dissertation, which were discovered as a result of several research visits to different
ports in Mexico, where the five pillars of port and maritime security were
interviewed, including Harbour Masters; Commanders of the Mexican Navy and
functioning as Presidents of the CUMAR; Directors of Customs Maritime Units;
Commanders of the UNAPROP (Navy Unit for Port Protection with duties of Coast
Guard, Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria, in Spanish, represented with the
acronym UNAPROP, and called with this acronym here thereafter); Port
Administration Directors, Port Security Officers (PSO) and Port Facility Security
Officers (PFSO).

7

Centro Unificado para la Protección Maritíma y Portuaria and represented with the acronym
“CUMAR”, in Mexico, in Spanish and will be referred to as CUMAR here thereafter. It could be
translated to “Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security”, but there is no official translation.
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These serious findings thoroughly discussed in Paper 5, are central to the topic of
this doctoral dissertation. Another aspect is that due to the gravity of those findings,
the researcher decided to make a further effort to integrate action research to the
study in a determination to contribute improving port and maritime security in
Mexico.
In 2017 important solutions were implemented. ISPS Code related training was
provided to Commanders of the Navy, functioning as Presidents of the CUMAR
and Commanders of the UNAPROP, who were made aware of their duties and
responsibilities related to the ISPS Code first by the researcher and later directly by
the International Maritime Organization, upon requirement of the National
Maritime Authority, in México, SEMAR.
The National Maritime Authority implemented at all ports the transparent incidentreporting tool, developed by the researcher. This brought a significant improvement
on increasing reporting of incident security incidents and updating of incident
security records, increasing from zero to 57, during the first year of its
implementation; the redacted PSP and PFSP were requested and are under revision
by representatives of the CUMAR.
These actions implemented by the Maritime National Authority were to a certain
extent harmonized with the aim of this dissertation, which was first to contribute to
the maritime world by developing a tool that could be used to set up the strategies
at a macro level for building a national maritime security policy in any Contracting
State to the SOLAS Convention around the globe, and at the same time, improve
security incident reporting and incident investigation. Secondly, to implement it in
Mexico, testing its usability, improving it through systematic periodical
measurements to assist the referred country in this duty and offer it to the world.
This was achieved through several phases of research work, which included
examination of the national legal framework for port and maritime security related
to the enactment of the ISPS Code into national legislation; second, to analyse
current security threats at Mexican ports and oil terminals at port facilities and
finally; to contribute to the understanding of the value of reporting security incidents
and updating of security incident logs through the use of “action research” and the
implementation of the referred tool above.
Emphasis was also put in the value of reporting incidents classified as “serious,” as
well as results of security drills and exercises for reassessment of PSA/PFSA, with
the consequent amendments to PSP/PFSP, recalling that such changes must be
tested and updated accordingly to manage security threats and maintain the security
of the port at an acceptable level.
As mentioned in the abstract, this doctoral dissertation encompasses six (6)
introductory chapters referred to as the “kappa”, in addition to five (5) annexed
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papers, which are the result of research conducted over the last three years. Chapter
one contains this overall introduction to the research presented in this document. It
is followed by relevant background information presented in Chapter 2. Objectives
are presented in Chapter 3 while research methods and instruments used in this
research are explained in Chapter 4, followed by Chapter 5 presenting results and
findings. General discussion and conclusions are discussed in Chapter 6, including
future research directions.
Two of the annexed papers to this kappa have been published as book chapters, one
more was published in an international peer review journal, and two more were
published in an international journal. Another one has been submitted to another
international peer review journal and is currently under review.
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2. Frames of reference

The following subsections cover relevant background information to understand the
importance of this research and its contributions and provide the adequate context
to the objectives of this dissertation, which will be presented in Chapter 3. The
subsequent subsections present international legislation related to port and maritime
security, national legislation in Mexico related to the same topic, current threats to
port and maritime security for the case of Mexico and finally, the value of testing
and updating PFSP through sufficient security drills exercises and after assessment
of serious incidents.

2.1 International legislation for port and maritime
security
Maritime security has been defined as “the state of being free from the threat of
unlawful acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, or any other form of
violence against ships, crews, passengers, port facilities, offshore installations, and
other targets at sea or in coastal areas” by Mejia, (2007). As it is observed, port
security is incorporated to the different areas of maritime security. Under this
approach, port security can be understood as the state where a port facility, including
its terminals, personnel and all its related infrastructure, as terminal berths and
navigations channels, vessels at the port, its crew, passengers, service providers
during operations at the port, Customs Maritime Units and in general, customers of
the port, are free from any unlawful act of violence such as terrorism, sabotage,
armed robbery and illegal transportation of drugs and weapons among others.
A difference between “port security” and “maritime security” as two different study
areas is appointed for the purpose of this dissertation. However, even if both
concepts involve different type of risks or threats, in practice they are
interdependent. This research effort will mainly focus on the part of port security.
Among the lessons from the terror attack of September 11th, 2001 is that terrorist
are acquiring a higher level of training and coordination required for aviation and
maritime targets. Even if land-based infrastructure represents a higher security risk
and probability factor than terror attacks to the port industry as bomb threats or other
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scenarios like sinking a vessel in navigation channels, or using it as a weapon against
the port facility or oil terminals, among others, these are not impossible. Neither is
the fact of using the ship to smuggle drugs or weapons.
Jones (2012) argues that “port facilities are inherently vulnerable because they must
provide access by land and sea and because they are sprawling installations, often
close to population centres”. The referred author adds that smuggling of drugs,
contraband, weapons or other illegal products and goods is a well-established
security threat to shipping and highlights the inherent duty of the master to keep the
vessel free of illegal items, pointing out the importance of the relationship between
the charterer and the Port Facility Security Officer in safeguarding both the vessel
and the port facility. Where there is a suspicion of smuggled unlawful items onboard
the vessel, a search regime must be carried out.
To keep the port facility, including its berths and navigation channels on one side
and vessels on the other side, free of drugs and weapons is a shared responsibility
from the ship’s Master and the PFSO. The ISPS Code has addressed the risks of
smuggling items at the interface between the vessel and the port facility and
establishes the responsibilities and duties of each of the parts for these port
operations. However, cooperation between both sides is a prerequisite to achieve to
manage properly such situations.
Huge differences in security levels can be found at different ports even within the
same country. These differences in security are even more evident when studying
ports in different geographical areas. Non the less, some elements of physical
security must be included in general at all ports to comply with minimum
international standards concerning security measures established by the ISPS Code,
regardless of its location. The elements that must be considered in the development
of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP include an effective port perimeter security,
surveillance and patrols, as well as strict access controls by sea and land, Intruder
Detection System (IDS), CCTV systems to keep control over sensitive areas, metal
and explosives detectors and establishment of security procedures.
As Jones (2012) explains, “a port security regime also needs to be able to assess
the security implications of cargoes and shipments inside, or arriving at, the port.
This involves investing in X-Ray technology and scanners to pick up security
breaches such as people, drugs, explosives, radiation and illegal shipments”.
Considering that security risks can be reduced to an acceptable level through
implementation of security measures, but never be totally eliminated, the candidate
defines port security as the comprehensive set of security measures and instruments
implemented at a port, after security risks has been assessed appropriately,
continuously and systematically in relation to the port facility (including its
terminals, personnel, service providers, customers and all its related infrastructure)
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through security risks assessments, security drills, exercises and the fully
implementation of a security plan; to manage threats and mitigate results of security
incidents.
In reality, there is no port around the world that can claim to be 100 per cent free of
security threats and, therefore, it is necessary to have performed a PSA/PFSA and
have implemented a PSP or PFSP, for port terminals, with all its related procedures
and security measures to respond to security incidents and mitigate the results of
unlawful actions that threaten the security of ports, port terminals, personnel,
maritime customs facilities, vessels, and the public in general.

2.1.1 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code)
Concerning maritime security, one of the most important instruments of
international law is the set of maritime security regulations developed by the IMO,
after the tragic events of September 11th, 2001. These provisions were established
in Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention),
containing the ISPS Code. This Code is defined by the IMO as “the comprehensive
set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in
response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11
attacks in the United States” (International Maritime Organization, 2012). Whereas
part A of the Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory
(“recommended”) part B comprises guidelines about how to comply with the
mandatory requirements of part A.
Paper 3 of this dissertation makes it clear that the ISPS Code “only apply to
passenger ships, high speed passenger vessels and cargo vessels of 500 gross
tonnage and upwards; as well as Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in
transit and at ports (but not to fixed and floating platforms and MODUs on the oil
field); and all type of port facilities serving vessels offered for international
voyages”. It is also explained in Paper 3, that, “the extent to which the guidelines
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its cargo and number of
passengers, as well as its sailings routes and the features of the port of or port
facilities visited by that specific ship. Regarding the application of guidelines to port
facilities, it will depend on the type of carriages and vessels visiting that particular
facility and its ordinary trading routes”.
The mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code, describes that contracting governments
have to appoint the Designated Authority to carry out certain maritime security
duties/responsibilities established in the Code. This Designated Authority holds the
responsibility of setting Maritime Security Levels and ensuring compliance with the
maritime security measures at all ports (where the ISPS Code apply) through the
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PSA and PFSA; the revision, approval and control of compliance of the PSP and
PFSP, which shall be based upon the PSA and the PFSA. The development of
PSP/PFSP is also within the responsibilities of the PSO/PFSO. The PSO/PFSO must
identify critical assets within the port when developing the PSA, and plan for
adequate security measures to meet specific needs in case of security incidents.
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels: Security Level 1
(normal) requires the minimum protective security measures at all times. Security
Level 2, which requires additional protective security measures for the specific
period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened and Security Level
3, which requires specific protective security measures which shall last only for a
limited period of time when risk for a security incident is probable or imminent,
even when it is not possible to identify the target. Security Level 3 involves the
strictest security measures and its priority is the security of the port, port facilities,
vessels and society that may be affected by a security incident and may result in the
suspension of commercial operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred
to the government or other organizations responsible for dealing with significant
incidents (International Maritime Organization, 2012).
K. Christopher (2009) describes the PFSP as:
“The plan developed to ensure the application of security measures designed to
protect the port facility and its serving vessels or those vessels interfacing with the
facility, their cargoes, and persons on board at the respective MARSEC levels”.
Christopher correctly points out that the PFSP is the cornerstone for the construction
of the port’s security program and includes personnel and physical security systems
and processes, access control, security force management and vessel and cargo
operations. He emphasizes the need to develop contingency and emergency
operations plans and to work efficiently with the federal agencies, port authorities
and private enterprises in coordinating both routine and emergency response
mechanisms. According to the IMO Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code
(2012), threat Level 1 is considered to be “background”, threat level 2 is considered
to be “moderate” and threat level 3 is considered as “high”.
However, governments can authorize a Recognized Security Organization (RSO)
outside the government to carry out part of their responsibilities regarding the
Maritime Security Measures.
Never the less, the level of delegating security duties to RSOs is limited to
performance of PSA/PFSA (which must be approved by the government); approval
of SSP and subsequent amendments, but only in the case that that specific RSO has
not been involved in the development and implementation of the Ship Security Plan;
as well as guidance and assistance on security issues, including advices related to
SSAs, SSPs, PFSPs and PFSAs. The verification and issuance of the Statement of
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Compliance (SOC) for port facilities and International Ship Security Certificates
(ISSC) that comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code are responsibilities of
the Designated Authority.
Governments are not allowed to delegate the setting of security levels to RSOs. The
setting of security levels according to the ISPS Code focuses on the alert for the
perceived risk of terrorism attacks, but governments may include other type of
threats in their risk evaluation like armed robbery against vessels and platforms.
Security levels apply both to ships sailing over their territorial sea and port facilities.
The governments can decide on the implementation of different security levels for
different ports, port facilities and different areas of their territorial waters. However,
the change of security levels must be clearly communicated to port, port facilities
and vessels attempting to call that port or port facilities and vessels in transit or
attempting to transit those areas.
Other duties which governments are not allowed to delegate to RSOs include the
establishment of requirements for the Declaration of Security (DoS); determining
the type of port facilities that must appoint a PFSO as well as those facilities that
must develop and implement the PSP/PFSP; authorization of PSA/PFSA and
amendments, approval of PSP/PFSP and amendments; exercise of control of
compliance of security measures of ships with flags from other SOLAS signatory
states, and issuance of security certificates to personnel on board ships for
compliance of requirements of the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) Convention
and the STCW Code.
The ISPS Code does not apply to offshore activities. Instead, the IMO has left it up
to SOLAS contracting Governments to decide whether to extend its application to
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) and to fixed and floating oil platforms,
located in the Continental Shelf. Some Governments with high level of offshore
activities related to oil and gas exploration and production have developed their own
regulations extending the application of the ISPS Code security measures to vessels
engaged in offshore activities, MODUs on location and to fixed and floating
platforms. In addition, “when foreign-flagged ships are engaged in offshore supply
or support activities on a State’s Continental Shelf, they can be covered by both, the
requirements of the Maritime Security Measures and any additional requirement set
by the coastal state” (International Maritime Organization, 2012).
In this particular subject a significant case is the model adopted by Brazil, which
extended the application of the ISPS Code to MODUs and vessels engaged in
offshore activities. By 31st July, 2009, and through national regulations with specific
guidelines established by CONPORTOS, the Code (adapted) also applies to vessels
doing cabotage and support operations to MODUs, according to the Direction of
Ports and Coasts of the Ministry of Defence, Marine of Brazil.
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Concerning security for oil platforms, the Brazilian government, under national law,
launched a series of special regulations adapted from the ISPS Code, where fixed
and floating platforms located in the Continental Shelf have been treated as port
facilities and are required, in practice, to adopt the Maritime Security measures
applied to port facilities as the appointment of a PFSO, the development of PFSA
and the consequent implementation of PFSP. This facilities, as well as the MODUs
on location and vessels that under international law are not required to comply with
the ISPS Code requirements, do not get their certification in direct accordance with
the ISPS Code; instead, they get issued a “Security Certificate” with the observation
that it is only accepted in their national territory and not valid for international travel
or operations at other nations, as established under NORMAM 01/DPC related to
“Naval Craft Used at the Open Sea8” and NORMAM 08/DPC related to “Traffic
and Permanence of Naval Craft in Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters”.
Regrettably, the ISPS Code is mainly focused on terrorism and leaves up to each
government to determine the extent to which PSO/PFSO/SSO shall reflect threats
related to armed robbery; drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and the
security of dangerous goods, into the evaluation of risks in the PSA/PFSA/SSA and
their consequent implementation into the respective security plans (International
Maritime Organization, 2012). However, for many countries these are threats with
a much higher probability factor of occurrence than terror attacks.
Raymond & Morrien (2009), criticize that the ISPS Code was sold on the misleading
premises that it would fundamentally address the threat of terrorism to the shipping
industry; which according to them was not achieved, neither was this set of
regulations able to support the shipping industry regarding other type of security
challenges as armed robbery and traffic of humans and drugs at sea.
Certainly, the ISPS Code focuses on terrorism and leaves up to each government to
determine the extent to which this instrument applies to threats related to armed
robbery, drug smuggling, stowaways and illegal migration; but, the security
measures established in the Code implicitly cover these areas. If there is a
framework created by security measures including access control and monitoring,
restricted security areas, strict control of unauthorized persons, fencing, lightening
and CCTV monitoring the perimeter area of the port facility, together with intruder
detection sensors, X-Ray cargo screening, boat patrolling sea waterways, combined
with floating waterside barriers to protect waterborne access to docks, vessels and
in general to the harbour area and, if necessary, underwater detection and monitoring
with security trained divers for underwater surveillance and inspections of vessels
and the docking area; these should be sufficient to keep port facilities free of drugs,
weapons, stowaways and unlawful items.
8

EmbarcacionesEmbarcações Empregadas na Navegação em Mar Aberto, in Portugese.
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2.1.2 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watch keeping for Seafarers, 1978
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch
keeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW Convention), is another international
convention with important provisions regarding port and maritime security. It was
adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 April 1984 is also extremely
important concerning training for both, safety and security. And according to the
IMO, the main purpose of this Convention is to promote safety of life and property
at sea and the protection of the marine environment by establishing international
standards of training, certification and watch keeping for seafarers. The Manila
amendments to the STCW Convention and the Code were adopted on 25th June
2010, marking a major revision of both, the Convention and STCW Code.
The 2010 Manila Amendments include, among other things, measures to prevent
fraudulent practices related to the expedition of certificates of competency and
strengthen the evaluation process and new requirements related to training in
modern technology such as electronic charts information systems (ECDIS) and
Dynamic Positioning Systems; as well as marine environment awareness training
and training in leadership and teamwork; updating of competence requirements for
employees serving on board all types of tankers, including new requirements for
personnel serving on liquefied gas tankers and for personnel serving on board ships
operating in polar waters; and provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly trained
to cope with a situation where their ship comes under attack by pirates (International
Maritime Organization, 2015).
The set of regulations about training standards for seafarers contained in the
Convention are reinforced by sections in the STCW Code, from which Part A is
mandatory, while Part B contains recommended guidance to help contracting
governments to implement the Convention. The minimum requirements of training
concerning security awareness are established in Section A-VI/6, paragraph 4 of the
STCW Code. The minimum standards of competence required for seagoing
personnel are presented in detail in a series of tables. The measures, suggested in
Part B, are non-mandatory and the examples given are intended to explain how some
particular Convention requirements may be complied with. However, the
recommended guidance represents a harmonized approach between IMO and other
international organizations.
It is important to highlight that there are several areas of the STCW Code that
overlap with some provisions of the ISM Code, as well as the ISPS Code. Adequate
competence and training are areas addressed in the STCW Code, the ISM Code, and
the ISPS Code. The concepts of maritime safety and security involve competent and
sufficient crew/personnel for the respective vessel, port and port facility (port
terminal).
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2.1.3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, (SUA Convention), Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), as well as its Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf are other instruments to deal with terrorism and activities associated with
terrorism in the Continental Shelf. The SUA Convention and the Protocol relating
to Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf were adopted on March 10th
1988; and entered into force on March 1st 1992. The SUA Convention and the
Protocol were revised in 2005, when the 2005 Protocol was added, after being
adopted on October 14th 2005 and which entered into force on July 28th 2010. A
total of 166 countries members of the IMO have ratified the SUA Convention of
1988 and 154 ratified the corresponding SUA Protocol of 1988. However, by March
20th. 2018, only 42 countries around the globe have ratified the SUA 2005
Convention, from which only 36 ratified the 2005 protocol (International Maritime
Organization, 2018).
The ISPS Code is complemented by the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol,
“providing a legal basis for the arrest, detention and extradition of terrorist in the
event of a terrorist attack against shipping” as explained by Jones (2012).
In the case of Mexico, the SUA Convention 1988 and its Protocol was ratified.
However, the Mexican authorities have yet to ratify the SUA Convention 2005 and
Protocols 2005. This is a gap between international and national legislation that
must be revised by the Mexican authorities.

2.1.4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) &
Port State Control
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is the
comprehensive regime of law and order that regulates the oceans and seas of the
world in the international jurisdiction, establishing rules for the governance of all
uses of oceans and their natural resources. The Convention entered into force on 16
November 1994 and it is globally recognized as the international regime dealing
with all subjects related to the law of the sea, such as delimitation, environmental
control, economic and commercial activities in international waters and the
settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters, among others. It encompasses 320
articles and nine annexes (United Nations, 1982).
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The importance of the UNCLOS in relation to port and maritime security is
associated to some of its articles dealing with Port State Control (PSC) and
international criminal activities. Port State Control can be described as the exercise
of the right of protection of the coastal state, as established in Article 25 of
UNCLOS. The international IMO Conventions; such as SOLAS, including the ISPS
Code, STCW and MARPOL 1973, as amended9 amongst others, provide the basis
for carrying out inspections of foreign ships in national ports under PSC.
The primary obligation to ensure effective implementation and compliance with
IMO requirements lies with the flag state, through flag state implementation, but
simultaneously the concept of PSC provides a "safety net" to prevent substandard
ships from entering/leaving the port (International Maritime Organization). Article
94 of UNCLOS establishes the duties of the flag State, requiring that:
“Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag”. Provision 3 of this article
reads as follows: “Every state shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as
are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: (b) the manning of
ships, labour conditions and the training of crews [including security
requirements], taking into account the applicable international instruments [ISPS
Code]”. Provision 5 of this Article requires each State “to conform to generally
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps
which may be necessary to secure their observance”.
Through Resolution A.1052(27) adopted on 30 November, 2011, the IMO launched
the new procedures for Port State Control (2011) that established guidelines for
carrying out inspections under PSC. These guidelines were issued to update them,
considering the amendments to IMO instruments, which had entered into force or
become effective since the adoption of previous PSC resolutions. PSC procedures
establish that vessels larger than 500 tons are subject to inspection of a valid
International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) on board, as required by the ISPS
Code.
In cases where there are “clear grounds” for believing that the ship does not comply
with the requirements of Part A of the ISPS Code (when inspecting security
matters), further control measures shall be imposed, such as inspection, delaying or
detention of the ship and restriction of operations within the port or even expulsion
from the port, following the established in Regulation XI-2/9.1 (which applies to
control of ships in port) and Regulation XI-2/9.2 (which applies to control measures
to ensure compliance to ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting
9

It is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, with Protocol
1978 (MARPOL), it covers prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from
operational or accidental causes (International Maritime Organization, 2018).
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Government and introduces a totally different concept of control that applies to
security only) of the SOLAS Convention. These regulations are established in the
ISPS Code, Part B through sections 4.29 - 4.46 about “Control and Compliance
Measures”.
Currently there are nine (9) regional agreements about the implementation of PSC
(Memoranda of Understanding, MoUs). Among these agreements is the Latin
American one (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar). At present this MoU encompasses
cooperation between Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras Mexico, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay (Official
Website of the Latin American Agreement of Viña del Mar). The Annual Report on
Port State Control for the year 2016 in relation to the Latin American Agreement
reveals that the highest number of deficiencies discovered through application of
PSC in the region corresponds to Brazil with 1,432; from this number 940 were
rectified, equal to 65.64% success rate. According to the same source, Colombia
was the State member with the highest level of success, with 81.94 % with respect
to 454 of deficiencies discovered, from which 372 were rectified. In the case of
Mexico, there is a rather poor level of resolution (37.65%), with 85 deficiencies
discovered through PSC, from which only 32 were effectively corrected.
Another relevant article from UNCLOS and associated to port and maritime security
and directly or indirectly to PSC is Article 108, dealing with Illicit traffic of narcotic
drugs or psychotropic substances. This Article reads as follows:
“All States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international
conventions. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying
its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may
request the cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic”.

This provision is especially important in the case of Mexico, due to the fact that the
highest number of port security incidents during the implementation of the
“transparent port security incident reporting tool”, through this research effort,
involved confiscation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as presented
in Paper 5.
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2.2 National legislation in Mexico for port and maritime
security
To understand the evolution of maritime legislation in Mexico, it is necessary to
comprehend the development of the maritime transport in the country and the
changes of its control among governmental institutions. Therefore, a brief
introduction of the maritime realm in Mexico is presented below.

2.2.1 Evolution of the maritime realm in Mexico
Mexico has experienced a period of extreme violence during last decades when
“extortion payments” by Port Directors, concessionaries and port terminals
operators to members of the organized crime to avoid damage to their installations,
started, as denounced by the Federal Deputy from the Deputy Chamber of the
Federal Congress, LXII Legislature, Germán Pacheco Díaz, before the National
Parliament, Chamber of Deputies on 5th of November, 2013, (Cámara de Diputados
del Honorable Congreso de la Unión, LXII Legislatura , 2013).
This resulted in the reorganization of maritime and port security in the country,
reforms to several laws and the approval of new regulations since 2014, including
the Law of Ports10, the regulation of the CUMAR and the Law of Navigation and
Maritime Trade11, amongst others. Additionally, the creation of the UNAPROP(s)
was decided. Later, on 3rd March, 2016 the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña
Nieto presented a legislative initiative to reform, add and derogate diverse
provisions of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration12, Law of
Navigation and Maritime Trade and the Law of Ports to transfer the control,
inspection, vigilance and other activities related to the merchant marine and the
maritime industry, including Harbour Masters and the National Maritime Authority
from a civil authority (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR), but excluding port
development and its administration. This legislative initiative was approved by the
National Congress without any change and published as a decree on the Official
Diary of the Federation and called DOF here thereafter 13 on 19th December, 2016.
The decree establishes the new attributions of SEMAR, which entered into force on
17th June, 2017.
The then President “Don Porfirio Díaz” (1876-1911), instigated the development of
the maritime industry in Mexico with the construction of ports as Veracruz,
10

Ley de Puertos, in Spanish.
Ley de Navegación y Comercio Marítimos, in Spanish.
12 Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal, in Spanish.
13 Diario Oficial de la Federación, in Spanish and represented with the acronym DOF.
11
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Tampico, Coatzacoalcos, Manzanillo and Salina Cruz, as explained in a chronicle
written by the National Congress about the development of the Mexican Merchant
Marine. The maritime economic vision of Porfirio Diaz was truncated with the
Mexican Revolution and recommenced during the government of General Manuel
Avila Camacho, with the creation of the SEMAR, in 1940. During the government
of Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez together with Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, as the Secretary
of SEMAR, started the first maritime industrial program, called “Towards the Sea”,
which had the goal of the integration of a national maritime and port network;
exploit the maritime resources; transfer population from the cities to the coast;
establish shipyards and finally; develop the merchant marine.
According to historical records, until 1976 the SEMAR kept control of ports and the
merchant marine; but in 1977 the then President José López Portillo (1976-1982)
reformed the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, allocating to the
SCT all activities related to the development and promotion of merchant marine, as
well as the construction of port infrastructure and its respective administration and
operation, including port and maritime security. As a part of this reform, it was also
integrated into the SCT the National Commission for Coordination of Ports, the
escrow for port and maritime equipment; the port services enterprises, the escrow
for the Nautical Merchant School and the pilot service. It is also necessary to
highlight that Lopez Portillo consolidated the tanker fleet and established the four
biggest shipyards in the country: Veracruz, Mazatlán, Guaymas and Ensenada.
However, naval crafts, including patrol vessels, helicopters and other associated
equipment were left to the Navy (SEMAR). SCT and particularly the Harbour
Masters, never received the necessary human and material resources to exercise its
authority in a satisfactory manner regarding its functions and duties related to
maritime safety and security, port state control and inspection of vessels, port
facilities and port terminals. In 2017, almost 40 years later, these functions were
reallocated to the authorities of the SEMAR.

2.2.2 Port & maritime security legislation in Mexico
The IMO communicates via its web site the information that 35 different countries
located in the American Continent have signed and ratified the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; Mexico is included in the
aforementioned group. Thus, Mexico, as Contracting Government to the SOLAS
1974 Convention, which includes Chapter XI-2 concerning special measures to
enhance maritime security, and Regulation XI-2/3 that enshrines the International
Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), must fully enact the ISPS Code
into national legislation.
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The ISPS Code was implemented by Mexico since it entered into force in July 2004.
Later it was integrated into national law through the Regulation of the CUMAR,
which was published in the DOF on April 21st 2014 and is comprised of 21 articles.
Its object is to regulate the organization and operation of the CUMAR, which is
responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code.
The ISPS Code applies to 16 Federal Integrated Port Administrations (FIPA) in
Mexico, which operate under concessions given by the SCT and are the following:
Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Dos Bocas, Progreso,
Ensenada, Guaymas, Topolobampo, Mazatlán, Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo, Lázaro
Cárdenas, Salina Cruz y Puerto Madero, (Secretariat of Communications and
Transport, 2016).
As explained before, there are three different security levels: Security Level 1
(normal); Security Level 2, (which requires additional protective security measures
for a specific period of time) and; Security Level 3, (which requires specific
protective security measures). In Mexico, it is the CUMAR which is responsible to
ensure implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code at all security levels, as
established in the Law of Ports, Article 19 TER and is responsible for decisionmaking, coordination and execution of all security operations under Security Level
3. The commander of the Naval Military Zone (from SEMAR) of each jurisdiction
where a CUMAR is established, shall be appointed as the Chairman of that
respective CUMAR, as established in provision 8 of the CUMAR’s Regulation
published on the DOF on 21st April, 2014. This provision adds that the Harbour
Master (which now belongs to SEMAR), shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman
of the CUMAR, plus three employees of each of these institutions, who shall be
selected as advisers. A CUMAR shall be established at each of the 16 ports (FIPAs)
designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage or receiving vessels trading
in international traffic, according to Provision 6 of the referred regulation.
Contrariwise, the Law of Ports Article 19 BIS, establishes that the CUMAR is a
group of inter institutional coordination between the SEMAR and the SCT for the
application and compliance of the ISPS Code. However, since the Harbour Master’s
authority figure has been transferred from SCT to SEMAR, the application of this
“inter institutional character” must be reassessed, as discussed in Paper 4 of this
dissertation. Article 19 TER, paragraph II of this law highlights that “the CUMAR
shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework of the
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code and ensure
the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of the respective three
security levels”. This is part of the maritime security reforms that took effect on
April 21st 2014. But because of lack of knowledge about the reform itself, the
SEMAR did not fully exercise its authority and the Harbour Masters, which under
this reform relinquishes the chairmanship of this operative organ to the Commander
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of the Navy Military Zone from SEMAR, were still erroneously recognized as the
authority by PFSOs and port agencies until 2017. The CUMAR is responsible for
the revision and approval of the PSA and PFSA, which covers the security risks
evaluation for ports or port facilities, which shall be the base for developing the PSP
or PFSP, which then, shall be submitted for revision and approval to the CUMAR.
Once the Plan is approved, the Designated Authority (SEMAR from June 2017 and
SCT before that) must verify its implementation and compliance through the
CUMAR and issue the Statement of Compliance (SOC), which shall not exceed five
years.
The responsible person for developing the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP is the PSO or
PFSO, including compliance of all requirements established in the ISPS Code and
reflected in the PSP/PFSP as training, exercises, practices, inspections audits and
modifications via formalised procedures to the plan.
As established in Paper 3, PSO/PFSO must attend security incidents and keep
incident security records updated, which must be considered in the risk evaluation
and integrated into the security plan to achieve a constant reduction of risks and the
continuous improvement of port and maritime security. The CUMAR shall verify
among other aspects, that security incidents are properly recorded in the security
incidents register and even if it is the UNICAPAM (Unit of Harbour Masters and
Maritime Affairs)14 from SEMAR, the responsible institution for the issuance of
certification of security plans, the CUMAR is responsible for its approval and the
organ that must instruct to UNICAPAM (after the last maritime reform) the issuance
of the respective certificate. This, due to the established in the Law of Ports, Article
19 TER, which as explained before, says that the CUMAR is the responsible for
control and compliance of the ISPS Code and co-responsible for the revision and
approval of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP, according to its Regulation, Article 7,
paragraph II, which reads as follows:
“[CUMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime and port
security, previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose the
necessary modifications and updating to those plans”. Paragraph III of this article,
adds that, once the plan has been approved, the CUMAR shall participate in the
verification and control of compliance of plans ensuring its effective
implementation.
This means, from a strict judicial perspective, that all current certificates of
approved PSP and PFSP and even Ship Security Plans (SSP) not originally approved
by the CUMAR and issued directly by the SCT were not issued in accordance to the
juridical procedures. As mentioned before, the CUMAR representatives did not
14

Unidad de Capitanías de Puerto y Asuntos Marítimos, in Spanish and represented with the
acronym UNICAPAM.
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understand their duties and responsibilities, which were practically ignored and
most PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP were approved directly by FIDENA15 and the
certificates issued by the previous National Maritime Authority, SCT, without
following the established legal procedures concerning approval by the CUMAR.
The SCT renewed an agreement with FIDENA on 7th March, 2013, to practically
allow them operate as a Recognized Security Organization (RSO) and delegate
some functions of the Designated Authority, including the revision and approval of
PSA and PFSA, as well as the audits and verification of its implementation, without
taking into consideration the established in the Law of Ports and the Regulation of
the CUMAR, concerning the responsibilities of the CUMAR. Moreover, the validity
of this agreement between the SCT and FIDENA can also be questionable, since the
Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, Article 16, third paragraph,
establishes that “the agreements through which attributions are delegated to other
administrative organs must be published in the DOF”. This agreement, which has a
hypothetical validity of six years and expires in 2019, was never published in the
DOF.
Therefore, the validity of Statements of Compliance of Mexican Ports should be
revised concerning the issuance´s procedures, under a strict juridical perspective.
Unfortunately, the majority of ports and terminals in Mexico are facing this
situation. Vessels calling to ports that do not hold a valid SOC should not be able
to call to American or European ports, due to their strict regulations. However, since
the legality of such SOCs and ISSCs has not been evaluated yet, there has not been
recorded any problem in respect of Mexican vessels calling on American ports or
the case were American or European ports denied entrance to vessels that have
previously conducted loading and unloading operations at Mexican ports.
Vessels that do not hold a valid ISSC or that report in the Advance Notice of Arrival
(ANA form) or Advance Notice of Arrival and Departure (ANAD form, for the
United States of America) to have previously performed operations at ports or
terminals that do not comply with the ISPS Code, may be denied entrance to ports
and port facilities that fully comply with the ISPS Code requirements, through PSC
inspections for that particular port. The last 10 calls at port facilities at which the
ship conducted a ship-port interface must be reported in the ANA/ANAD when
vessels attempt to call a port.
Consequently, the implementation of a national program for recertification of
compliance with the ISPS Code at Mexican ports and vessels to which this

15

Fideicomiso de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional, in
Spanish, in Mexico (Fund of Education and Training for the National Merchant Marine, in
English, own translation).
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international regulation applies is critically urgent, to avoid possible and severe
international and economic consequences.
Accordingly with the CUMAR’s regulation and until this law provisions change,
SEMAR must instruct the CUMARs to perform an extensive revision and approval
of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP at all ports in the country, and instruct/advise to
UNICAPAM the issuance of the respective certificates and SOCs, and do it properly
according to current procedures established by law.

2.2.3 The maritime reform of 2017 that transferred Harbour Masters
from SCT to SEMAR
This legislative initiative was presented on 3rd March, 2016, by the current
President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto before the Chamber of Senators of the
National Congress to reform the country’s legal framework and allow the shift of
maritime safety and security responsibility, as well as port state control from a civil
authority (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR). Additionally, to improve the
level of maritime safety and security at sea at all ports, as well as in the Mexican
ocean territory. It also covered the control change of all Harbour Masters, from SCT
to SEMAR. It was approved by the National Congress without any change and
published as a decree on the DOF on 19th December, 2016; establishing the new
attributions of the SEMAR, which entered into force after 180 “natural days” of its
publication in the DOF, on 17th June, 2017.
As described in Paper 4 of this dissertation, the initiative emphasized the
convenience of defining one National Maritime Authority to be able to comply with
the national and international obligations, and the need to limit and redistribute the
attributions that both SEMAR and SCT actually exercise. However, after the
reform, several duties and responsibilities are shared and the amendments do not
specify clearly enough the change from SCT to SEMAR, creating a duality of some
serious attributions concerning the existence of only one entity to represent the
country before international organizations for the negotiations of international
treaties, and executing its obligations derived of such international conventions.
Whereas SEMAR is the “Maritime National Authority” concerning maritime safety
and security; SCT was also appointed as the “Maritime National Authority” for ports
and its economic development. Additionally, it is attributed to SCT the “port
authority”.
The legislative initiative stressed that the SEMAR as an institution of the Federal
Public Administration currently has the human and material resources necessary to
comply amongst other attributions, with the exercise of the national sovereignty and
authority in the Mexican marine zones; guarantee the compliance of the port and
maritime national legal framework; protect the maritime and fluvial traffic;
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intervene in the prevention and control of marine pollution; and safeguard human
life at sea, “without prejudice of the attributions that correspond to SCT in the area
of merchant marine”.
The initiative, which was approved without any change, has several ambiguities.
The reform to the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade empowers both, the
SEMAR and the SCT to represent the country in the negotiations with international
conventions in the maritime realm; and to be the executor organ and its interpreter
in the administrative sphere with respect to the attributions that according to this
law, to each of them corresponds. It précises that Harbour Masters are transferred
to SEMAR, redistributing the attributions that they currently have, leaving uniquely
to SCT those related with the regulation, organization and administration of the
merchant marine and economic administration and development of ports.
In summary, the reform provides attributions to SEMAR to approve and issue the
licenses for passenger & tourism maritime transport services with small boats;
authorize the vessels to bear away and bear off as well as customs clearance; flag
and register of vessels, administrate the national registers both, of maritime crew
and ships; inspect and verify national and foreign vessels; the compliance of
international conventions as well as national legislation and official Mexican norms
related to maritime safety and security; safeguard human life at sea and the
prevention of marine pollution; the imposition of sanctions; as well as appointing
and removing Harbour Masters. Whereas it confirms SCT to continue leading the
administration of ports, stimulate port development, training and control of
merchant marine; construction of port infrastructure and ocean dredging, maritime
and fluvial passages; development of the maritime industry; concessions,
permissions and maritime fees and in general, all maritime business related to
productive activity generator of economic resources. Another inconsistency is that
it will be the SCT which will be the responsible institution for planning, formulating
and conducting the political programs for the development of water transport and
the merchant marine and which will regulate and verify that the pilot service is
offered in a safe and efficient form. The pilot service is an important part of maritime
safety and security; often, it is the pilot as the first person on board who can
determine if the vessel represents a risk for safety/security of ports. Currently in
Mexico vessel inspections are performed at the dock in the ports, while it is
recommended to carry this activity in the 12 to 24 mile Contiguous Zone. With the
reform, the resources of SEMAR can allow Harbour Masters to comply with their
obligations as established by law.
The reform modifies Article 7 of the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade and
establishes that the “National Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal
Executive Power through SEMAR for the exercise of national sovereignty;
maritime safety and security; as well as the Right of the State to be applied in the
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marine Mexican zones; all this without prejudice to the attributions that correspond
to other institutions. Concerning areas related to the merchant marine, the authorities
are:
I.
II.
III.

"Both, the SCT and the SEMAR according to their respective attributions;
Master Mariners of Mexican vessels; and
The Mexican consul abroad, authorized at the port or place where the vessel
that requires the authority intervention is required for the effect that the
referred law determines”.

Supporting this provision, the law decree reforms Article 8 of the Law of Navigation
and Maritime Trade establishing the new attributions of the SCT, without prejudice
of other institutions that belong to the Federal Public Administration. These
attributions are:
I.
II.

III.
IV.
V.

VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.
X.
XI.

48

"To plan, formulate and conduct policies and programs for the development
of water transport of the merchant marine and national ports respecting the
provisions established in this law and other juridical provisions applicable;
To represent the country in the negotiations in international treaties in the
maritime domain respecting the attributions that conforming to this law
corresponds, being the executor of them and its interpreter in the
administrative sphere;
To keep the Maritime National Public Register;
To integrate the statistical information of the maritime merchant transport;
To grant permissions and authorization of navigation to offer services in the
general passages of water communication, as well as verifying its
compliance, revocation or suspension of them if necessary, in the case of
major naval craft;
To organize, regulate and offer services of control of navigation at the ports
and anchoring area.
To regulate and oversee that the pilot service is offered both safely and
efficiently and according to this Law and its Regulation;
To organize, promote and regulate the education and training of marine
merchant’s personnel, as well as granting certificates of competence in the
terms of this law and its regulation, vigil its compliance and revoke or
suspend them, in cases when necessary;
Participate with the SEMAR in safety of navigation and safeguard human
life at sea;
Establish in coordination with SEMAR, the port security measures that
must apply the CUMAR, conforming to the settled in the Law of Ports;
Establish terms and regulations for the fees of maritime services in national
territory including coastal and fluvial waters, when in the opinion of the

XII.
XIII.

XIV.
XV.

Federal Commission of Economic Competition, where conditions for an
effective competition do not exist.
To apply for the intervention of the Secretariat of Economy, when assuming
the existence of international commercial practices breaching the national
legislation with respect to foreign trade as well as international treaties;
To apply for the intervention of the Federal Commission of Economic
Competition, when assuming the existence of practices that breach the
Federal Law of Economic Competition, as well as assisting in the respective
investigation;
To impose sanctions for breaches to this law and its regulations and current
international treaties in the areas that correspond to this order;
Other provisions from other laws and regulations juridical applicable”.

The decree also reforms Article 8 BIS of the referred Law to establish the new
attributions of the SEMAR, without prejudice of other institutions that belong to the
Federal Public Administration. These attributions are:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.

"To flag and register the Mexican vessels and naval artefacts;
Certify navigation days, issue the sea ledgers and identify the maritime
personnel sailing of the Mexican merchant marine;
Oversee that the general communication of water passages and navigation
comply with the safety conditions and maritime signalling;
Oversee the safety of navigation and safeguard human life at sea;
Organise, regulate and, if necessary, offer services to help the navigation
and maritime radio communication;
Inspect and certify the Mexican vessels for compliance with the
international treaties, national legislation, regulations and other Mexican
norms in the area of safety navigation and human life at sea as prevention
of marine pollution from ships;
Inspect foreign vessels and naval craft, conforming to the established in
international treaties;
Grant authorisation of inspectors as physical persons to perform the
verification and certification of compliance of international treaties and the
applicable national legislation, keeping supervision over such persons;
Establish and organize a body of vigilance, safety and help for the
navigation in fluvial waters;
Carry out investigations and proceedings as well as designing experts
professionally empowered in the area and terms of the respective regulation
to emit dictates concerning maritime and fluvial accidents and incidents;
Help in the boundaries of competence with the labour authority for the
compliance of resolutions maritime conflicts of labour nature;
Impose sanctions for breaches to this Law and its Regulation, as well as
current international treaties in the terms corresponding to this provision;
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XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.

XIX.

Appoint and remove Harbour Masters;
Establish and coordinate with the SCT, the maritime security measures that
shall apply the CUMAR, conforming to the established in the Law of Ports;
Direct, organize and carry out the search and rescue for safeguard of human
life at sea in the maritime Mexican zones, as well as coordinating help and
rescue in the case of accidents and incidents of vessels and port installations;
Integrate the statistical information of accidents in the marine Mexican
zones;
Administrate the national registers of sea crew and vessels, conforming to
the established in the respective regulation;
Represent the country in the negotiations of international treaties in the
maritime area, with respect to the attributions that conforming to this Law
correspond; and being the executor organ of such treaties and its interpreter
in the administrative sphere;
Other provisions from other laws and regulations juridical applicable”.

Concerning Fraction XIV of this Article, it is important to recall that according to
the Law of Ports Article 19 BIS, the CUMAR is a group of inter institutional
coordination between SEMAR and SCT. This part was not amended with the
reform. However, since SEMAR will have the control of both, Harbour Masters and
the CUMAR itself; the “inter institutional character” of this group should be reevaluated to analyse to which extent the inter institutional coordination is necessary.
As described in Paper 4 of this dissertation, SCT kept the control of FIDENA, which
in practice has some functions of a RSO. It is the authorized institution for giving
the courses 18.1 (PFSO course), 18.2 (personnel with specific security duties) and
18.3 (rest of port facility personnel) concerning the ISPS Code, and in practice, since
2004, it has been the only authorized institution for performing PSA and PFSA and
erroneously, performing the respective approval’s revision of PSA/PFSA, as well
as inspections and audits for approval of PSP and PFSP [and also the part concerning
vessels], which should had been conducted by the CUMARs. Until 2017 there was
no regulation dealing with Recognized Security Organizations. Consequently, there
was no RSO operating in Mexico. Because of the lack of exercise of its authority,
on the part of SEMAR and the CUMARs at each port, FIDENA is also executing
the annual inspections to revise compliance with PSP/PFSP.
These duties are responsibility of the CUMARs, as established in Article 12 -17 of
its Regulation, where it is clear that the CUMAR is responsible for revision of
PSA/PFSA and to make modifications when necessary, also to the PSP/PFSP. All
these revisions, inspections and audits that should have been performed by the
CUMAR and in international practice are free of charge, since these obligations
provided by the National Maritime Authority, were performed and economically
charged by FIDENA to port and terminal operators.
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After the extensive reform of 2016, concerns have been expressed about the validity
of the “inter institutional character” of the CUMAR, due to this, SCT has demanded
representatives in the CUMAR. But, as discussed previously, the Regulation of the
CUMAR, Article 8 establishes very clearly how it shall be constituted. The
Commander of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where a CUMAR is
established shall be appointed as the Chairman of that respective CUMAR, while
the Harbour Master shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman, plus three employees
of each of these institutions [the Navy and the Harbour Master], who shall be
selected as advisers. Currently both belong to SEMAR and therefore SCT is out of
the CUMAR.
On the one hand, with the reform, the Article 8 of the CUMAR’s regulation is not
harmonized with the “inter institutional character” of Article 19 of the Law of Ports.
On the other hand, if they include representatives from SCT to the CUMAR, it
contravenes the specifications of Article 8 of the Regulation of the CUMAR about
how it shall be constituted. In both cases the constitution of the CUMAR might be
declared invalid.
Yet, SCT argues that because of the inter institutional character between SCT and
SEMAR, the conformation of the current CUMAR is unacceptable, while SEMAR
refuses to include SCT in this organ. Therefore, in practice, the CUMAR has not
been fully operating after the last reform either. To clarify these aspects,
coordination between these two institutions is still necessary.
The CUMAR is currently performing the responsibilities of a Port Security
Committee (PSC)16, which is a committee recommended by the ISPS Code to
coordinate security procedures and measures. Under the CUMAR is also established
the Port Security Advisory Committee, which is integrated by the CUMAR,
UNAPROP, customs and immigration authorities operating at the port; as well as
management of the port operator and port terminals; municipal and regional
authorities with interests in that specific port or jurisdiction.
The UNAPROP, which currently functions as coast guard, is under the control of
the Commander of the navy zone at each port, who is the President of the CUMAR.
However, as recommended in paper 4 and appended to this dissertation, the duties
and responsibilities of the UNAPROP should be evaluated and confirmed. This unit
currently has duties of a port and maritime police and its main function is the
security of vessels (in territorial waters and those flagging the Mexican flag), ports
and port facilities. According to UNAPROP’s guidelines concerning duties and
responsibilities, in addition to port security; this unit is responsible for control and
16

This is also an ambiguity of IMO, which established the same acronym for both, Port Security
Committee (PSC) and for Port State Control (PSC). Therefore, when referring to the Port Security
Committee in this dissertation, it will be called by its full name.
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compliance of the ISPS Code at the port and port terminals. But this document it’s
not clear enough with respect to its duties and responsibilities under the CUMAR.
The development of rules/protocols with specific and concrete duties for the
UNAPROP is examined in Paper 4.The recommended duties for this unit are as
follows:
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Revision and control to ensure all maritime ports and port facilities are
operating with an updated and valid Statement of Compliance (SOC).
Revision and control that all ports and terminals have employed a certified
PSO/PFSO with an updated and valid certificate.
Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals with
security duties have been certified with the necessary training concerning
the required course 18.2 as established in the ISPS Code.
Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals without
specific security duties have been certified with the necessary training
concerning the required course 18.3 as established in the ISPS Code.
Develop and keep the official register of maritime security incidents for that
specific port.
Revise and control that all PSO/PFSO keep updated their own register for
reporting maritime security incidents.
Participate in the revision and analysis of PSA and PFSA (for terminals).
Participate in the inspections for approval of PSA and PFSA (for terminals).
Participate in the revision and analysis of PSP/PFSP and make observations
for necessary modifications to those plans.
Participate in inspections and audits to verify the implementation of
PSP/PFSP before the issuance of the SOC.
Carry out random inspections onsite and general inspections to verify the
compliance of PSP/PFSP during the validity period of SOCs, including the
inspection areas concerning documents and records; access control;
restricted area access control; availability and maintenance of security
equipment; training for security equipment; handling of cargo; delivery of
ship’s stores and bunkers; security procedures for monitoring security
vulnerabilities acknowledged in the PSP/PFSP; procedures for threats and
security incidents; security and communications; internal audits and
amendments to PSP/PFSP; procedures for shore leave and visits to the ship;
procedures for the interface between the ship and terminals related to ship
security activities; evacuation procedures and the security procedures for
protecting the PSP/PFSP from unauthorized persons and handling of

•
•
•
•

security information. All these points with specific procedures for each of
the three maritime security levels (1, 2 and 3).
Plan, coordinate and carry out security exercises (level 3) at a minimum
interval of once per annum with a maximum of 18 months intervals.
Participate in the evaluation of security exercises (level 3).
Participate and make the necessary observation for the external security
audit, which shall be performed with a minimum interval of once a year.
Develop and keep updated the register of approved PSA/PFSA; PSP/PFSP;
drills, exercises; inspections and other relevant operations for availability to
IMO, in the case of mandatory audits.

The agreement number 039 was published on 31st of March, 2014 in the DOF, for
the creation and activation of 19 UNAPROPs at the maritime ports of Ensenada
(B.C.N.); La Paz (B.C.S.); Guaymas (Sonora), Mazatlán (Sinaloa); Puerto Vallarta
(Jalisco); Manzanillo (Colima); Lazaro Cárdenas (Michoacán); Acapulco
(Guerrero); Salina Cruz (Oaxaca); Puerto Chiapas (Chiapas); Matamoros, Altamira
and Tampico (Tamaulipas); Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Veracruz); Dos
Bocas (Tabasco); Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche); and finally Progreso (Yucatán).
However, from these 19 authorized UNAPROPs only 14 have been created and
activated. It lacks its activation at the ports of La Paz, Puerto Vallarta, Matamoros
and Dos Bocas. This last port also lacks the official creation of the CUMAR! This
means that since the creation of the CUMAR, there has not been any authority
performing port security duties and control of compliance with the ISPS Code at the
Port of Dos Bocas, in which there are located some of the most important and
vulnerable terminals involved with handling hydrocarbon resources.
The CUMAR and respective UNAPROP should also be created at the Federal
Integrated Port Administration (FIPA) of Topolobampo and the State-owned Port
Administration of Cozumel as well as at ports with Integrated Port Administrations
from the National Board of Tourism17 at Cabo San Lucas and Huatulco, due to the
type of operations of these ports and its importance concerning security inspections;
since most of their operations are related to passenger transport and the cruise vessel
industry, which could represent a target for terrorist groups.
A terror attack against a ferry that transported passengers and mainly foreigner
tourists occurred on February 21st 2018, when the ferry arrived at the Cozumel port
facility from Playa del Carmen, both close to Cancun (Sputnik, 2018). The referred
source pointed out that the explosion left 18 persons seriously injured and that more
explosives ready to be detonated were found by Federal Authorities of Mexico on
March 1st in another ferry at the same port facility. The Embassy of the United States
17

Fondo Nacional de Turismo, and represented with the acronym FONATUR, in Spanish.
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of America stated that the event was a terror attack and recommended American
tourists to avoid travelling to that destination. Thus, it is recommended to extend the
application of the ISPS Code to ferries of less than 500GRT sailing in main national
touristic routes, which might be a target for terrorist organizations.
As mentioned in Paper 4, due to the lack of resources at the Harbour Masters offices,
vessel inspections are currently performed at the dock in the ports of Mexico, which
for safety and security reasons, should be done preferably outside, in the open ocean,
between 12 and 24 miles in the Contiguous Zone. To allow Harbour Masters to
comply with their obligations as established by law, the SEMAR should evaluate to
allocate to them some of the interceptor-patrols they already have or assess the
acquisition of some additional Ocean Patrol Vessel(s) Defender II, which is a
relatively small naval vessel designed to perform coastal defence duties, but large
and seaworthy enough to patrol offshore areas in the open ocean. Another option is
to allocate interceptor patrols to the UNAPROP at least at the four hub ports of
Manzanillo, Lázaro Cárdenas, Altamira and Veracruz; and also Ciudad del Carmen
which encompasses the offshore area of Campeche, where the oil exploration and
production zone is located; performing joint inspections between Harbour Masters
and the UNAPROP, in a way that, inspectors belonging to Harbour Masters perform
the verification of required certifications, and if necessary, registers, machinery,
lightening, communication, and navigation equipment, anti-fire systems, life boats
and marine insurances; among other aspects, while the UNAPROP may perform the
inspection for issues related to the ISPS Code.

2.2.4 The decree about safety & security zones for navigation and over
flight in the surroundings of offshore installations
The decree on the agreement for the establishment of safety and security zones for
navigation and over flight in the surroundings of offshore installations, and integral
and sustainable exploitation of fishery and aquaculture resources in Mexican marine
areas, is another recently published ruling worthy to discuss. This ruling was
presented by the current President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto and published in
the DOF on 11th October 2016. The decree has a direct impact in maritime safety
and security around the oil platforms located at the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of
Mexico and vessels conducting loading and unloading operations at the area.
This decree changed the provisions also established by another decree published on
the DOF on 11th September 2003, where it established safety and security measures
for the offshore area of Campeche. This decree established that in the “Prevention
Areas” no activity would be allowed, excepting those related to oil exploration and
production; but permitted the fast and uninterrupted traffic of fishery vessels en
route to their fishing areas located outside the exclusion areas. The traffic of naval
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vessels and aircraft entering the zones was controlled. On the other hand, it did not
permit all naval traffic or aircraft, including fishing vessels, in the “Exclusion
Areas”, excepting those required by the platforms. In addition the decree also
required the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board aircraft and vessels
transiting in the prevention and exclusion areas already in 2003.
These provisions were derogated with the purpose of increasing the productivity of
the country and reactivating the economy of those provinces, with the new decree
published in the DOF on 11th October, 2016; and which entered in force already the
day after its publication, on 12th October, 2016. It was decided and published
without conducting any risk assessment on the impact of such decision concerning
maritime safety and security. Article 1 of the new ruling established a “Security and
Safety Zone” in the surroundings of oil drills, platforms and other installations for
oil exploration, extraction and operation in the Mexican marine zones an area of
“500 metres from its external border”; where it will only be allowed the traffic of
vessels and aircraft required for the operation of such installations.
It also established a “Security and Safety Zone” of 5,500 metres in the surroundings
of hydrocarbon’s export areas as the oil operation buoys or floating units for oil
production, warehousing, charge and discharge; to preserve the manoeuvres of
conduction, mooring, unmooring and bearing off of tankers authorized to access
them; whereas the anchorage of transiting vessels not related to the activities of oil
exploitation and production will only be allowed at 2,500 meters of distance from
oil installations.
Article 2 of this new decree establishes that areas located outside the “Security and
Safety Zone” referred to in Article 1 and where installations exist for oil exploration
and extraction of hydrocarbons of submarine type; such as marine oil heads, cables
or pipelines; shall not be used for anchorage, but only navigation. It adds that
activities regulated in the General Law of Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture
and other provisions deriving therefrom, can be made at a distance of 1,000 meters
from these facilities, with the exception of trawling. This ruling says that only in the
case of emergency when safety of human life at sea or the ship itself is in danger,
will be allowed the access to these “Security and Safety Zones”, previous
authorisation of that particular installation. It emphasizes that naval craft, including
small vessels transiting in the surroundings of such “Security and Safety Zones”,
shall have the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board at all times, while
the fishing vessels shall have the System for Localization and Monitoring of Fishing
Vessels.
Article 4 of this ruling states that it will be the SCT and the SEMAR, the institutions
responsible to establish the navigation rules applicable to these areas to avoid
maritime accidents and incidents with the tankers that regularly operate in the zone,
stressing that, “the fishing vessels shall not hinder the traffic of any tanker sailing
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in the marine passages, but that it will not be forbidden to fish in the sea roadways
or marine passage areas”.
Even though the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, establishes that it shall be
the coastal State member, who determines the total extension of security zones,
having in mind the applicable international regulations, concerning the rule of
minimum 500 metres for exclusion areas from the artificial islands and offshore
installations; it is priority to make a study on how such decision will affect maritime
safety and security of offshore installations and operations. Piratical acts against oil
platforms located in the Gulf of Mexico increased after the security zone was
reduced to 500 metres from its external border, as discussed in the next section of
this dissertation.

2.3 Current security threats at Mexican ports
This part includes identified security threats to port facilities, oil terminals and oil
platforms located in the Continental Shelf. Unlawful actions related to theft of
hydrocarbons represent a security threat not only for the affected oil terminal, but
also for the whole port facility and even for the whole community and marine
environment of the port, in the case of explosions caused by such crimes. However,
this risk will be assessed from a strict security perspective, including the risk of
hiring personnel that passes confidential information to criminal organizations,
leaving out risks connected to safety and marine environment. It is important to
highlight that the Government has not been able to determine how much oil or oil
products have been stolen from the different oil facilities, including port terminals.
This part is based on port security incidents, which were documented in Paper 2, 3
and Paper 5.
These are the reasons and justification for one of the recommendations to the
Government of Mexico discussed in Paper 4, which is to extend the application of
the ISPS Code to offshore activities, including mobile offshore drilling units on
location and to fixed and floating platforms by defining them as port facilities and
extending all the requirements of maritime security measures required to port
facilities under the ISPS Code; as the appointment of PFSO, the development of
PFSA and the implementation of PFSP.

2.3.1 Security threats related to port oil terminals
Mexico faces large security challenges regarding the security of oil production, its
transportation, commercialization and maritime infrastructure, even though the
importance of the oil industry as the major source of income for the social
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expenditure. In spite of hundreds of soldiers and navy workers, protecting the
refineries, oil terminals and other important oil installations, the theft of oil products
continues to increase through illegal connections to oil terminals, oil pipelines and
the theft of oil tanker lorries that transport diesel and gasoline in the country.
As one of several measures to fight corruption, Mexico established in 2002 the
Federal Institute of Access to the Information and Protection of Data (Instituto de
Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos, in Spanish and represented with the
acronym IFAI), which in May 2012, changed name to the National Institute of
Transparency, Access to the Information and Protection of Personal Data (Instituto
Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos
Personales in Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI (called here
thereafter with this acronym), to comply with the provisions of the new General
Law of Transparency also promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that
information from public institutions and all public or private persons that receive
and operate money from the federal budget or national resources shall be open to
the public scrutiny and the exceptions where information cannot be public to protect
the national security. It also establishes that the INAI must organize the applications
and send them forward to the respective institution or authority and the time limit
for the delivery of information.
Exercising this right of information, an application with number 1857200255715
and dated on October 10th, 2015, was sent to the INAI to request some information
from Pemex, which included several questions regarding the security and
economical aspect of theft, robbery and smuggling of hydrocarbons. Among other
data, it was requested statistics about tons/litres of hydrocarbons that has been stolen
from oil facilities from 2000 to 2015; the number of illegal connections discovered
and employees or ex-employees that had been arrested for participating in the theft
of hydrocarbons; as well as the level of education and expertise of these.
On 29th October, 2015, Pemex sent the requested information by email through the
INAI with the answer marked with register number SISI 1857200255715. The
document only included figures for 2014 and up to October 27th 2015. However it
did not include the information about the academic level of education and expertise
of the employees that have been involved in theft of hydrocarbons. This was
considered crucial information by the researcher since a very high level of education
and training is required to make the illegal connections to pipelines and to
disconnect valuable equipment from abandoned oil platforms.
As presented in Paper 2 of this dissertation, the number of legal claims and number
of litres of crude oil recovered from the crime organizations for 2014 is also offered
in table 1 below; while figures for the year 2015 are presented in Table 2. However,
the tables do not include the amount of stolen oil not recovered by the federal police.
As it can be observed in table 1 below, it is the province of Tamaulipas, where one
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of the biggest oil port terminals from Pemex is located, in the Port of Tampico,
which reports the highest number of theft of hydrocarbons.
Table 1
Number of litres of crude oil stolen, 201418
Legal claims for theft of crude oil after federal entity, 2014
Federal Entity

Nr. of Legal Claims

Nr of litres recovered

Mexico, DF

1

20,000

Mexico State

3

64,780

Guanajuato

4

80,000

Hidalgo

2

17,556

Jalisco

1

24

Oaxaca

1

76,702

Puebla

3

45,274

Queretaro

1

35,127

Tamaulipas

4

2,327,443

Tlaxcala

1

27,000

Veracruz

2

31,000

TOTAL

23

2,724,906

Table 2
Number of litres of crude oil stolen 2015
Legal claims for theft of crude oil after federal entity, 2015
Federal Entity

Nr. of Legal Claims

Nr of litres recovered

Aguascalientes

1

200

Jalisco

1

57,654

Puebla

3

33,094

Tamaulipas

4

72,000

Tlaxcala

1

40,000

Veracruz

1

29,640

TOTAL

11

232,588

The number of Pemex employees or ex-employees legally prosecuted for crimes
relating theft of hydrocarbons for both 2014 and 2015 is presented in table 3, while
figures of illegal connections to Pemex’s pipelines discovered and disconnected
during the years 2014 and 2015 (up to October 27th 2015) are presented in Table 4.

18

Tables 1 and 2 were elaborated with data received from the application of information to the INAI
number 1857200255715. Several of these tables are also presented in Paper 2.
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Table 3
Pemex employees prosecuted for theft of hydrocarbons, 2014-201519
Pemex’s employees or ex-employees arrested for crimes involving theft of hydrocarbons
2014

2015

Persons arrested and prosecuted before a Court of Justice

5

6

Persons condemned with absolute sentence to jail

1

0

TOTAL

6

6

Table 4
Number of illegal connections to Pemex's pipelines discovered, 2014-1015
Illegal connections (IC) to Pemex’s pipelines discovered
Year

Quantity of Illegal Connections

2014

3,635

2015

4,298

In another official document with number SISI 1857200171515; Pemex informed
the number of employees and ex-employees investigated for theft of hydrocarbons
during the years 2006-2015; this is illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5
Number of employees/ex-employees investigated for theft of hydrocarbons per year. Period 2006-2015. Source Pemex
answer to INAI, SISI 1857200171515
Nr. of Employees and ex-employees involved and investigated
in theft of hydrocarbons 2006-2015
Year
Nr. of employees investigated for theft of
Nr. of ex-employees investigated for theft of
hydrocarbons
hydrocarbons

19

2006

10

0

2007

7

3

2008

19

0

2009

10

0

2010

14

2

2011

5

2

2012

11

2

2013

15

1

2014

33

1

2015

12

1

TOTAL

136

12

Table 3 and 4 are elaborated with data received from the application of information to the INAI
number 1857200255715.

59

Table 6
Number of employees arrested theft of hydrocarbons by working division. Source Pemex’s answer to INAI, SISI
1857200171515
Nr. of employees & ex-employees arrested for of hydrocarbons 2006-2015
Year
Department
Nr. of Employees & ex-employees
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

TOTAL

Pemex Oil Refining

14

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals
Pemex Exploration and Production

0
2

Pemex Petrochemicals

1

Pemex Oil Refining

9

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

2

Pemex Exploration and Production

1

Pemex Petrochemicals
Pemex Oil Refining

0
12

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

1

Pemex Exploration and Production

1

Pemex Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Oil Refining
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

9
1

Pemex Exploration and Production

4

Pemex Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Oil Refining

5

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

1

Pemex Exploration and Production
Pemex Petrochemicals

8
0

Pemex Oil Refining

2

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Exploration and Production

7

Pemex Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Oil Refining
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

8
0

Pemex Exploration and Production

2

Pemex Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Oil Refining

13

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals
Pemex Exploration and Production

0
0

Pemex Petrochemicals

3

Pemex Oil Refining

6

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

0

Pemex Exploration and Production

1

Pemex Petrochemicals
Pemex Oil Refining

0
3

Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals

1

Pemex Exploration and Production

4

Pemex Petrochemicals

2

123

Table 6 above presents also the data of table 5, regarding number of employees and ex-employees investigated for
theft of hydrocarbons during the years 2006-2015, but by division to which they were working at Pemex. Figures for
other type of crimes committed by Pemex employees are presented in table 7.
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Table 7
Pemex's employees investigated for other crimes, 2006-201520
Pemex’s employees investigated for other crimes (2006-2015)
Crime

Nr. of employees

Possession of Cocaine

9

Possession of Cannabis

25

Falsification of company’s card

1

Possession/bearing of fire arms

7

Violence with weapons

8

Explosion Threat
Theft of production material, ferric material, working tools, machinery, cable, pipes,
car parts, cooper and cranes among other Pemex’s property items.

1

Murder

1

115

Kidnapping

2

Corruption regarding employment of staff

4

Improper (unmoral) Behaviour at work

2

Psychotropic medicine drugs

1

Stealing other employees properties

4

Falsification of fuel tickets

1

Car accident

1

Fraud

1

Attack/assault & Violence

2

Being member of the “Z” narcotic organization

1

Alcohol at work

3

TOTAL

189

During the period 2006-2015, 136 employees from Pemex have been investigated
in relation to theft of hydrocarbons. Likewise several employees were arrested and
put under investigation for other type of crimes including possession of cocaine at
work installations, cannabis, and falsification of company’s card, terror attempts
and murder (SISI1857200171515).

2.3.2 Criminal acts in relation to oil platforms located in the
continental shelf
The definition of piracy established in UNCLOS Article 101, provides several
conditions for what is to be considered piracy. These conditions include that the
incident must involve violence, detention or depredation; that it must occur on the
20

Elaborated with information from Pemex’s answer to the INAI, SISI 1857200171515
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high seas, in other words, outside the jurisdiction of any nation; that it must be
following private ends (economic motives); and finally, that it must be committed
on board a ship and “against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State”, as subsection a (ii) of the referred article reads.
Following this definition, acts of armed robbery against oil platforms located in the
Continental Shelf of Mexico and within its territorial waters or national jurisdiction
are not considered piracy, but unlawful acts with piratical elements. Jones (2006),
criticize the UNCLOS definition and particularly the restrictive factor of the high
seas, arguing that based on reports from IMO member States, most of pirate attacks
take place within territorial waters or while the ship is on a berth or at anchor, which
creates uncertainty about the piracy data registers might slow the juridical process
against perpetrators. The referred author highlights the following definition adopted
by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for acts of piracy:
“An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft
or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of
that act”.

The IMB’s piracy definition does not restrict the pirate attack to the high seas, but
on the contrary to the one established by UNCLOS, they restrict it to be against a
“ship”, leaving out elements like “aircraft, persons or property” covered in the
UNCLOS definition. This means that under the IMB’s definition piratical acts
against an oil platform are not considered piracy either (oil rigs/platforms are not
ships), even when the location factor is irrelevant and involves territorial waters.
Additionally, the piracy definition provided by the IMB does not require that the
pirate attack must be committed for private ends, since it refers to theft or any crime,
as opposite to the UNCLOS definition. Thus, an attack against a ship for political
or terrorist motivations would not qualify as piracy under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea but it would point towards that direction under
the IMB’s piracy definition.
However, piratical acts against oil platforms located in the Continental Shelf are
criminal activities that put in distress the security of offshore installations. The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention), was complemented with the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, 1988, which extended the requirements of the SUA Convention
to fixed platforms, as those used in the oil and gas industry for offshore operations.
Its last Protocol was adopted on 14 October 2005; with entry into force on 28 July
2010 (International Maritime Organization). It is the most important international
regulation concerning unlawful acts against fixed platforms offshore. However it
has been critisized by several authors, as Mejia (2007) who wrote “The
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Convention´s Title refers to unlawful acts but foes not provide a generic characterto
the offenses it identifies; it ostensibly purports to combat terrorism at sea and yet
fails to define it”.
Therefore it is necessary to improve the security of this type of critical infrastructure
in Mexico. According to reports about security incidents and damages to marine oil
platforms for the year 2016, from Pemex, and provided by one of the research
participants, the number of security incidents against oil platforms increased in
2016, as presented in figures 1, 2 and 3.

2
2

1

1

2

2

1
1
1
4

January

April

July

August

7

7

September

Illustration 1 Security incidents at oil platforms January-September 2016, area of Tabasco by month

Oil Marine Platform

2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Tsimin-A
Akal-H Satelite
Akal-Mb Satelite
Ku C Perforación
Chuc-B Satelite
Manik-A Satelite
Akal Ciny
Akal-N…
Akal-N…
Akal-R Satelite
Balam-Te Satelite
C.P. Akal-N
Chac-A Satelite
Edificio…
Nohoch-C…
Akal-J…
May-A Satelite
Olg Yaxche-…
Sinan-D Satelite
Terminal…
Tsimin-B
Tsimin-B Satelite
Tsimin-C
Xanab-A Satelite
Xux-A Satelite
Xux-B Satelite

3

Illustration 2 Security incidents at oil platforms, January-September 2016, area of Tabasco by oil facility
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equipment

Vandalism

1
1
1
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Unauthorized
access to platforms

2
Other
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Illustration 3 Security incidents at oil platforms January-September 2016, area of Tabasco, by type of incident

Regarding the category of Robbery, it refers to equipment for the system of closing
of wells, and specifically, tubing, cabling, battery banks, lifeboats and equipment to
prevent or against fire. Vandalism is used when there was no robbery but only
destruction of equipment and part of the installations like doors and looks;
Unauthorized Access refers to the introduction of civilians without authorization to
the platforms that when they see personnel from the company the intruders threat
them and leave.
Besides, one of the reported incidents at the platform MANIK-A included the
unauthorized access of persons armed with machete, which resulted with the few
crew on board rescued by helicopters, while at platform ETKAL-101 in addition to
several fire prevention equipment, a lifeboat was also stolen.
They also explained that 65 per cent of reported incidents occurred within the
Tisimin Xux area and 25 per cent in the area of the oil field Cantarel, specifically
100 percent of these to the platform Akal-N. It can also be observed that 70 per cent
of the incidents have occurred at satellite platforms; that 80 per cent of the incidents
have occurred during the months of July (65%) and August (15%). It is also
reflected that 70% of the security incidents are produced by robbery, while 30% are
connected to unauthorized access of civilians at the marine platforms.
Jones (2006) classifies piracy in the following types, but specifically against vessels:
•
•
•
•
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“Opportunistic Crime (OC)
Low Level Armed Robbery (LLAR)
Medium Level Armed Assault and Robbery (MLAAR)
Major Criminal Hi-jack (MCHJ)”

If Jones’s classification is applied to the type of incidents that are registered against
Pemex’s oil platforms located in the Gulf of Mexico, it would be LLAR were
perpetrators, considered as “simply petty criminals” use high-speed boats and
weapons to board the vessel, and as long as the ship’s crew “do not act harshly, they
would not be in too much danger”. Other incidents also fall in the type of MLAAR,
were the “attack is often meticulously planned. Experienced seafarers and a mixture
of criminal elements are often involved. They come together to form formidable
pirate gangs. There is a very high risk of injury or death for innocent seafarers
(…)”.
On the other hand, the type of incidents that fall in the MLAAR type are those where
the lifeboat was stolen, since to launch this kind of naval craft requires a high degree
of training, as well as those of stolen heliports and valuable operative equipment,
which require the use of bigger craft to be transported and special expertise to be
disconnected from the rest of equipment.

Illustration 4 Cuts to monitors and fire prevention equipment
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The document about the incident’s report for Pemex oil platforms, specify that the
possible consequences of such crimes are the following: a significant reduction in
oil production caused by closing of wells; extensive damage to the marine
environment caused by oil pollution, casualties and loss of life caused by over-press.

2.3.3 Security threats related to ports and port facilities in general
Diverse documented security incidents at ports and port facilities are presented and
analysed in Paper 3 and Paper 5 of this dissertation. The analysis is made on the
bases of the requirements and specifications of the ISPS Code, presented in section
2.1.1 of this dissertation.
The methodology for paper 3, included a questionnaire about the ISPS Code
implementation, security incidents and incident reporting, sent through the INAI to
Port Directors of nine different ports located in the Gulf of Mexico. However, to
each of the specific questions about security incidents concerning armed attacks for
robbery at the port/port facility; confiscation and smuggling of weapons and drugs
or other dangerous restricted substances in the cargo; cargo theft at the port/ port
facility; theft of material and other items or machinery on the part of employees,
property of the port/ port facility; personnel working under the effects of drugs and
psychotropic substances; situations of vandalism and sabotage; and kidnapping of
port/terminal personnel, with the exception of one port, where a weapon was
confiscated, the respondents from the other eight ports and Pemex terminals replied
that there has never been any security incident of that nature. This significantly
differs from the findings of the document analysis through Google, presented in
paper 3 annexed to this dissertation.
On the other hand, security incidents and threats to ports, port facilities, oil terminals
and their personnel documented in Paper 3 and 5, included transport of drugs and
psychotropic material in cargo transported in vessels, which varied from the
confiscation of more than eleven tons of cocaine, significant amount of weapons,
confiscation of stolen crude oil transported in large tankers, kidnapping of port
personnel, Armed attack against an oceanic patrol from the Mexican Navy, illegal
traffic of stolen hydrocarbons, and inclusive plundering of marine oil platforms
where it was stolen a whole heliport.
Furthermore, Paper 5 presents a deep analysis of security incidents documented
throughout the year 2017 with the establishment of the “transparent port security
incident reporting tool” developed by the researcher. The records illustrate the high
risk of smuggling of weapons, drugs and illegal items.
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2.4 The value of incident reporting and updating of
PSA/PFSA & PSP/PFSP
The value of incident reporting and keeping updated incident security records in
relation to the assessment of security threats and risks (PSA/PFSA) and its
implementation to PSPs/PFSPs relies on the fact that security incident reports are
the foundation for the evaluation of threats.
From this approach, if a security incident that was not considered earlier in the
development of the PSA/PFSA, such assessments must be re-evaluated integrating
this incident and updating security plans with the necessary amendments in
accordance to the results of such re-evaluation. This is extremely valuable because
it allows the continual improvement of security plans, as it should be, since ports
and port facilities are subjects to constant changes and therefore the evaluation of
security measures and plans must also be constant, accordingly.
As highlighted in Paper 3 of this dissertation, “the analysis of security incidents’
root causes is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of the PFSP, but if a
new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary. Therefore it is crucial
to keep security incident records updated”, recalling that the ISPS Code has been
designed to counter terrorism, drug smuggling, and cargo theft, among other crimes,
establishing an international cooperation framework between most of the
governments of the world, its government’s agencies and the shipping industry to
detect security threats, as emphasized by Christopher, (2009).
As mentioned before, the IMO left to signatory governments of SOLAS the decision
to extend the application of maritime security measures derived from the ISPS Code
to subjects related to piracy; drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and the
security of dangerous goods. However, for the case of Mexico, these types of threat
have a higher factor of probability of occurrence, as presented in Paper 5 annexed
to this dissertation. Under this approach these types of security incidents are
included in a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”, which is also
presented in paper 5, developed by the researcher and implemented at all ports in
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National Maritime Authority, through
UNICAPAM, from SEMAR.
This instrument included a series of incident security codes related not only to
terrorism, but also to armed robbery, armed attacks against security personnel from
ports and port terminals, drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration;
unauthorized access and the security of dangerous goods among others. By applying
this instrument to all Mexican ports through the official channel of SEMAR and the
CUMARs and UNAPROPs at the different ports, Mexico is automatically extending
the application of the ISPS Code to this type of security threats.
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The application of this instrument demonstrated in a real case through “action
research,” the contributions of this tool to improve incident reporting, incident
investigation, PFSA and PFSP, as the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were
carried out every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incident reporting
instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results show a significant improvement
in reporting security incidents in the country, increasing from zero to 57, some of
them considered very serious, during the first year of this tool implementation. In
addition, 56% of the reported maritime incidents were associated with
recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and to be considered for
improvement of PFSP.
Furthermore, the use of this tool provided PFSO with accurate information and
evidence material from security incidents, which facilitated the re-evaluation of
threats; proving that reporting security incidents is the key not only for reassessment of PFSA and modifications to PFSP but also for effective incident
investigation and strengthening of port security awareness.

2.5 Summary
The ISPS Code represents a structural change in port and maritime security
management and should be seen as a basic framework for port and maritime
security, and international cooperation, covering specific standardised security
measures. Unfortunately and despite the increase of terrorist attacks and piracy, the
implementation of a “security culture”, including implementation and compliance
of the ISPS Code has not yet reached the level achieved by the institutionalisation,
application and operation of the “safety culture” in the shipping industry. It is also
important to note that security is closely related to safety; a serious security incident
would put at risk the safety of the whole port, its infrastructure and personnel.
Certain SOLAS Contracting States will need to make further regulations, related to
the implementation of the ISPS Code for port and maritime security, giving special
focus to security challenges that affect most their territory, like armed robbery to
port and port terminals; drug smuggling; and illegal migration, for the case of
Mexico.
Other Contracting States, including Mexico, will have to make further regulations
and a deeper risk evaluation of the threats threatening their territorial waters and
other maritime installations, concerning subjects related to armed robbery on
offshore installations, theft of hydrocarbons, and illegal transport of stolen
hydrocarbons.

68

Contracting States are free to extend all or some of the ISPS Code requirements to
other type of vessels than those SOLAS-class ships and port facilities addressed by
the Code; and to impose greater security measures on vessels and port facilities
concerning traffic of drugs and people, but respecting the provisions of other
international treaties. The authorities cannot carry this out unilaterally.
Governments need to involve not only the shipping industry, but all stakeholders
involved, including seamen and crew organizations in order to help them understand
that port and maritime security is a responsibility of everyone involved in the
maritime realm, including, ship owners, crews, port administration, port terminal
operators, its whole personnel, service providers, customers and even the society of
the communities in which they are operating, which may contribute by informing
port security authorities of suspect items or activities around the port.
The integration of everyone in the process of strengthening port and maritime
security will ensure continuous, effective and satisfactory commercial operations.
Authorities from neighbouring countries could also be involved in this process to
strengthen an open international cooperation neutralizing the fear of violence of
sovereignty rights for the States, especially in consideration that terror actions
against offshore and port facilities located close to the border lines may result in
extensive environmental and economic damage for both nations.
Yet, it may be argued that an international harmonisation of the implementation of
the Code is desired to ensure international cooperation between Contracting States;
in that case States will be free to enforce greater security measures than those
established in the ISPS Code, if the protection of port facilities and sea waters in
their country requires that. In this process, they must also procure efficient and
continuous commercial operations at ports, and respect the provisions of other
applicable international treaties, for example those that are protected by diplomatic
principles. It is important to stress that this international set of regulations allows
for differences in the implementation and compliance regarding the implementation
of greater security measures than those established in the ISPS Code, but not less.
This is to ensure the harmonisation of the rules to the minimum level established by
the Code.
Finally, the main instruments and key concepts related to port and maritime security
are addressed in the ISPS Code. If these are efficiently implemented according to
the principles, provisions and guidelines established by the same Code; its
compliance is verified systematically; and they are updated in accordance with new
security threats, they are good enough to ensure the security of port facilities, vessels
and territorial sea waters, to an acceptable risk level.
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3. Research objectives

As stated in the introduction, the aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the
maritime world by developing an instrument that can be used to set up the strategies
at a macro level for building a national maritime security policy in any Contracting
State to the SOLAS Convention around the globe, and at the same time improve
security incident reporting and incident investigation. The development of this
instrument is under the context of the maritime and particularly, port security
situation of Mexico, but with application to other regions of the world facing similar
security threats, as smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal goods, theft of
hydrocarbons, dissemination of port security classified information, unauthorized
persons in port and seaways restricted areas, and misuse of access identity cards,
among others.
As a part of this, another aim of this research effort is to study the current situation
of maritime security and particularly port security in Mexico, including a critical
analysis of the national legal framework for port and maritime security related to
the enactment of the ISPS Code into national legislation in Mexico; as well as the
current security threats at Mexican ports and port facilities. Additionally, this
research intends to contribute to the understanding of the value of reporting security
incidents, and updating of security incident logs, by taking into consideration those
security incidents classified as “serious,” results of security drills and exercises for
reassessment of PFSA/PSA, with the consequent amendments to PFSP/PSP. It is
important to recall that such changes must be tested and updated accordingly to
manage security threats and maintain the security of the port at an acceptable level.
This, to develop an analytical transparent incident-reporting tool useful not only for
updating of Port Facility Security Assessments and respective Security Plans, but
also, to provide official security incidents investigators with all the necessary
information to investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures
that could prevent the re-occurrence of such incident. This Instrument can also be
used to establish the necessary strategies to develop a national maritime security
policy. The goal is also to implement this instrument in Mexico, helping the State
to improve maritime and in particular port security, testing it through action research
and improving it in the process, to finally offer it to other regions of the world that
might benefit from it.
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As Mejia (2007) pointed out, “one of the many challenges facing policy makers is
the lack of useful tools for the multilevel analysis of the security seascape [port
facilities in our case] to facilitate the identification of problem areas and the
formulation of appropriate, perhaps even proactive, actions plans”. The author
referred to Schröder (2005) to highlight the paucity in tools available for assessing
and managing risk in maritime security. It is important to recall that under his
approach maritime security covers port security, which means the extension of the
problem to the port security area as well. Currently, the tools used in port security
are developed for application at an operational level for port facilities and not at a
national level. This tool will provide the State with crucial information at a macro
level that can be used to set up the strategy for developing a national maritime
security policy.
Based on these goals, the general research objectives are developed and presented
in this section with the specific objectives of each of the annexed papers.

3.1 General research objectives
As mentioned previously, this doctoral dissertation intends to contribute to
improving maritime and port security worldwide by developing an instrument
useful to set up the strategies to build a national maritime security policy. To do this,
it is a prerequisite to understand the legal framework of the State where it will be
implemented, as well as security threats for that particular Nation; Mexico, in this
case, studying the level of compliance with the ISPS Code by the Mexican
government, both from a legal and practical perspective.
From the legal perspective, it attempts to identify the legal gaps between
international and national legislation in relation to the enactment of the ISPS Code,
and its harmonization in national law to allow full compliance from all actors
involved.
From the practical perspective, it strives to identify threats to port security, including
oil terminals as well as oil platforms; improve the development of PSA/PFSA AND
PSP/PFSP, increasing the focus on security incident-reporting and security incident
investigation by extending the application of the ISPS Code to both:
1) MODUs on location, fixed and floating oil platforms through the development of
national regulations by defining these type of offshore installations as “port
facilities” to be covered by the requirements of the ISPS Code regarding the
appointment of a PFSO, the development of PFSA and the implementation of PFSP
and;
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2) Subjects concerning drug smuggling; stowaways; illegal migration; and other
serious security threats not directly covered by this set of regulations.
The identification of security threats is necessary to develop an analytical
transparent incident-reporting tool suitable to support security incident reporting,
improve PFSA and PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. To
create an instrument that would also be useful to set up strategies for building and
implementation of a national maritime security policy. This innovative instrument
will be tested through action research in Mexico, with the support of the Mexican
Government. Action research will allow to discover the strengths and weaknesses
of this tool and improve it during the testing period (2017), through its application
in a real case.
This is intended to be achieved by pursuing the subsequent general objectives:

3.1.1 Elaborate a critical analysis of the current port security situation
of Mexico, with special focus on implementation and compliance of the
ISPS Code, including the state of the art and harmonization of
international legislation with national law.
This objective is first, to study the state of the art related to the implementation and
compliance of the ISPS Code within the context of port security and oil terminals in
Mexico, covering the need of understanding the fundaments and evolution of the
topic to set up the theoretical framework for this research effort. Secondly, to
establish the directions of the study, it’s priority to critically analyse the enactment
of the ISPS Code into national law in Mexico; understanding the strengths and
deficiencies of the port and maritime security legal framework of the referred
country in relation to Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974,
(SOLAS Convention), covering the need to understand the legal framework, from a
strict juridical perspective, that establishes the bases for compliance of the ISPS
Code in this Contracting State. Additionally, elaborating a critical evaluation of the
level of implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, by the Mexican
government, with focus on port facilities from a practical perspective, covers the
need to find the deficiencies and areas of opportunity for improvement including
security incident reporting and incident investigation.

3.1.2 Identify the most relevant security threats to port facilities in
Mexico, including oil terminals, and offshore installations
This objective will cover the need to discover the most relevant security threats at
ports and port facilities in Mexico to study them in relation to the reported security
incidents. Identifying security threats and areas that can represent a security risk for
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the port facility, its whole infrastructure, personnel, customers and in general, all
persons involved with the port operations is necessary to develop the analytical
transparent incident-reporting tool. Identification of security threats is also essential
to implement security measures, plan for security incident response and be able to
mitigate its consequences.

3.1.3 Develop an analytical instrument for security incidents-reporting
& incident investigation, to strengthen the continual evolution of
PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP and useful for setting up the strategies of a
national maritime security policy
The third general objective of this dissertation is to develop an analytical transparent
incident-reporting tool to support security incident reporting and incident
investigation, which simultaneously is useful to establish the strategies to build a
national maritime security policy. This is intended to be done, by acquiring all
relevant information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool,
thereby facilitating a learning process from that particular security incident and use
it not only for updating of PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP, but also, to provide
official security incidents investigators with all the necessary information to
investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures that could prevent
the re-occurrence of such event. Moreover, acquiring all data related to all security
incidents at all ports and port facilities across the country would provide the State
with crucial information at a macro level useful to set up the strategies, including
allocation of material, economic and human resources, which would be the
foundation for developing a national maritime security policy.

3.2 Objectives of the individual papers
This doctoral dissertation incorporates five articles. Two of these have been
published as book chapters, two more were published in an international journal,
and another one has been accepted for publication and is currently in press. The
objectives for each of these papers are presented below:
Paper 1
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Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Implementation
and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code in Mexico: A literature review and selected issues. TransNav,
International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea
Transportation, 12(2). P.363-373. DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.02.18.

The objective of this paper is to examine the state of the art related to the
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, within the context of port
security in Mexico, based on a cross-disciplinary approach among eight selected
categories.
Paper 2

Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018. Opening of
offshore oil business in Mexico and associated framework to cope
with potential maritime security threats. TransNav, International
Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation,
12(1). P.173-179 DOI: 10.12716/1001.12.01.20

The objective of paper 2 is to review the situation of the oil industry from a strict
security perspective and discuss key elements of port and maritime security;
addressing the necessity of the inclusion of port and maritime security and the
protection of critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental Shelf in the national
agenda, which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security
domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.
Paper 3

Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2017 Enhancing
maritime security in Mexico: Privatization, militarization, or a
combination of both? (2017) In: Chaumette, P. (ed.) Economic
challenge and new maritime risks management: What blue growth?
Nantes, France. Gomylex. P. 81.101. ISBN: 9788415176862

The objective of paper 3 is to examine three different options/solutions that Mexico
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the
country’s maritime security situation, as well as ensuring compliance with the ISPS
Code: privatization, militarization and finally, their combination.
Paper 4

Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D., 2018 Mexico's
reorganisation of maritime security regime: A new role for the navy
and emphasis on energy related infrastructures. In: Ölçer, A.I.,
Kitada, M., Dalaklis, D., Ballini, F. (Eds.) Trends and challenges in
maritime energy management. Springer. P. 95-108 DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-74576-3

The objective of paper 4 is to examine the latest maritime reform in Mexico, which
provides the legal framework to shift the National Maritime Authority from a civil
institution (SCT), towards a military one (SEMAR). As well as its extent of
harmonisation with international law in respect of the ISPS Code implementation
and compliance; and the critical situation that the shipping and oil industry is facing
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in this country. Another objective of this article is to study the level of acceptance
concerning the shift of the National Maritime Authority from SCT to SEMAR,
between the four pillars of representatives of authorities/institutions directly related
to duties and operations within these two important domains, a prerequisite for
success.
Paper 5

Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A. & Dalaklis, D. (2018) Integrating the
procedures of reporting port security incidents and the follow-up
investigation to build a national maritime security policy: A case
study in Mexico. Accepted for publication by the WMU Journal of
Maritime Affairs (in press, 2018).

The first objective of paper 5 is to develop an analytical transparent incidentreporting tool to be used to support security incident reporting, improve PFSA and
PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. By acquiring all relevant
information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool would
facilitate learning from that particular security incident and use it not only for
updating of Port Facility Security Assessments and respective Security Plans, but
also, to provide official security incidents investigators with all the necessary
information to investigate the event and instruct the implementation of measures
that could prevent the re-occurrence of such event. The second objective of this
article is to examine port security at Mexican ports from an incident reporting and
investigation perspective by implementing this instrument at all ports in Mexico
where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National Maritime Authority,
demonstrating in a real case through “action research,” the contributions of this
instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA and PFSP,
as the ISPS Code requires. The third objective of this paper, is to demonstrate the
use of this tool for a multilevel analysis of port security threats to identify the
problem areas and contribute to set up the strategies for the development of a
national maritime security policy.
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4. Materials and methods

The methodological approach adopted in this doctoral dissertation is principally
based on qualitative methods, including action research with a limited use of
statistics, which are mainly used in paper 5, for the development of the analytical
transparent incident-reporting instrument to be used to support security incident
reporting, improve PFSA and PFSP and port/maritime security incident
investigation.
Based on this, it was developed a Model for Port and Maritime Security Incident
Investigation. On the bases of this Model, a new and “transparent incident-reporting
tool” was developed, building the bridge between PFSA, PFSP and port security
incident investigation, as illustrated in the model below.
Area of research and

Port Facility Security
Plan (PFSP)
&
Ship Security Plan
(SSP)

Port Facility
Security
Assessment
(PFSA) &
Ship Security
Assessment (SSA)

development of the
maritime and port

Incident
Reporting,
Incident Records
Updating &
Incident
Investigation

Illustration 5 Model for port and maritime security incident investigation
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The selection of methods is based on their suitability in both, law and social
sciences, disciplines where they are widely used, in accordance with the exploratory
nature of political themes as in this case; where one of the general objectives is to
contribute to the development of a national maritime security policy. These were
combined in the last phase of the study with action research, which is necessary to
implement, test and improve the above-referred tool.
The research objectives call for classical documental analyses examining the
elements of the relevant international legislation against its implementation into
national legislation in the referred nation-state. The objectives also require the use
of semi-structured interviews and participant observation to identify security threats
at the field study.
The questionnaires used to perform the semi-structured interviews include questions
for the different papers and therefore, the same questionnaire, but different questions
were used to develop the different articles annexed to this doctoral dissertation.
Structured and semi-structured questionnaires with open questions, helped the
researcher to avoid being obtrusive and engaging in active listening strategies during
the interview. McCracken (1988) pointed out that active listening strategies, must
not be used by the qualitative researcher because they are obtrusive and likely to be
almost completely destructive of good data. This can be avoided through the use of
the construction of a well-designed questionnaire, which has several functions; it
ensures covering all subjects in the same order for each respondent; establishes
channels for the direction and scope of discourse; and allows the scientist to give all
his/her attention to the informant’s testimony.
By referring to Merton, Fiske and Kendall (1956), McCracken (1988) emphasized
that the use of questionnaires does not pre-empt the “open-ended” nature of the
qualitative interview; because within each of the questions, the opportunity for
exploratory, unstructured responses remains.
Structured questionnaires with open questions help researchers to give order to the
subjects during the interviews, which simplify data analysis while developing
categories or themes.
As mentioned above, during the last phase of the study, Action Research was used.
It is a form of interactive inquiry process that balances problem solving, actions
implemented in an interactive context with data-driven and collaborative analysis
or research, allowing practitioners to evaluate their job and understand the
underlying problem causes, enabling organizational change (Reason & Bradbury,
2001).
The figure following illustrates an action-reflection cycle for action research.
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Illustration 6 Action-reflection cycle (Mcniff, 2011)

Figure 6 illustrates how the researcher identifies a particular subject, investigates
different ways of doing their job, reflects on what is happening and why, check out
any new understandings with others - and in light of those reflections - try new ways
or methods to do their tasks that may or may not be more successful. If the trials
show that the tested methods are better, then the individual or the group moves
forward in that new direction.
Mcniff (2011) stated that Action Research is meant to be a systematic process and
recommends to use this type of research when the goals of the researcher are to
improve his/others understanding, develop his/others learning and influence other’s
learning. He places the emphasis of the study on the researcher’s intent to take action
for social improvement. This is highly relevant to the general objectives of this
research study and the objectives of paper five, which are the following:
a) Develop an analytical transparent incident-reporting tool to be used to
support security incident reporting, improve PFSA and PFSP and
port/maritime security incident investigation;
b) Examine port security at Mexican ports from an incident reporting and
investigation perspective by implementing this instrument at all ports in
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National
Maritime Authority, testing and demonstrating in a real case the
contributions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident
investigation, PFSA and PFSP, as the ISPS Code requires.
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c) Demonstrate the use of this tool for a multilevel analysis of port security
threats to identify the problem areas and contribute to set up the strategies
for the development of a national maritime security policy.
In accordance with these objectives, the researcher is expected to actively participate
in testing the instrument and apply the necessary changes through the testing period,
which in coordination with the SEMAR of Mexico, is set up to the entire year of
2017. After which, they will continue operating the instrument on their own. Due to
its extent, the transparent incident-reporting tool is presented as annex to this
dissertation, both in English and in Spanish.
This is the first time that an external academic institution was allowed to conduct a
scientific study involving the direct participation of the Mexican Navy and Customs
authorities and that results were published openly and made available for anyone.
The methodological approach of “Action Research” used to test and improve the
proposed transparent security-incident reporting tool required a strong interaction
between the researcher and the representatives of the Mexican Navy and indirectly
from Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) at all ports in Mexico as well, during
the complete testing period of the year 2017. The use of Action research in this
academic effort makes this a distinctive research undertaking that provides a unique
insight into port security threats, port security systems and the naval world.
The methodological approach of “Action Research” also demanded a close joint
analysis of data between the researcher and the representatives of the institution
(research setting). As mentioned before, data was collected every quarter through
2017 and scrutinized to analize security incidents, with special focus on the
discovery of new security threats not considered in the security incident-reporting
instrument. New codes were allocated and the respective incidents were followed
up. This would not have been possible without the direct participation of the
Mexican Navy and the selected research methods.

4.1: Paper 1: Implementation and compliance of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues
Research methodology for paper 1 involved a review of the published literature on
the subject. Webster & Watson (2002, p. xiv) explained that a high quality review
must cover all relevant literature on the topic and should not be confined to a limited
set of journals. The literature search method encompassed querying ten (10)
different scientific databases as proposed by Webster & Watson (2002, p. xvi).
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Apart from articles, the literature review also included book chapters and other
relevant documents captured during the search process. The analysis of the relevant
literature was made on the bases of eight categories. This allowed the conversion
from the author-centric approach towards the category-centric approach and
synthesise the relevant literature, developing a category matrix in relation to the
selected categories with a cross-discipline fertilisation approach. The selected
literature was then analysed with a geographical approach. After the first search, in
2015, a second search in 2018 was conducted to update data and verify the
inexistence of research contributions for the specified search parameters.

4.2 Paper 2: Opening of offshore oil business in Mexico
and associated framework to cope with potential security
risks
The methodology for Paper 2 included documental analysis and critical review of
the actual situation of port and oil terminals with special focus on the oil industry in
Mexico from the security perspective. The data was gathered from different sources
that included official information from Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the Mexican
oil agency and various authorities. In addition some very relevant information was
requested from Pemex and port administrations through the National Institute of
Transparency, Access to the Information and Protection of Personal Data (INAI).
Once the relevant documents for this topic were gathered, they were further selected
and classified according to their relevance to the study.

4.3 Paper 3: Enhancing maritime security in Mexico:
Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both?
The research methodology for paper 3 included the use of an extended questionnaire
with 71 open questions concerning maritime security, sent to eight (8) ports of
Mexico; through the INAI. A questionnaire of 70 similar questions (but, specifically
addressed to oil port terminals) was also sent to “Pemex Exploración y Producción,”
through the INAI to acquire information for their port and terminals. An inquiry
about the establishment of the UNAPROP at the different ports of Mexico was sent
to the SEMAR, whilst another request of information about the total number of
persons employed at private security companies that have got the courses 18.2 and
18.3 as required in the ISPS Code was sent to the FIDENA, also through the INAI.
The INAI was created to comply with the provisions of the General Law of
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Transparency promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that information from
public institutions operating money from national resources shall be open to public
scrutiny with exceptions related to national security.
These actions were combined with a six-day visit of the researcher in one of the
three largest ports of Mexico with port oil terminals conducted in April 2016, where
she performed interviews and “participant observation.” The questionnaire that was
sent to the other ports through the INAI; was also answered by respondents at that
specific port. At this port, the researcher participated as observer at the preparations,
performance and post-evaluation of an exercise at level 3, of those required by the
ISPS Code. Listening to arguments in many different directions while the
preparations and execution of the exercise for security incident response and its
evaluation awarded the researcher with a unique insight about deficiencies and
adequate actions of the actors involves when undertaking such exercises.
The results from the questionnaire were examined using document analysis with an
exploratory approach, to confirm or reject the inexistence of security incidents at
the selected ports and oil terminals trough a critical review of security incidents
reported in national newspapers and media sources, using Google to have a wider
coverture within the period of 2004-2015.

4.4 Paper 4: Mexico's reorganisation of maritime security
regime: A new role for the navy and emphasis on energy
related infrastructures
The research methodology of the current study includes semi-structured interviews
made to Harbours Masters, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Port
Administration Directors, PFSOs from ports and certain number of hydrocarbons
terminals, Presidents of CUMAR (1st Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector
or Navy Station) and Commandants of the UNAPROP. Additionally, participant
observation at the terminals and harbours master’s installations and ports, including
not only the land areas but also the maritime passages took place; they were visited
on board oceanic patrols from the Mexican Navy. The visit to the mentioned ports
in Mexico had an average duration of one week at each port. The observation of
normal daily operations at the different areas of the ports, including the Customs
Maritime Unit installations, the oil port terminals and the navy security areas
provided the researcher with a unique insight of the strengths and weaknesses of
port security in México, as well as the opportunity areas for improvement, by
identifying the most relevant security threats and problem areas, as well as the level
of cooperation between these institutions at the ports.
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The poll of data included the leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports of
Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos
Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche); Progresso (Yuc.); as well as another
Hub Port from the Pacific in Mexico. By doing this, the researcher covered the four
pillars for the operation of the port. The pool of data is deemed sufficient, based on
the fact that it includes eight out of sixteen FIPA in Mexico where the ISPS Code
applies, representing a coverture of 50% of them and seven out of seven FIPAs
situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and production activities take
place, achieving a 100% coverage of them. One State-Owned Integrated Port
Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil activity is
concentrated was also included in the study. Two informal interviews of top
Directors from SEMAR were performed on key themes identified from issues
prevalent in the analysis of the interviews to Presidents of the CUMAR and Federal
FIPAs. From the total of persons invited to participate and representing Harbour
Master offices at these nine cited ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The
same figures correspond to representatives from the Customs Maritime Units (one)
and Directors from FIPAs (one) as well as the PFSO from that same port that due
to extreme work volume had to decline the interview.
The purpose of the study was described to the participants via an information coversheet letter where the research objectives were explained, clarifying that their
participation was voluntary, confidential and without any economic contribution, or
gifts. The Research Ethics Committee of the World Maritime University approved
the study. The total of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all involved in areas
of maritime safety and security. The semi-structured interviews were carried out in
the participant’s workplaces by the researcher and free from intervention with
management and carried out during the visits to the installations for participant
observation, which uncovered several aspects and deficiencies of the
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico.

4.5 Paper 5: Integrating the procedures of reporting port
security incidents and the follow-up investigation to build
a national maritime security policy: A case study in
Mexico
Paper 5 includes the first stage of the design, an analysis of data developed from the
same semi-structured interviews with Harbour Masters, Directors of Customs
Maritime Units; Port Administration Directors; PFSOs from ports and some
terminals of hydrocarbons; Presidents of CUMARs (1st Commander of the Navy
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Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station) and Commandants of the UNAPROP, used for
paper 4.
It uses qualitative semi-structured interviews to allow new viewpoints to emerge
freely, particularly about their opinion and perception concerning port security
threats. This method is valuable to study opinions and fears of people when
changing processes and systems, especially after the shift of maritime safety and
security responsibility, as well as port state control from SCT to SEMAR.
In a second stage of the research and after the findings of the 15 themes; “Action
Research” was integrated into the methodology with the genuine interest of
contributing to improve maritime security in the country. A three day ISPS Code
implementation and compliance course was provided to Admirals from the
CUMAR and Commanders from the UNAPROP from all ports on 17th, 18th and
22nd November 2016.
Based on the findings of the interviews and participant observation, the researchers
developed a new and “transparent incident reporting tool”, as mentioned before,
which was implemented at all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the
National Maritime Authority of Mexico. The purpose of this was to test the
instrument, and demonstrate in an actual case through “action research,” its
contributions to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA and PFSP,
as the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were carried out every quarter throughout
the year 2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly when
incidents without code were reported, adding new codes. As mentioned previously,
due to its extent, it is annexed to this dissertation both, in English in Spanish. The
Spanish version is the one implemented in México; but the English is also provided
with the hope that other countries facing the same problematic might benefit from
that instrument.

4.6 Scope & delimitations
The main scope of this research effort is to evaluate the level of implementation and
compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico, as well as identify the most relevant
security threats at port facilities and port oil terminals and fixed and floating
platforms in this nation State. To develop and implement the “transparent incident
reporting tool” referred to above. It shall be highlighted that even if this instrument
is developed tested and implemented at the different ports of Mexico were the ISPS
Code applies, it can be applicable to other regions of the world facing similar
security threats.
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An important limitation to mention is that the research only considers ports
(common areas) oil port facilities and marine oil platforms in Mexico, concerning
the interviews. However the instrument for reporting of incidents was applied at all
Mexican ports, including most type of port facilities.
The study focuses mainly on port security and to a limited extent, maritime security,
excluding other areas like safety, economics and marine environment, since these
are topics of such importance that they deserve their own study.
The doctoral dissertation is presented in the compilation format, compiling all the
articles and manuscripts published by the candidate about the topic. This design was
advised because through the research the referred tool and other recommendations
following the published articles were implemented during the research period, and
the security status is already improving, avoiding that the research loses its actuality
and relevancy.

4.7 Validity and reliability
Validity has been described by Francfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (1996) as
understanding the question “Am I measuring what I intend to measure?” Reliability,
as Mejia (2007) explains, “It refers to the extent to which a measuring tool contains
variable errors, that is, errors that appear inconsistently from observation, to
observation during any single measurement attempt”.
Qualitative methods and specifically; interviews, participant observation and action
research are mainly used in this study. Qualitative methods are used to describe the
world of the human experience, emotions, perceptions and its interaction with
groups of a specific type with defined tasks or responsibilities, among other aspects.
Several researchers have criticised that qualitative methods are largely exposed to
the subjective experience, disapproving its application in terms of validity and
reliability. Both, qualitative and quantitative methods aim to reveal the truth about
the investigated phenomena. As Bashir, Afzal, & Azeem (2008), established, the
validity and norms applied to quantitative research do not completely apply to
qualitative research. The referred authors wrote:
“Validity in qualitative research means the extent to which the data is plausible,
credible and trustworthy; and thus can be defended when challenged. Reliability and
validity remain appropriate concepts for attaining rigor in qualitative research.
Qualitative researchers have to salvage responsibility for reliability and validity by
implementing verification strategies integral and self-correcting during the conduct
of inquiry itself. This ensures the attainment of rigor using strategies inherent within
each qualitative design, and moves the responsibility for incorporating and
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maintaining reliability and validity from external reviewers’ judgments to the
investigators themselves”.

Even if interviews and participant observation do not score high in tests of validity
and reliability, it does not necessarily mean that the methods applied are not
acceptable. Stanton & MS (1998) argued that, “analysts should be aware of the
potential power of the method before they use it, rather than proposing that they
should not use it”.
Mejia (2007) clarified that it does not mean that validity and reliability are not
essential in qualitative methods, instead, he argues “different methods are
appropriate in different stages of the design and one method scores differently from
the other in terms of reliability and liability”. Kvale (1995) discusses validation of
qualitative research relation to postmodern conceptions of knowledge and presented
three different approaches to validity:
“First, validity is treated as an expression of craftsmanship, with an emphasis on
quality of research by checking, questioning, and theorizing on the nature of the
phenomena investigated. Second, by going beyond correspondence criteria of
validity, the emphasis on observation is extended to include conversation about the
observations, with a communicative concept of validity. Third, by discarding a
modern legitimation mania, justification of knowledge is replaced by application,
with a pragmatic concept of validity. In conclusion, the validity of the validity
question is questioned”.

Action Research is a form of interactive inquiry process that balances problem
solving, actions implemented in an interactive context with data-driven and
collaborative analysis or research, allowing practitioners to evaluate their job and
understand the underlying problem causes, enabling organizational change (Reason
& Bradbury, 2001). It is about how the researcher identifies a particular subject and
undertakes alternative methods of carrying out that particular job, reflects on what
is happening and why, checks out any new understandings with others involved and
in light of those reflections - tries new ways or methods to do their tasks that may
or may not be more successful. If the trials show that the tested methods are better,
then the individual or the group moves forward in that new direction. It requires
constant evaluation, judgment and trial. Mcniff (2011) suggested that Action
Research is meant to be a systematic process and recommended the use of this type
of research when the emphasis of the study on the researcher’s intent is to take action
for social improvement.
McTaggar (1998) analysed validity in participatory action research, in terms of
content and outcome. He said that for participatory action, researchers report on how
things changed. Because of the shared work between the participants and the
researcher the focus should be on the research itself as well as it’s reporting,
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including the crucial questions of “how things were changed and how things were
resisted”. He adds categorically that, “validity implies content. It requires thinking
about how a social practice has changed”. He proposes that the following questions
must be considered in the participatory research reporting:
1. “How have things changed?
2. What has not changed?
3. What has been confirmed?
4. What has been ignored?
5. What has been made problematic”?
Each of these questions is thoroughly answered in section 6 of this dissertation,
which presents the discussion and conclusions. McTaggar, (1998) argued that the
use of several methods is possible in action research to achieve validation. This is
known as triangulation. This coincides with Hoepfl (1997), who also wrote that
triangulation may enhance validity in qualitative methods. By referring to Alison,
(2005), Mejia (2007), clarifies that triangulation is acceptable under the premises
that “no single approach ever really solves, delineates, or validates a particular
problem. Different methodologies, investigative approaches and other types of
triangulation yield more complete data and result in more credible findings”. He
explains that there are four types of triangulation: a) data triangulation; b)
investigative triangulation; c) theory triangulation; and d) methods triangulation.
Methods triangulation is defined by Alison (2005), as “the use of different methods
to study a single research problem,” according to the referred by Mejia (2007).
Methods triangulation was applied in this doctoral dissertation by using interviews
(semi-structured using a questionnaire with open questions, which was approved by
the Research Ethical Committee of this World Maritime University upon starting
the study); heuristics (document analysis); observation (visits to eight ports of
Mexico including Customs Maritime Units, port terminals, Navy Zones, Harbour
Masters, oil platforms and observing patrolling of port navigation channels and the
Continental Shelf with the Mexican Navy on board oceanic patrols. In addition the
sea waters of Campeche and Tabasco, were most fixed and floating platforms are
located, were flown by helicopter to explore the security at offshore facilities).
Finally, it was also used action research for the implementation of the “transparent
incident-reporting tool”.
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5. Results

5.1 Paper 1: Implementation and compliance of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in
Mexico: A literature review and selected issues
This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and
compliance of the ISPS Code for the case of Mexico. This investigation was initially
oriented solely towards Mexico. Due to the absence of research within this subject
for the referred country the review had to be done through subcategories with the
conditional connection of Mexico and relevant issues were selected. The primary
data confirmed the absence of research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary
data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed
for a wider geographical coverage and expanded on general bases the scope of
analysis, since ten (10) different academic databases were exploited. The literature
review from an author-centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the
basis to further develop (and examine) the concept-centric approach, through eight
selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on specific
concepts, allowed the identification of cross fertilization of such concepts in the
respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts focused on the ISPS Code
and the development of a PFSP have an integrated perspective, where the categories
of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management and the
issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. The results
demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in these areas from
America Central and South America in relation to other parts of the globe, as well
as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code in Mexico. In the
scientific contributions on the subject were Mexico is included; it is in reference to
isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on
general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific
research on this area for the specific country might also be related to the lack of a
national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors
have pointed out in other contributions.
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5.2 Paper 2: Opening of offshore oil business in Mexico
and associated framework to cope with potential security
threats
Paper 2 describes the situation of Mexican ports and the oil industry from a security
perspective and discusses key elements of port and maritime security; addressing
the necessity of the inclusion of port and maritime security and the protection of
critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental Shelf in the national agenda
which would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain
and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy. It
identifies the substantial security challenges that are facing maritime port and the
oil industry in Mexico; and proves that the losses are not limited to economic
factors, but also to loss of civilian life and the environment. It calls for attention of
the subject of port and maritime security in the national agenda for the development
of a national maritime security policy to provide the foundation for an effective and
proactive port and maritime security programme.

5.3 Paper 3: Enhancing maritime security in Mexico:
Privatization, militarization, or a combination of both?
Paper 3 examines three different options/solutions that Mexico implemented within
its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country’s maritime
security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code:
privatisation, militarisation and finally, their combination. Results included
inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records;
inadequate competence and training among the PSO/PFSO; use of different
procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same
security issues; some port terminals were operating even though the PFSP and
respective SOC had expired in 2014, two year prior this questionnaire being sent. It
also found a significant improvement of inter institutional communication and
coordination at the visited port where the “militarisation model” was being tested
and where the port administration and Harbour Master positions were given to
personnel from the Navy. It was concluded that after twelve years of the ISPS Code
implementation, Mexico does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code
at an acceptable level; and the lack of a national maritime security policy has
resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security)
challenges that this nation is facing. To see the detailed list of incidents found see
the appended paper.
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5.4 Paper 4: Mexico's reorganisation of maritime security
regime: A new Role for the navy and emphasis on energy
related infrastructures
Paper 4 presents a critical analysis of the latest maritime reform in which Mexico
provides the legal framework to shift the National Maritime Authority from a civil
institution (SCT) towards a military one (SEMAR). It also examines its extent of
harmonisation with international law in respect of the ISPS Code implementation
and compliance; and the level of acceptance of such changes, between the four
pillars of representatives of authorities/institutions directly related to duties and
operations, as Directors of Customs Maritime Units; Port Administrations Directors
and PFSO; Commanders of the Navy and Harbour Masters.
The results of the critical analysis of the maritime reform, highlights several
contradictions and ambiguities of the new regime, since several duties and
responsibilities are still “shared”. While the SEMAR is responsible for
implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code, the SCT is holding the port
authority role and is responsible for imposition of sanctions related to violations of
the Code. In addition, a significant inconsistency is that the decree modifies Article
7 of the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and establishes that the “National
Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal Executive Power through SEMAR
for the exercise of national sovereignty, deal with maritime safety and security
issues, as well as exercise the Right of the State to be applied at the Mexican marine
zones, while Article 9 B establishes that SCT will exercise its functions at the ports
through the Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine. Additionally, the “Law of
Ports”, Article 16, clearly established that the Port Authority is exercised by the
Federal Executive Power through SCT, which in practice, would be exercised
through the “Offices of Services to the Merchant Marine” established at all ports.
In 2014, the Mexican government attempted the reorganisation of its maritime
security regime. Several existing laws were revised and a new set of regulations was
introduced including amendments to the “Law of Ports” and the regulation in
relation to the establishment of the CUMAR, which is the organ responsible for the
implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code in this nation. However, since
this attempt, the Parliament has focused on port security and port installations. They
overlooked including in the regulation the part related to maritime security and the
requirements for ships, established in the ISPS Code, such as the Ship Security
Officer (SSO), Ship Security Assessment (SSA), the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and
the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). This part was not revised either
in the major maritime reform of 2017. From April 21st 2014 to June 2017, when the
last updates to this chapter were made, there was no institution appointed as
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responsible for maritime security in respect of vessels conforming Mexico’s
national legislation.
It was established in Article 19 TER, paragraph II, of the Law of Ports, since the
maritime security reform that took effect on the 21st of April 2014, that “the
CUMAR shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the
framework of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS
Code and ensure the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of
the respective three security levels”. But, because of poor knowledge about the
reform itself, the SEMAR did not exercise its authority and SCT through FIDENA
directly revised and approved the PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP for the
consequent issuance of SOCs, without taking into consideration the legal procedures
regarding the CUMAR. After the last reform of 2016 the CUMAR kept this
responsibility as established in Article 19 TER, of the Law of Ports, where there are
clear specifications for each of the three maritime security levels.
PSP/PFSP and SSP were not revised and approved by the organ responsible for such
action. Thus, SOCs and ISSC were not issued in acordance to the juridical
procedures and must be revised and renewed, following the procedures established
by law. The paper also highlights the unnecessary “inter institutional character” of
the “CUMAR”, once the control and management of Harbours Masters was
transferred to SEMAR.
Concerning the level of acceptance of this reform between those involved in port
and maritime operations; the results show that from the interviewed subjects with
functions of Harbour Masters, 75% expressed their approval of being transferred to
the SEMAR and supported the law decree, while 25% strongly disapproved the
transferral between the institutions. An important conclusion is that people
interviewed were either very much in favour or very much against the change.
87.5% of Directors of Customs Maritime Units and 75% of Directors of FIPAs
supported the law decree; at the same time, 100% of Presidents of CUMAR held a
positive view. Same figures correspond to Commandants from the UNAPROP
(coast guard-navy unit), whereas 87.5% from PSO supported the transferral of
Harbour Masters to SEMAR; and 80% from interviewed subjects functioning as
PFSO from hydrocarbon terminals supported the transfer.
As presented in Paper 4, twelve categories were identified that either prevent or
promote the transferral of Harbour Masters from SCT to SEMAR:
I)
II)
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Poor performance of Harbour Masters from the SCT;
Acute lack of human and material resources available for Harbour
Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory
manner;

III)

IV)
V)
VI)
VII)
VIII)

IX)
X)

XI)

XII)

High exposure to corruption on the part of Harbour Masters related to
Mexican criminal organisations due to death threats against them or
their families;
Fear losing their jobs on the part of Harbour Masters in a later stage of
their productive life;
Uncertainty on the part of Harbour Masters with respect to their salary
levels, working rights and pension schemes;
Improvement of salary and working rights for Harbour Masters and
their personnel with the transferral to SEMAR;
Already high participation of the Mexican Navy performing duties that
correspond to Harbour Masters;
Fear on the part of Directors of Port Administrations concerning lack
of knowledge, stubbornness and unwillingness/inflexibility to negotiate
on factors related to business issues with respect to authorities from the
Mexican Navy;
(Trust in) Security improvement for offshore installations and vessels
serving the oil market;
Trust in a significant improvement of maritime safety and security on
the part of Directors of Customs Maritime Units with the transferral of
Harbour Master offices to the SEMAR;
Bigger and better capabilities (from SEMAR) to combat criminal
organisations that are using port installations for the transport of drugs,
weapons, money laundering and transport of stolen hydrocarbons, and
finally;
Need of providing juridical support and attributions to the SEMAR to
activities already performed by the Navy and which currently are
outside their juridical attributions.

5.5 Paper 5: Integrating the procedures of reporting port
security incidents and the follow-up investigation to build
a national maritime security policy: A case study in
Mexico
Paper 5 presents the findings of the study about the implementation and compliance
of the ISPS Code in respect of report and investigation of port security incidents and
the results of an action research study, where an analytical transparent incident93

reporting tool developed by the researchers was implemented at all ports in Mexico
where the ISPS Code applies, with the support of the National Maritime Authority.
The aim is improving reporting of security incidents, allowing major insight in the
problem areas to be integrated into PFSA, facilitating amendments to PFSP and
enabling port/maritime security incident investigation. It is argued that by acquiring
all relevant information of a particular event in this security incident-reporting tool;
it would facilitate in learning from that particular security incident and use it not
only for updating PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP, but also, to provide official
security incidents investigators with all the necessary information, to investigate the
event and instruct the implementation of measures that could prevent the reoccurrence of such event. It is suggested that the use of this tool combined with
statistics provides the fundament for a multilevel analysis of port security threats,
identifying the problem areas and contributing to set up the strategies for the
development of a national maritime security policy.
On the basis of the interviews and observations to evaluate the implementation and
compliance of the ISPS Code, in respect of report and investigation of port security
incidents, fifteen themes were identified across the studied groups [CUMARs &
UNAPROPs; Port Administration Directors; Customs Maritime Unit Directors;
PSO/PFSO and Harbour Masters]; that affect port security either in a negative or
positive way.
It is important to emphasise that these findings were made on the basis of the visits
to ports and interviews before the transferal of the National Maritime Authority from
the SCT to SEMAR, which entered into force on 17th of June 2017. However, the
CUMAR was responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code
since 21st April, 2014. The themes (which are presented in paper 5), are the
following:
I)

II)

III)

IV)
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High discontent among Customs Maritime Units Directors concerning
the rotation of customs authority agents between Customs Maritime
Units, Airport Units and Cross-Border Units;
High reluctance by Port Administration Directors and PSO to allow port
security authorities from the CUMAR and the UNAPROP permanent
interconnection to CCTV systems in real time;
High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to allow PSO
and the UNAPROP permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in
real time from port facilities (terminals) installations;
High reluctance by Customs Maritime Units Directors to allow port
security authorities from the CUMAR and the UNAPROP permanent
interconnection to CCTV systems in real time concerning customs
warehouse and other vulnerable customs areas;

V)
VI)

VII)

VIII)
IX)

X)
XI)

XII)

XIII)
XIV)

Separate IT and CCTV systems rooms between naval authorities and
customs authorities;
High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to share their
PFSP with the representatives from port security authorities from the
CUMAR (responsible for inspection and approval of PFSP) in order to
inspect it, revise it and approve it and to develop the PSP for MARSEC
(maritime security) level 3, responsibility of the CUMAR;
Poor development of maritime security exercises at level 3, most performed without access to PFSP from port (terminals) facilities
[exercises to be conducted once every calendar year, with no more than
18 months between them];
Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope with
the ISPS Code duties;
Poor development of PSP. Port Security Officers only consider risks
and threats related to common port areas, installations and roadways
within the port, but not for each of the port facilities (terminals) located
within the port, neither analyse the impact of security incidents of the
terminals against each other and particularly, specific high risks
terminals against other considered of less risks.
Poor training of private security agents concerning port security risks
and threats, as well as use of fire weapons.
Satisfactory level of cooperation between the Customs Maritime Units
authorities and the UNAPROPs for inspection of goods and vessels at
the customs warehouse with ZVB and other no intrusive security
systems. The ZVB is a mobile screening system using X-Ray for
screening of cargo and vehicles. It uses a backscatter technology to
provide photo- images of suspected objects within the cargo such as
explosives, currency, drugs, psychotropic materials, forbidden
chemicals, and trade-fraud items;
With the exception of one port, none existence of official records of
port and maritime security incidents (before the implementation of the
“trans-parent incident reporting tool”);
None existence of PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port
security authorities following port security incidents;
None existence of official reassessment of PSA/PFSA requested by port
security authorities following port security incidents;
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XV)

None existence of official investigation of port security incidents
(excluding judicial ones) made by port security authorities.

Concerning implementation and results of the “transparent incident reporting tool”,
the results show a significant improvement in reporting port security incident
records, which increased from zero to 57 during the first year of this tool
implementation. During the first quarter 2017, twenty port security incidents were
reported. For the second quarter, same year, the figure was nine, which represented
a decrease of 55.00 per cent, compared to the first quarter. During the third quarter,
a total of seventeen port security incidents were recorded, which represents an
increase of 88.88 per cent, compared to the previous quarter. For the fourth quarter,
eleven port security incidents were reported. This represents a decrease of 35.29 per
cent, compared to the previous period. In addition, 56% of the reported maritime
incidents followed recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and to be
considered for improvement of PFSP. However, none of such recommendations
have been integrated into PFSA yet. The need for further training and competence
about the ISPS Code, as identified in paper 3 is confirmed with the implementation
of this tool. On three occasions members of the UNAPROP reported pure safety
incidents as security incidents, which were not included in the macro analysis. The
figures about reported security incidents per quarter, is presented in illustration 7.

Port Security Incidents by Quarter
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 quarter 2017

2 quarter 2017

Illustration 7 Graphic of port security incidents by quarter
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3 quarter 2017

4 quarter 2017

As it can be observed in figure 8 below, the type of security incident that was
reported most, is the code IFP-007, which stays for “confiscation of drugs, narcotics
or psychotropic material”. The second place is shared by the classification codes
IFP-006 (confiscation of weapons/firearms); IFP-009 (unauthorized access to
restricted areas, including fishermen and stowaways); IFP-017 (vehicles abandoned
in the port installations or its surroundings); IFP-019 (failures in control areas) and,
the category “without code”. This type of incidents was assigned a code for the new
quarter in relation to the period they were recorded.
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Illustration 8 Graphic of port security incidents by incident code

In opposition to the significant improvement in respect of reporting security
incidents, such progress was not reflected on consequent amendments to PSP/PFSP.
However it does not necessarily mean that the recommendations for changes to
PSA/PFSA and respective PSP/PFSP were ignored, but it must be taken into
consideration that this type of process can take between six and twelve months; a
period where they must be evaluated, tested, inspected and approved and they might
be in a phase of this process. Anyhow the task has been problematic for members
of the UNAPROP and representatives of the CUMAR since PSO/PFSO who have
been very reluctant to deliver a copy of PSP/PFSP to the port security authorities
from the CUMAR.
Other important findings are related to the location where the incidents took place.
From a total of 57 port security incidents reported by the UNAPROP for the year
2017, 23 occurred within the Customs Maritime Unit Installations. As it is observed
in figure 9 below, which represents a 40.35 per cent of the total of security incidents
at port facilities.
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From these 23 security incidents, four were about failure of access control to
restricted areas and the precise discovery of unauthorized persons found within the
customs restricted areas; and one more about discovery of suspicious packages
within the customs area, all the rest involved confiscation of drugs, narcotics,
psychotropic material and fire weapons in containers at the customs area. In one of
the events, it was reported 800 units of grenades and pistols including AK-47 Rifles.
The rest of security incidents at the customs installations involved confiscation of
cocaine and chemical materials for the production of synthetic drugs illegally
transported in containers by ships.

Port Security Incidents by quarter and port area
(customs installations)
25
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2 quarter 2017
By quarter

3 quarter 2017
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At the customs installations

Illustration 9 Port security incidents by quarter and port area

The findings related to serious deficiencies in the implementation and compliance
of the ISPS Code in Mexico, within reporting of security incidents and its reevaluation to PFSA and respective amendments to PFSP; the poor exercise of its
authority from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs (SEMAR) in respect of fulfilling its
obligations and responsibilities with respect to port and maritime security; and the
remarkable improvement in reporting security incidents after the implementation of
the “transparent security-incident-reporting tool”, which enables port/maritime
security incident investigation and can serve to identify the problem areas;
contributing to setting up strategies for the development of a national maritime
security policy are some of the most relevant contributions of this dissertation.
Another important finding that should call for attention worldwide, is the fact that
more than 40% of the reported security incidents occurred within the customs area,
which even if it is within the port installations, is not required to conduct a security
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risk assessments and develop the respective security plan. It has already occurred in
the past (as reported by one of the participants in the interview) that heavily armed
members of criminal organizations have penetrated the port and customs
installations to recover confiscated quantities of cocaine and materials for
production of methamphetamines. This is evidence, that the lack of a risk
assessment and security plan for installations of the Customs Maritime Units put at
risk the whole port and its port facilities.
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6. Discussion and conclusions

6.1 Evaluating the need of expansion to apply the ISPS
Code to passenger ferries of less than 500 GRT and its
respective port facilities
The annexed papers illustrate through different but connected topics, the rationing
and purpose of the ISPS Code. They also highlight deficiencies and areas of
opportunity for expansion of the application concerning this set of international
security regulations to better secure oceans and port facilities.
Certainly the main focus of the ISPS Code is on terrorism. A number of theoretical
scenarios about terror attacks have been tested around the globe and security
measures have been thereby implemented. However, the Code does not apply to
vessels of less of 500 GRT, including leisure craft. Medium and large ferries
transporting travellers between tourist destinations in a specific State also fall out of
this international security legislation.
Jones (2006) referred to a USCG study to point out that large ferries have been
accounted with the highest risk assessment score from about 80 different maritime
terrorist scenarios. The cited author writes:
“Ferries come in all shapes and sizes, and serve a multitude of different ports and
trades. The largest ferries are indeed targets for terrorist, and they are extremely
susceptible to devices brought on board by passengers”.

Because of the big number of people gathered in one specific place, public transport
systems, including ferries, have been nominated as soft targets for terrorist
organizations, appearing on the target list of different terrorist groups worldwide.
Just a few months ago, on February 21st 2018, a terror attack against a large ferry
with capacity for 300 passengers occurred in Mexico, when the craft arrived at the
Cozumel port facility from Playa del Carmen, both close to Cancun, leaving 18
persons seriously injured (Sputnik, 2018), as previously discussed in section 2.2.3
of this dissertation. Different media sources published that a national drug crime
organization announced the attribution of the event and the political motive behind,
demanding the dismissal of the city mayor.
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Lately, to cut construction cost of ferries, several yards have replaced steel with
aluminium. Therefore concerns are growing about the ferry industry as well, as
Jones (2006) wrote:
“The effect of a bomb of fire on such vessels can be catastrophic as aluminium is
significantly weaker than steel when it undergoes heating and the effect of a terrorist
attack could lead to the melting and destruction of an entire vessel extremely quickly.
Aluminium melts at approximately 660 degrees C., whereas most commonly used
steel melt at around 1370 degrees C, so the potential for an earlier degradation in the
event of fire is obvious”.

One solution to this problem, would be to expand the application of the ISPS Code
regarding the requirement of the SSA, PFSA, SSP and PFSP as well as the hire of
SSO and PFSO to medium and large ferries and port facilities serving this type of
naval craft and services. Additionally, construction rules for passenger ferries at the
State level should be revised to limit the use of aluminium, reducing the risk level
of a potential catastrophe.
Stricter security measures for the access of leisure craft and small fishery vessels,
as well as high speed fibre boats used for fishery to port facilities should also be
evaluated. During the participant observation phase of this study it was registered
several small boats and high speed craft used for fishery within the navigation
channels and in restricted seaways areas of the ports. It is important to recall that
small boats are used for performing terror attacks against vessels and ports by
deploying explosives, in most of the designed theoretical scenarios and tested
worldwide in exercises for maritime security level 3, as the ISPS Code requires.
As expressed by (Dunham, 2004), the U.S.S. Cole (on 12 October 2000) and the
French tanker Limburg (on 6 October 2002) were attacked by small vessels, whereas
it was with small and high speed boats that al-Qaeda planned to blow up the Israeli
Cruise ships off Turkey, as Jones (2006), pointed out.

Illustration 10 A very small ferry sailing in a restricted waterway in a maritime oil port facility, in Mexico
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In a hypothetical scenario that this boat had carried explosives and performed a
terror attack, the consequences would have been catastrophic, since the tanker
vessels could have exploded in chain and the explosions would have reached the oil
tanks onshore, and in addition to loss of life and property, the marine environment
devastation could have reached as far as coastal waters of the United States.
Stricter security measures are necessary to protect port facilities from small boats
and leisure craft that might be used for terror attacks. The same risk factor also
applies to marine oil platforms located in the Continental Shelf.
However, measures must include solutions for affected citizens at port cities, as in
the case illustrated in the figure above, where locals use small boats to cross from
one side to the other without subject to any control, crossing the main navigation
channels, putting at high risks oil terminals.

6.2 The inherent role of the ISPS Code in keeping ports
and vessels free of illegal traffic of drugs, weapons and
unlawful items & the use of the developed transparent
tool for reporting of security incidents and development
of a national maritime security policy
Several of the annexed papers discuss findings related to port security incidents
connected to smuggling of drugs, psychotropic material and weapons. Although the
IMO has left Contracting Governments to determine the extent to which the ISPS
Code and particularly the maritime security measures shall apply to armed robbery,
drug smuggling, stowaways, illegal migration and the security of dangerous goods,
if the security measures established by the Code are strictly implemented at ship and
port facilities, they would be sufficient to keep them free of illegal traffic of drugs,
weapons and illegal items, considering access controls, control of unauthorised
persons and security of the port perimeter area and waterways.
If an illegal carriage of drugs, weapons or unlawful goods is found within a port
facility, on the vessel or in a container, it implicitly means that there has already
been a security breach of the measures established by the ISPS Code, either at that
port, at one of the previous ports of departure reported by the vessel involved, or in
less common cases, at the vessel itself during bunkering or catering stores
operations, which in some illicit cases are performed outside the port facility and
without the necessary authorities inspection. There are also registered cases in
Mexico and several South American ports where swimmers and divers affix drugs
packages to the bulbous bow of vessels.
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In Cartagena Colombia, the Federal authorities arrested 14 persons involved in such
operations for hiding the drug to be transported in the vessels hulls while they lay at
the port for loading and unloading operations (RCN Noticias , 2015), similar, reports
come from Puerto Bolívar, La Guajira, Colombia (Rodríguez, 2015), as well as the
port of Santa Elena, in Ecuador, where the Navy found 5.53 tons of cocaine in an
adapted compartment outside the hull of the vessel which were supposed to be
transported to Europe (La Prensa, 2017). Additionally, the same practice regarding
packages adhered to the bulbous bow of the vessel have been reported in
Panamanian ports, where the Federal authorities found 213 packages containing
cocaine in this way (El Nuevo Diario, 2017). The same situation has been reported
at Quetzal Port, in Guatemala, where suitcases with 281 packages containing
cocaine were discovered adhered to the bulbous bow of a vessel by the Navy Police
of that State (El Periodico, 2017). Mexico is not exempted of this threat. On January
3rd this year (2018), the UNAPROP commissioned to Port of Lazaro Cardenas, in
Mexico confiscated 300 kilos of cocaine that were also adhered to the bulbous bow
of a vessel with Liberian Flag with the United States as destination (Casillas, 2018).
The problem has also reached Peru, where the reported confiscations of drugs are
not limited to merchant vessels, but even ships belonging to the Peruvian Navy,
where Canadian authorities confiscated 28 kilos of cocaine (El Tiempo, 1996).
Therefore, special measures must be implemented at ports and port facilities as well
as with the vessels themselves regarding increased lighting around the hull and at
docks and berths, giving special attention to small boats and high speed craft that
could serve for hiding of swimmers/divers, sailing or waiting in the vicinity of ships.
On the other hand, divers could also be used to affix bombs to vessel hulls for
detonation at the next port of arrival, in another country. As Jones (2006) says:
“Security must therefore begin at the point of loading. Any container to be shipped
through a port must be loaded in an approved secure facility. These facilities should
be secured against unauthorized entry and the loading process monitored by camera.
In high risks areas, cargo and vehicle scanners must be employed and the images
stored so that they can be crosschecked with images taken by inspectors at a transshipment or arrival destination (…). It is vital to understand that all parties to the
movement of cargo now have responsibilities and that if one sector does not apply
itself rigorously to security then the entire effort can fail”.

One solution for this increasing problem is strengthening underwater surveillance
with remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVS) specially designed for harbour
security, equipped with sonar, acoustic technologies and cameras as the UK’s
Cerberus Yacht Sonar system, which is a diver detection system that provides 360degree sub-surface security protection using the Ocean Marine Systems (OMS) for
retracting through-hull instrument hoist. “The hoist enables active sonar to be
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deployed with the vessel in motion, resulting in continuous monitoring of subsurface activity around a vessel” (Jeffrey, 2017).
On the other hand, the ISPS Code does not directly consider security measures for
the aerial space of ports, including security threats that drones pose to the security
of ports, port facilities and vessels. Lately the use of drones for smuggling of cocaine
has increased. Ports and port facilities should consider this new technological threat.
The use of drones deploying or intending to deploy explosives by terrorist
organizations has been documented in previous events. The risk for a drone to
deliver explosives, drugs, weapons and currency to port, port facilities and vessels
needs to be included in the PSA/PFSA/SSA and respective PSP/PFSP/SSP. Though
the ISPS Code establishes requirements for “preventing the introduction of
unauthorised weapons, incendiary devices or explosive to ships” to vessels and port
facilities, it does not directly address the security of the aerial space and the
connected risk of drones.
The IMO reports that they work in close cooperation with the World Customs
Organization on matters related to prevention and suppression of drug smuggling
on ships engaged in international maritime traffic and relevant authorities from
member States worldwide. The Revised Guidelines for the Prevention and
Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor
Chemicals on Ships engaged in International Maritime Traffic were adopted by
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) through resolution MSC.228(82), on 7
December 2006; and by Facilitation Committee (FAL) through resolution
FAL.9(34), on 30 March 2007.
The Organization adds that the aim is to enhance maritime security worldwide, with
particular focus on developing countries through capacity-building activities,
“which are conducted at national and regional levels, by the IMO sub-Division for
Maritime Security and Facilitation (MSF) that operates under the auspices of the
Maritime Safety Division (MSD), which in turn functions under the purview of
MSC” (International Maritime Organization, 2018).
Although, as the 228(82) Guidelines for the prevention of smuggling of drugs
establishes, there are no shipping routes free of illegal traffic of drugs, psychotropic
substances, precursor chemicals and weapons; countries located in the LatinAmerican region are overrepresented in production and confiscation of drugs and
precursor chemicals for production of synthetic substances, according to the World
Drug Report of 2017 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). All Centre
and South American nations, excluding Chile, are considered as developing
countries (varying from lower to upper middle income countries) by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore, they
should be prioritized for the IMO capacity-building programme on maritime
security.
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The findings of this research illustrate the significant number of port security
incidents related to smuggling of drugs, precursor chemicals and weapons. This is
highly relevant since confiscation of drugs; illicit substances and weapons were not
considered as a port security incident at the different ports in Mexico before the
implementation of the transparent reporting incident tool developed by the
researcher. As documented in the appended papers 3 and 5 the selected ports
reported that they have not registered a security incident since the ISPS Code
implementation, back in 2004. Incidents records are the cornerstone for conducting
PSA/PFSA and the respective development of PSP/PFSP.
The transparent incident reporting tool developed by the researcher serves not only
for reporting of security incidents but also for security incident investigation and
protection of evidence material, as it includes the type of incident, code, description
of the incident and / or protection failure, time, date and maritime terminal (place)
of the security incident, support evidence’s documents, daily event’s report, extract
of binnacle, diagrams, pictures, videos, audio recordings: yes no personal
information (involved persons), description of damages, authorities involved,
description of authorities response to the incident, recommendations to modify the
PSP/PFSP, if the incident should warrant official investigation, if there are arrested
persons and it is transparent since it is signed by the PFSO, the Director of the Port,
the Chief Commander of the UNAPROP and the Chairman (President) of the
CUMAR.
Together with the use of statistics by incident code and port/port facility at national
level, this instrument provides the State with crucial information at a macro level to
set up strategies for developing a National Maritime Security Policy by identifying
threats and applying a risk-based approach to port and maritime security
management, allowing the state to allocate material, economic and human resources
as required at each port.
Although this instrument was successfully implemented and tested at all ports where
the ISPS Code applies in Mexico, with most type of port facilities, it can easily be
adapted to other countries worldwide facing the same problems. It can also be
modified to include other type of incidents not considered in the format by adding
the type of security incident and allocating the respective incident code.
Edgerton (2013), cited by Kusi (2015), said that when security strategies and
measures are appropriately designed, functions as enablers, facilitating costeffective and reliable operations for all stakeholders.
Bateman (2005), studied capacity building in respect of maritime security for the
region Asia-Pacific, he said that many countries belonging to this region lack the
capacity to provide adequate maritime security at a national level, under their
national jurisdiction and to implement international security standards as required
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by the ISPS Code. The author highlighted factors as lack of political and social will;
lack of maritime security awareness; ineffective arrangements for maritime
jurisdiction and enforcement, and differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea. He
referred to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992)
to define capacity building in the terms of maritime security:
“Capacity-building encompasses the country's human, scientific, technological,
organisational, institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of
capacity-building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial
questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development
options”.

Currently Mexico shows several of the weaknesses revealed by Bateman (2005),
and generally the lack of political and social will, as well as lack of maritime security
awareness among the authorities of SEMAR and SCT to politically cooperate for
the development of a National Maritime Security Policy.
This also makes obvious the need for the development of a National Maritime
Security Culture. The implementation of the “transparent incident reporting tool”
can facilitate it by providing crucial information to set up the strategies related to
policy choices.

6.3 The need for expansion of the ISPS Code to offshore
facilities in Mexico
As discussed in section 2.3.2 of this dissertation, piratical acts against oil platforms
and offshore facilities located in the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico have
significantly increased during the last decade.
The list of security incidents, vary from armed robbery on oilrigs, robbery of
valuable equipment on “abandoned platforms” (empty of crew on board, but still
under production and connected to other facilities with high production levels),
including lifeboats and heliports, cabling and pipes to wells. Until now there has
been no reports on loss of life in direct connection to violence during these unlawful
acts (at the sea). However, the improper and rash disconnection of pipes and cables
to wells might causes explosions resulting with the loss of life of perpetrators and
an extensive marine disaster.
Because of ambiguities to what constitutes piracy under international law, this
criminal action cannot be counted as “piracy”. Under the UNCLOS definition,
piracy events must occur in the high waters and outside the jurisdiction of any State,
but it encompasses not only ships, but any “property” attacked by a ship for private

107

(economic) ends, whereas under the act established by the International Maritime
Bureau, the location of the incident is irrelevant, as is the end (including terror and
political motives), but it imposes the ship to ship rule, leaving oil rigs and offshore
facilities outside this definition.
Mejía (2007) discusses the fact that while “the definition of piracy in international
law is quite precise and detailed, it has not been updated to take into account the
development of the modern regime of maritime zones”.
Although, in the hypothetical expansion of the term piracy under UNCLOS to
include acts within territorial waters, it would only include the unlawful acts with
violence or a threat of violence, leaving out robbery or plundering on board
“abandoned” platforms, where the use of violence is unnecessary.
On the other hand it is important to highlight that until now, all robbed and
plundered platforms, were owned by PEMEX, the Mexican State oil company and
with Mexican registration number, and therefore both, the nationality and the
territorial principles of law applies.
The relevant question would be about enforcement of jurisdiction, if oilrigs and oil
marine platforms located in the Continental Shelf (of Mexico) in the Contiguous
Zone or at the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with a foreign State flag suffer
armed robbery on board or are plundered. In that case they could also make the
claim under the jurisdiction of their Flag State. Mexico amended its Constitution
and Energy Law to open the oil business market to private companies for the
exploitation of oil reservoirs from deep waters with the approval and
implementation of the Constitutional Energy Reform, which became effective on
December 21st 2013. On August 12th 2014 the new Hydrocarbons Law and the new
Hydrocarbons Revenues Law became effective. These are part of a set of new laws
and legal amendments to the energy reform (Cross & Patten, 2014).
With the opening of the oil market, security threats against critical infrastructure as
offshore installations may increase, including activities associated with terrorism,
considering the establishment of oil companies that have already experienced terror
acts in the past, such as the Norwegian Statoil.
The security situation described above concerning offshore facilities needs to be
improved. Part of this solution could be to expand the application of the ISPS Code
instruments, declaring oilrigs and offshore facilities as port facilities, extending the
requirements for the appointment of a PFSO, the development of a PFSA and the
respective implementation of PFSP. By considering armed robbery into their PFSA
and PFSP, offshore facilities would be better prepared for that type of events,
improving their response to these type of incidents.
As explained in paper 1 of this dissertation, in the hypothetical scenario of a large
terrorist attack on oil terminals, or even a marine casualty as a result of a security
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incident, it is necessary that the PFSP should include procedures and measures for
response to this type of emergencies, including the environmental factor. An attack
against this type of infrastructure would require extensive coordination not only at
national level, but also international.
Therefore the development of a plan for bi-national coordination with the
neighbouring State, United States, putting aside sovereignty concerns and focusing
on cooperation to avoid and manage (in this case) an extensive marine catastrophe
is recommended.
Another solution is as Menefee (2002), argues Governments worldwide could
develop a law under their national legislation to sanction acts of piracy and maritime
violence committed within territorial waters or at the coastal zone. In the model
presented by this author offshore installations are also considered for sanctions of
maritime violence.

6.4 The enactment of the ISPS Code into Mexico’s
national legislation, the 2016 maritime reform and
possible solutions to juridical ambiguities
The appended papers present several deficiencies concerning the implementation
and compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico. Errors in the enactment of the Code
into national legislation are exacerbated by the lack of cooperation between SEMAR
and SCT for the adequate operation of the CUMARs at all ports, which is the organ
that holds the responsibility for the revision and approval of PSA/PFSA PSP/PFSP
SSA and SSP, audits and annual inspection on compliance of security plans.
One of the most serious deficiencies is the fact that due to the rather weak exercise
of authority on the part of the representatives of the Navy at the CUMARs at all
ports, and ignorance about their duties and responsibilities according to the Law of
Ports and the CUMAR’s Regulation; the juridical procedures for the the revision
and approval of PSA/PFSA PSP/PFSP and the issuance of respective SOCs to ports
and port terminals were not followed. The void left by the CUMARs was in practice
filled by FIDENA (through an agreement with SCT), which performed the revision,
approval and inspections of security assessments and plans and send the respective
notification of approval to SCT for issuance of issuance of the Statement(s) of
Compliance and International Ship Security Certificates. Hence the current security
plans and respective SOCs at all ports in Mexico must be revised and renewed, since
they were not originally approved by the CUMAR, but by another institution
violating the requirements established in the Law of Ports, articles 19; 19 BIS, and
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19 TER; as well as the CUMAR`s regulation, as explained in paper 4 and section
2.2.3 of this dissertation.
Because of ambiguities and contradictions in several laws, the CUMAR has not
been fully operating, inclusive after the last reform. This situation must be seen in
light of the rather limited work of the National Parliament in respect of the
inadequate enactment of Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974,
(SOLAS Convention), containing the ISPS Code into national legislation in Mexico.
This, together with the poor cooperation between SEMAR and SCT has resulted in
the fact that the juridical procedures for the revision and approval of all PSA(s),
PFSA(s), PSP(s), PFSP(s), and SSA(s), SSP(s) and and the issuance of respective
Statement of Compliance (SOC) and International Ship Security Certificate(s), were
not followed even after the last reform. The problem was regarding the revision and
approval of those security evaluations and plans by the CUMAR, which was done
by another institution that has not that attribution by law.
The significant deficiencies of the new maritime regime, including the “inter
institutional character” of the CUMAR [completely unnecessary after the transferal
of Harbour Masters to SEMAR] are presented in paper 4 and section 2.2.3 of this
dissertation.
The magnitude of juridical weaknesses of the national legal framework, even after
the last maritime reform, limit the exercise of authority of the “National Maritime
Authority”, the CUMARs and UNAPROPs before national vessels, its masters and
ship-owners; port administrations and port terminals to an obvious and outstanding
degree.
Port and maritime security in the terms of the ratified international treaties and
instruments (ISPS Code), is established as one of several attributions of SEMAR,
according to the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, Article 30,
subsection V, letter d. On the contrary, Article 36, subsection XVII of the same law,
does not allocate this attribution to SCT, instead it establishes that SCT shall
“participate” with SEMAR in the application of maritime safety and security
measures.
The endorsed duty to SCT is on a “participation” level and only regarding maritime
and not port security, since this is not reflected in the article as it is in the case of
SEMAR. It is important to highlight that the Organic Law of the Federal Public
Administration is above the Law of Ports, since that law establishes the attributions
of each of the different secretariats of the State. Thus, port and maritime security is
a total responsibility of SEMAR and the “inter institutional character” of the
CUMARs is unnecessary.
A reasonable solution is that the President disregards the “inter institutional
character” of the CUMAR established in the Law of Ports by a decree and gives full
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attributions to SEMAR concerning port and maritime safety and security, leaving to
SCT the responsibility for development of ports from an economic perspective, as
it was intended with the 2016 reform and in harmonization with the established in
the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration.
Article 24 of the last referred Federal Law gives the power to the President to
determine the attributions of an institution/ministry when there is disagreement
between two laws or between two institutions. This Article reads as follows:
“In extraordinary cases or when exists doubts about the attributions of any of the
Secretariats of the State related to a specific matter, the President of the Republic
will resolve to which Secretariat corresponds its execution, through the Secretaría
de Governación, SEGOB (Secretariat of Governance)”. Such solution must be
published in the Official Diary of the Federation.
This decree could also include the part of the ISPS Code related to vessels as the
SSA, SSP and the designation of SSO, which was not included in the CUMAR’s
Regulation in the sections dealing with the ISPS Code. Otherwise a revision to the
CUMAR’s regulation is necessary.
The implementation of a national program for recertification of compliance the ISPS
Code instruments at Mexican ports and vessels flagging its Flag to which the Code
applies to, would be necessary as soon as the character and constitution of the
CUMAR is solved. This is crucial not only for the national interest of Mexico and
port stakeholders since it might have international and economic consequences, but
also for ship-owners and charterers.
As previously discussed, ships must declare in the Advance Notice of Arrival the
last 10 ports/port facilities where it has conducted loading and unloading operations.
A ship that declares to have been at a port without a valid PSP/PFSP might be denied
entrance to other ports in another country.
Additionally, a ship that lays in a port that does not comply with the required
international security standards might not be secure. If it is not secure, it might not
be safe, either. There is an obligation for all ship-owners and charterers under
marine insurance law, amongst others, to keep the vessel safe.
Ship-owners and charterers might be unprotected regarding marine insurance
coverage for Hull Insurance, Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I Insurance)
and Loss of Hire Insurance, in the case of a casualty or time lost if the ship is
detained because of confiscation of drugs or weapons, while laying in port facilities
that do not hold a valid SOC and which have not implemented an approved security
plan.
Even the national interest of a State regarding protection of the marine environment
might be vulnerable in the case of a marine disaster caused by a ship, to which
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coverage for environmental liability under P&I insurance is denied, because of
laying on a port without a revised and approved security plan and respective SOC
by the correct institution and in accordance to procedures established by law.
Finally, the five questions that McTaggar (1998) considers regarding validity for an
action research study has been clearly answered through this section, specifying the
changes that were made through the implementation of the “transparent incident
reporting tool” and highlighting the improvement in reporting of security incidents,
as well as the legal changes concerning the latest maritime reform. It also
emphasizes what was not changed pointing out the unnecessary inter-institutional
character of the CUMAR.
It remarks that the allocation of the Port Authority to SSCT was confirmed in the
analysis of the reform, as well as the poor level of compliance with the ISPS Code
at the visited port facilities.
The fact that amendments to PSP and PFSP that should have been conducted after
security incidents were ignored, was also highlighted, as well as the lack of
enactment of the part of maritime security regarding the SSO, SSA and SSP into the
CUMAR’s Regulation.
The fact that the proper operation of CUMARs at all ports is problematic because
of its “inter-institutional character” as well as operational conflicts between
SEMAR and SCT was properly documented.

6.5 Conclusions and recommendations
The transparent reporting-incident tool developed and tested through this study has
been proven to be highly valuable for reporting of port and maritime security
incidents, as discussed in Paper 5 and section 5.5 of this dissertation, where it is
demonstrated a significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the
increase from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of
success. Moreover, it joins three primary port/maritime security functions: a)
reporting of port and maritime security incidents; b) classification and investigation
of serious security incidents that require reassessments of the PSA/PFSA/SSA and
amendments to the PSP/PFSP/SSP and finally; c) collection of evidence material
related to the security incident.
This instrument, combined with statistics, also provides nations with crucial
information about threats and needs for the allocation of economic, material and
human resources, absolutely necessary to set up the strategies for the development
of a Maritime National Security Policy. Its flexibility and adaptability makes
possible its implementation at any State of the world. Therefore it could be
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considered as an important contribution to the maritime realm for improvement of
maritime security.
Additionally, a critical analysis of the implementation and compliance of the ISPS
Code in Mexico, with special focus on port security both from a juridical and
practical perspective, was conducted in this dissertation. The appended papers and
different sections of this study illustrate the chaotic situation concerning port
security, which prevail in the referred country. It clearly identifies several breaches
concerning the compliance with this international set of security regulations, as well
as potential risks, and security threats for port administrators, terminal operators, oil
platforms, ship-owners, charterers and neighbouring countries. However, it also
provides possible and practical solutions, identifying the necessary amendments and
decrees to harmonise the national legal framework with international legislation as
the revocation of the “inter institutional character of the CUMAR”, which is urgent
to allow this organ operate and ensure compliance of the ISPS Code at all ports.
Likewise it suggests investments to upgrade physical security at port facilities as the
recommended acquisition of Cerberus Yacht Sonar systems for underwater
surveillance to cope with threats connected to smuggling of drugs and psychotropic
substances.
The described situation is quite serious, but it is already under improvement. The
SEMAR has taken several actions to upgrade port and maritime security under the
opportunities given by the limited maritime regime that currently applies, whereas
SCT has taken several actions to improve physical security of port facilities. The
problem remains concerning the procedures followed for the approval of
PSA/PFSA/SSA, PSP/PFSP/SSP, annual inspections, audits and respective
certifications, since this was not made in accordance with the requirements
established by law. Another issue is the limited cooperation between these
institutions. Therefore, it is necessary the implementation of an intensive
programme for revision and approval of PSA/PFSA/SSA, and PSP/PFSP/SSP with
respective issuance of Statements of Compliance and International Ship Security
Certificates, after the inter-institutional character of this organ is solved and
according to the procedures established by law. Strengthening of cooperation
between SEMAR and SCT is a prerequisite for success.
The findings of this dissertation are highly valuable for the required amendments to
the maritime regime in Mexico, whilst the instrument for reporting of security
incidents and its related applicability for the development of a National Maritime
Security Policy represents an important contribution not only for Mexico, but
worldwide.
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6.7 Further research
a) The expansion of the application of the ISPS Code to oil platforms and
offshore activities. It has been described in this dissertation how oilrigs and
offshore facilities are also highly exposed to piratical acts and terrorism.
The evaluation of the application of the ISPS Code instruments as PFSA
and PFSP need to be further explored under a holistic approach where
interest of the oil industry are represented in the balance between security
and economic aspects.
b)

The expansion of the application of the ISPS Code’s instruments to
Customs Maritime Units. Findings in Paper 5 of this dissertation show that
maritime customs installations are highly exposed to security threats. The
lack of a security plan at these units might also put in risk the rest of the
port area. The application of the PFSA and PFSP to Customs Maritime
Units could be explored to standardize all facilities within the port area and
synchronize port authority security efforts.

c) The definition of piracy concerning both the location of the incident and the
type of property, including oilrigs and platforms needs to be further
evaluated.
d) Specific strategies applicable worldwide for the development of a National
Maritime Security Policy should be explored. It is true that the different
parts of the world regions have different security risks, but there are some
common factors that could be considered while building policies.
e) Security Culture. The approach to security culture is different depending of
the world region. Lessons from countries with a strong security culture
could be evaluated for its adaptability to other regions through capacity
building.
f) The transparent reporting-incident tool developed and tested through action
research in this study could also be combined with the revised harmonized
reporting procedures for reports required under SOLAS regulation I/21 and
MARPOL, Articles 8 and 12, established in the MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3.
Another possibility is that the data acquired through this instrument could
serve to revise and complement information obtained through MSC-
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MEPC.3/Circ.3 and its respective format concerning the part addressing
information from casualties involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants
in packaged form on board ships and in port areas. It is important to recall
that whhile MEPC.3/Circ.3 focuses on very serious and serious marine
casualties and incidents, from the accidental or human factor perspective
(safety), the instrument developed in this study addresses incidents from a
strict security perspective. In other words, those intentionally caused by any
person with the aim of damaging the vessel, port facility or marine
environment, as well as threats related to armed robbery, drug smuggling,
stowaways and illegal migration.
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APPENDIX I
Format for reporting security incidents,
English version.

Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, Adriana
Dalaklis, Dimitrios

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION
PORT NAME:_________________________________
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER
FILE NR:
TYPE OF SECURITY INCIDENT

ASIGNED CODE

ATTACK TO THE PORT / PORT INSTALLATIONS
BOMB OR EXPLOSIVES WARNING / TERRORISM
PERSONNEL KIDNAPPING WITHIN THE PORT INSTALLATION
PERSONNEL KIDNAPPING OUTSIDE THE PORT INSTALLATION
ARMED ROBBERY
CONFISCATION OF WEAPONS/FIREARMS
CONFISCATION OF DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR PSYCHOTROPIC MATERIAL
CONFISCATION OF EXPLOSIVES
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS (INCLUDING FISHERMEN AND
STOWAWAYS)
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO PORT AUTHORITY AREA (CUSTOMS / PORT POLICE)
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PSP/PFSP’S INFORMATION
LERNING TO KNOW SECURITY INCIDENTS BY THE MEDIA (NOT REGISTERED BEFORE)
TROUBLE/DAMAGE IN CCTV SYSTEMS
DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT AND PROTECTIVE MEANS THROUGH VANDALISM
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES IN THE PORT INSTALLATION OR THEIR SURROUNDINGS
ACCESS POINTS PROVIDED WITH INADEQUATED PROTECTION MEANS
VEHICLES ABANDONED IN THE PORT INSTALLATIONS OR ITS SURROUNDINGS
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF ACCESS DOCUMENTS FOR VISITORS
FAILURES IN CONTROL AREAS
EXTORTION’S TELEPHONE CALLS
WORKER’S STRIKE OR DEMONSTRATION WITH CLOSURE OF ACCESS AREAS
FAILURE IN THE TELEPHONE SYSTEMS
FAILURE IN THE WATER, ELECTRICITY OR SEWAGE SYSTEMS
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY DAMAGE PORT SECURITY
INADEQUATED USE OF ACCESS DOCUMENTS AS ACCESS CARDS
STOWAWAYS
LOCALIZATION OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WITHIN THE PORT INSTALLATIONS
FAILURE TO PROTECT/HANDLE DANGEROUS GOODS
FAILURE TO USE ADEQUATE CLOTHING & ACCESS IDENTITY CARDS WITHIN THE PORT
INSTALLATIONS
FAILURE ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PORT INSTALLATION
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT MEANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS
FAILURE TO FOLLOW REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES OF THE PORT INSTALLATION
MEANT FOR PROTECTION
FAILURE ON RADIO AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
FAILURE IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND INFORMATIC NETWORKS
DETECTION OF ZONES THAT SERVE AS POINTS OF OBSERVATION FOR ILLICIT PURPOSES
RECOGNITION, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATORY CHARACTER, OF PERSONS WITH
CHARACTERISTICS OR BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS THAT SUPPOSE A THREAT
NOT AUTHORIZED COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN THE INTERFACE SHIP - PORT TERMINAL
LATE RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY OR CONTINGENCY PLANS
SECURITY INCIDENTS IN LOAD SPACES/WAREHOUSES AND STOWAGE DEVICES
DETECTION OF FAILURES IN THE EMERGENCY OR RESERVE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
INADEQUATED HANDLING OF THE CARRIAGE OR ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT OF SYSTEMS OF
THE PORT INSTALLATION
FAILURE OF LOGISTICS OR DELIVERY AND RECEPTION OF PROTECTION
EQUIPMENT/PROVISIONS TO THE PORT INSTALLATION
NON-AUTHORIZED INTRUSION TO EXTRICT RESTRICTED AREAS OF THE PORT
INSTALLATIONS

IFP-001
IFP-002
IFP-003
IFP-004
IFP-005
IFP-006
IFP-007
IFP-008
IFP-009

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

1

IFP-010
IFP-011
IFP-012
IFP-013
IFP-014
IFP-015
IFP-016
IFP-017
IFP-018
IFP-019
IFP-020
IFP-021
IFP-022
IFP-023
IFP-024
IFP-025
IFP-026
IFP-027
IFP-028
IFP-029
IFP-030
IFP-031
IFP-032
IFP.033
IFP-034
IFP-035
IFP-036
IFP-037
IFP.038
IFP-039
IFP-040
IFP-041
IFP-042
IFP-043
IFP-044
IFP-045

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION
PORT NAME:_________________________________
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER
FILE NR:

1

NAME OF INCIDENT AND / OR PROTECTION FAILURE:
ASSIGNED CODE:

2

DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT AND / OR PROTECTION FAILURE:

3

TIME, DATE AND MARITIME TERMINAL (PLACE) OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION
FAILURE:

4

SUPPORT EVIDENCE’S DOCUMENTS:
DAILY EVENT’S REPORT:
EXTRACT OF BINNACLE:
DIAGRAMS:
PICTURES:
VIDEOS:
AUDIO RECORDINGS:
PERSONAL INFORMATION (INVOLVED PERSONS):

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

5

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGES:

6

NOTIFICATIONS:
PSO / PFSO:
NAVY UNIT FRO PORT PROTECTION (NAUPPRO) NR.:
MASTER OF HARBOUR:
ANY OTHER INSTITUTION:
NAME OF THE INSTITUTION:

7

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

EXACT PLACE WHERE THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE HAPPENED:

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

2

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION
PORT NAME:_________________________________
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER
FILE NR:

8

DESCRIPTION OF AUTHORITIES RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE:

9

TYPE OF INCIDENT OR PROTECTION FAILURE IF NOT INCLUDED IN THE CODE’S LIST:

10

CROQUIS/ SKETCH OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT PLACE:

11

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN:

DID THE PSP/PFSP FUNCTION PROPERLY?
ARE THERE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MODIFY THE PSP/PFSP?
SPECIFY WHAT MODIFICATIONS ARE SUGGESTED TO DO :

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

3

YES
YES

NO
NO

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION
PORT NAME:_________________________________
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER
FILE NR:
12

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PSO / PFSO:

13

WAY OF PARTICIPATION OF AUTHORITIES AND INSTITUTIONS:

14

SHALL THE SECURITY INCIDENT PASSES TO OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION OR BE FOLLOWED UP?
NO
YES
_________________________________________________________________________________________
WHICH AUTHORITY SHALL BE IN CHARGE OF THE OFICIAL INVESTIGATION, IF NECESSARY?

WHICH OTHER AUTHORITIES INTERVENED IN THE OFICIAL INVESTIGATION?

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

4

PORT SECURITY PLAN / PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
FEDERAL INTEGRATED PORT ADMINISTRATION
PORT NAME:_________________________________
SECURITY INCIDENT REGISTER
FILE NR:
15

ARRESTED PERSONS AS A RESULT OF A SECURITY INCIDENT:

ARE THERE ARRESTED PERSONS AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY INCIDENT?
NO

YES

NAMES, LAST NAMES, GENDER, AGE AND OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION OF ARRESTED
PERSONS

¿HAVE THEY BEEN INVOLVED IN PREVIOUS OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS?
NO

YES

AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION NUMBER, ADDRESS OF THE AUTHORITY/COURT
AND OTHER RELATED DATA

16

GENERAL COMMENTS:

ELABORATED BY
PSO/PFSO

REVISED BY
GENERAL DIRECTOR OF PORT OR
PORT FACILITY

WITNESS OF THE ELABORATION
UNAPROP COMMANDER

V/O
B/O
CUMAR / CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP

DATE

REVISION

BOOK & FILE NR:

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

5

APPENDIX II
Format for reporting security incidents,
Spanish version.

Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld, Adriana
Dalaklis, Dimitrios

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________
TIPO DE INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO DE PROTECCIÓN
ATAQUE A LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
AVISO DE BOMBA O EXPLOSIVO
SECUESTRO DENTRO DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
SECUESTRO FUERA DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ROBO A MANO ARMADA
LOCALIZACIÓN DE ARMA O ARMAS DE FUEGO
LOCALIZACIÓN DE ESTUPEFACIENTES O PSICOTRÓPICOS
LOCALIZACIÓN DE EXPLOSIVOS.
ACCESO NO AUTORIZADO A UNA ZONA RESTRINGIDA (INCLUYENDO PESCADORES Y
POLIZONES).
ACCESO NO AUTORIZADO A LA AUTORIDAD PORTUARIA
DIVULGACIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE UN PPIP
CONOCIMIENTO DE UN SUCESO POR LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN.
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS DE CCTV
DAÑO A LOS EQUIPOS Y MEDIOS DE PROTECCIÓN MEDIANTE VANDALISMO
PAQUETES SOSPECHOSOS EN LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA O SUS INMEDIACIONES
PUNTOS DE ACCESO PROVISTOS DE INADECUADOS MEDIOS DE PROTECCIÓN.
VEHÍCULOS ABANDONADOS EN LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA O SUS INMEDIACIONES
USO INADECUADO DE PASES.
FALLOS EN LOS PUNTOS DE CONTROL.
LLAMADA TELEFÓNICA DE EXTORSIÓN
HUELGA O MANIFESTACIÓN DE TRABAJADORES CON CIERRE DE ACCESOS.
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS DE TELEFONÍA.
FALLO EN LOS SERVICIOS DE AGUA, ELECTRICIDAD O DRENAJE.
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE MATERIAL CONFIDENCIAL.
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE INFORMACIÓN SOBRE PROPIEDAD COMERCIAL.
DIFUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA DE INFORMACIÓN QUE PUEDA MENOSCABAR A LA
PROTECCIÓN.
USO INDEBIDO DE DOCUMENTOS DE ACCESO.
POLIZONES
MIGRACIÓN ILEGAL
FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN DE MERCANCÍA PELIGROSA
FALLO EN EL USO DE VESTIMENTA ADECUADA DENTRO DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
FALLO EN LA INTEGRIDAD ESTRUCTURAL DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
USO INADECUADO DE EQUIPOS O SISTEMAS DE PROTECCIÓN DEL PERSONAL
FALLO EN LAS NORMAS Y PROCEDIMIENTOS DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS RADIOELÉCTRICOS Y DE TELECOMUNICACIONES
FALLO EN LOS SISTEMAS Y REDES INFORMÁTICAS.
DETECCIÓN DE ZONAS QUE SIRVAN COMO PUNTOS DE OBSERVACIÓN CON FINES ILÍCITOS
RECONOCIMIENTO,
SIN
CARÁCTER
DISCRIMINATORIO,
DE
PERSONAS
CON
CARACTERÍSTICAS O PAUTAS DE COMPORTAMIENTO QUE SUPONGAN UNA AMENAZA.
PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES NO AUTORIZADAS EN LA INTERFAZ BUQUE - PUERTO
RESPUESTA TARDÍA ANTE UNA EMERGENCIA O PLANES PARA CONTINGENCIA
INCIDENTE EN LOS ESPACIOS DE CARGA Y DISPOSITIVOS DE ESTIBA
DETECCIÓN DE FALLOS EN EL EQUIPO DE EMERGENCIA O DE RESERVA DISPONIBLE
MANIPULACIÓN INDEBIDA DE LA CARGA, DEL EQUIPO O SISTEMAS ESENCIALES DE LA
INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
FALLO EN LAS ENTREGAS Y RECEPCIONES LOGÍSTICAS DE PROVISIONES A LA
INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA.
INTRUSIÓN NO AUTORIZADA A ÁREAS RESTRINGIDAS DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA

DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL

1

CÓDIGO
ASIGNADO
IFP-001
IFP-002
IFP-003
IFP-004
IFP-005
IFP-006
IFP-007
IFP-008
IFP-009
IFP-010
IFP-011
IFP-012
IFP-013
IFP-014
IFP-015
IFP-016
IFP-017
IFP-018
IFP-019
IFP-020
IFP-021
IFP-022
IFP-023
IFP-024
IFP-025
IFP-026
IFP-027
IFP-028
IFP-029
IFP-030
IFP-031
IFP-032
IFP.033
IFP-034
IFP-035
IFP-036
IFP-037
IFP.038
IFP-039
IFP-040
IFP-041
IFP-042
IFP-043
IFP-044
IFP-045

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________
1

NOMBRE DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN.

CÓDIGO ASIGNADO.

2

DESCRIPCIÒN DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN.

3

HORA, FECHA Y TERMINAL MARÌTIMA (LUGAR) DEL INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA
PROTECCIÒN.

4

DOCUMENTACIÒN Y EVIDENCIA DE SOPORTE:
REPORTE DE NOVEDADES:
EXTRACTO DE BITÀCORA:
DIAGRAMAS:
FOTOGRAFÌAS:
VIDEOS:
GRABACIONES DE AUDIO:
INFORMES PERSONALES:

5

DESCRIPCIÒN DE DAÑOS:

6

NOTIFICACIONES:
OPIP:
UNAPROP-14:
CAPITÀN DE PUERTO:
ALGUNA OTRA CORPORACIÒN:

7

SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

SI
SI
SI
SI

NO
NO
NO
NO

LUGAR EXACTO DEL INCIDENTE O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN:

DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL

2

.

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________
8

DESCRIPCIÒN DE LA RESPUESTA AL INCIDENTE O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN:

9

TIPO DE INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÒN.

10

CROQUIS DEL LUGAR DEL INCIDENTE.

11

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA.

FUNCIONO CORRECTAMENTE EL PPIP.
HAY RECOMENDACIONES PARA MODIFICAR EL PPIP.
ESPECIFICAR QUE MODIFICACIONES SE PROPONEN REALIZAR:

DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL

3

SI
SI

NO
NO

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________
12

COMENTARIOS Y RECOMENDACIONES DEL OPIP.

13

PARTICIPACIÓN DE AUTORIDADES:

14

EL INCIDENTE PASA A INVESJTIGACIÓN OFICIAL O DE CONTINUIDAD:
NO
SI
______________________________________________________________________________
___________
¿QUE AUTORIDAD ES LA ENGARGADA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN?

¿QUÉ OTRAS AUTORIDADES INTERVINIERON?

DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL

4

PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN PORTUARIA / PLAN DE PROTECCIÓN DE LA INSTALACIÓN PORTUARIA
ADMINISTRACIÓN FEDERAL PORTUARIA INTEGRAL___________________________________
NOMBRE DEL PUERTO:______________________________________
INCIDENTE Y/O FALLO EN LA PROTECCIÓN______________________
NÚMERO DE FOLIO:_________________________________________
15

¿HAY DETENIDOS?

SI

NO

NOMBRES, APELLIDOS, SEXO, EDAD Y OTROS GENERALES DE LOS DETENIDOS

¿HAY AVERIGUACIONES PREVIAS?

SI

NO

AUTORIDAD, NUMERO DE AVERIGUACIÓN, DOMICILIO DE LA AUTORIDAD Y OTROS DATOS.

16

:
COMENTARIOS GENERALES:

ELABORÓ
OPIP

REVISÓ
DIRECTOR GENERAL DE LA
INSTALACIÓN

CONSTAME
COMANDANTE DE UNAPROP

V/O
B/O
PRESIDENTE DE CUMAR

FECHA

REVISIÓN

LIBRO Y FOJA

DOCUMENTO CONFIDENCIAL

5
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Implementation and Compliance of the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code in Mexico: A
literature Review and Selected Issues
A. Ávila‐Zúñiga‐Nordfjeld & D. Dalaklis
World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and compliance of
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), for the case of Mexico. This investigation
was initially oriented solely towards Mexico, but due to the absence of research within this subject for the
referred country the review had to be done through subcategories with the conditional connection of Mexico
and relevant issues were selected. The primary data confirmed the absence of research within this subject in
Mexico. The secondary data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed for a
wider geographical coverage and an expanded on general bases the scope of analysis, since ten (10) different
academic databases were exploited. The literature review from an author‐centric approach is initially
presented; then, it is used as the basis to further develop (and examine) the concept‐centric approach, through
eight selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on specific concepts, allowed the
identification of cross fertilization of such concepts in the respective fields. It is observed that the research
efforts focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) have an integrated
perspective, where the categories of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management
and the issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. The results demonstrate the
limited number of academic contributions in these areas from America Central and South America in relation to
other parts of the globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code in Mexico. In the
scientific contributions on the subject were Mexico is included; it is in reference to isolated cases of armed
robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself.
The absence of scientific research on this area for the specific country might also be related to the lack of a
national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have pointed out in other
contributions.

1 INTRODUCTION
After the notorious terror attack in the United States
of America (U.S.) on September 11th, 2001, the
International
Maritime
Organization
(IMO)
developed a set of maritime security regulations for
managing the risk of maritime terrorism with the aim
to improve maritime and port security. These
provisions were established in Chapter XI‐2 of the

Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS
Convention), containing the new International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Part A of
this Code establishes the mandatory provisions, while
the non‐mandatory (“recommended”) part B
encompasses guidelines about how to comply with
the mandatory requirements of part A (IMO, Official
website, 2017).
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The IMO establishes that the ISPS Code is “the
comprehensive set of measures to enhance the
security of ships and port facilities, developed in
response to the perceived threats to ships and port
facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United
States” (IMO, Official website, 2017). As explained by
Nordfjeld & Dalaklis (2016), compliance with the ISPS
Code and submission of related information to IMO is
only mandatory for Contracting Governments to the
SOLAS 1974 Convention. They have also pointed out
that currently “there is not a penalty‐mechanism in
place for states that don’t effectively comply with the
ISPS Code”, since the overall concept is not to impose
penalties, but to rely on market forces and economic
factors to ensure compliance.
The development of Port Facility Security Plans
(PFSPs) has been discussed within the context of
maritime security management systems in several
research efforts after the approval of the ISPS Code by
the IMO; it has been viewed as the most important
instrument to cope with potential security risks at
ports and associated infrastructure‐installations.
Mexico implemented the ISPS Code in 2004 yet, the
development/establishment of PFSPs has not been
fully effective, especially regarding security incident
reporting and investigation. Incident record keeping
and the consequent investigation are crucial for the
performance and applicability of PFSPs, since these
Plans must be amended attending the causes of the
investigated event.
As discussed by Webster & Watson (2002), an
effective literature review is a crucial foundation for
advancing knowledge, because it defines the key
sources for a topic under research and uncovers the
areas where (more) research is necessary, giving a
clear contribution to science. Additionally, an
effective literature review must follow academic
guidelines to rigorously document the process of
literature search as discussed by Brocke, et al. (2009);
the literature review in hands strictly follows a linear
and simple approach that ensures academic integrity.
The foundation of the methodology used is presented
in the next section; subsequently, the results are
discussed, followed by the necessary conclusions.

2 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this paper is to examine the state of
the art related to the implementation and compliance
of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code) within the context of port security
in Mexico, based on a cross‐disciplinary approach
among eight selected categories.

3 METHODOLOGY
Webster & Watson (2002, p. xiv) explained that a high
quality review must cover all relevant literature on
the topic and should not be confined to a limited set
of journals. Therefore, a thorough search by topic in
different databases across all relevant journals and
across all disciplines must be performed. The
contextual boundary is within the scope of the
364

development of the PFSP for port oil terminals in
Mexico, under the framework of the opening of the oil
industry in that country; the respective time‐based
boundary covers all articles published in journals and
conference proceedings until the indicated dates for
search at the databases given in table 1 that follows.
This table describes the considered databases for this
literature review and the parameters for querying.
The literature search method encompassed
querying ten (10) different scientific databases as
proposed by Webster & Watson (2002, p. xvi). The
first test was made back in June 2015, with the search
queries for “ISPS Code Mexico”. This resulted in only
one book review about military law. New tests with
other words were tried. The key words used for the
search criteria, excluding the Google Scholar
Database, were “offshore, terrorism, Mexico”.
Furthermore, since probably there are thousands of
articles related to each of these concepts, testing
different combination of them was required. Other
combination of words were tested first, like “offshore,
terrorism, resilience” and “offshore, terrorism,
resilience, security management systems, ISPS Code”.
It was discovered that these search enquiries covered
a very few items. Additionally, the search “offshore,
terrorism, ISPS Code, Mexico” was tried. At the end
of the successive test queries, the keywords “offshore,
terrorism, Mexico” was tested. This one provided the
largest number of items; it was also noted that with
this search query several articles included in the other
tests were also included in the results (largest data
sample). It is important to recall that the search for
“ISPS Code Mexico” resulted in zero items and
therefore, the words “offshore, terrorism, Mexico”
were used with reasoning that ISPS Code focuses on
terrorism and provides maritime security measures to
counter terrorism both at ports and at sea and the
condition that we were searching for results in
Mexico. Other type of maritime security threats like
piracy; armed robbery; stowaways; illegal migration;
and drug smuggling, are not directly covered by the
ISPS Code, since it leaves up to the discretion of
contracting governments to SOLAS, its extension of
application to these type of subjects (IMO, 2012), and
hence they were not considered for the search query.
Since the words used for querying the different
databases were in English, the search included only
academic journal articles written in English.
However, for the Google Scholar Database another
combination of words in Spanish was used; “Mexico,
terrorismo, instalaciones portuarias petroleras, plan
de protección”11. The time boundary was specified to
2004‐2015 (after the ISPFS Code was introduced).
Even if the words were in Spanish, some articles in
English were also captured by this search. It was
decided to also use Google Scholar because several of
the leading scientific journals in Spanish are indexed
there. The considered databases for this literature
review and the parameters for querying are all listed
in Table 1.

11

Mexico, terrorism, oil port installations, security plan.

Table
1. Databases and parameters for search enquiry
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Database

Words
of search

Date of
search

Period
Nr. Articles Relevant articles Relevant articles
& Language / Books
after title
after Abstract/
of search
Preface/ Contents
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) CRC‐net‐Base

Offshore terrorism
03.06.2015 Non specified 190
40
21
Mexico (OTM)
(2) ProQuest
(OTM)
05.06.2015 Non specified 28
15
1012
(3) Science‐Direct
(OTM)
06.06.2015
279
36
5
(4) Academic Search (OTM)
06.06.2015 Non specified 1
0
0
Complete WMU
(5) Ingenta‐Connect (OTM)
06.06.2015 Non specified 0
0
0
Database
(6) Springer
(OTM)
06.06.2015 Non specified
1
1
0
(7) Emerald Insight
(OTM)
21.08.2015 Non specified 82
12
6
(8) IEEEXplore Digital (OTM)
21.08.2015 Non specified 134
21
3
Library
(9) Wiley Online
(OTM)
21.08.2015 Non specified 614
35
17
Library
(10) Google Scholar Mexico terrorismo inst. 22.08.2015 2004‐2015
472
34
11
Port. petroleras plan
13
de seguridad
__________________________________________________________________________________________________

TOTAL
1801
194
73
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
On 2nd of March, 2018 and with an effort to re‐
evaluate the state of the art and update the results, a
new test with the search query “ISPS Code, Mexico”
was conducted. This time it was made only in EBSCO
since this scientific search instrument covers all the
databases above, the results showed only one item. To
ensure that it was the right search query and avoid
human bias; the words “ISPS Code” but in
combination with several other countries were further
tested. These results are provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Number of research contributions by the
combination
of ISPS Code and the country
_______________________________________________
ISPS
CODE + COUNTRY
_______________________________________________
COUNTRY
NR. OF CONTRIBUTIONS /
ARTICLES
_______________________________________________
United States
29,107
Europe
15,276
United Kingdom
27,442
Greece
12,809
Turkey
12,721
Sweden
13,447
Norway
12,915
Canada
4
Mexico
1
Brazil
13,015
Argentina
12,641
Chile
12,645
Peru
12,529
Panama
12,648
_______________________________________________

Based on this outcome, the results from the search
of 2015 were used. However, it was discovered later
that the contributions were not directly related to
Mexico concerning the ISPS Code, but rather
connecting the country to isolated crime cases or drug
organizations.

12
13

4 RESULTS
As shown in Table 1, the search from June 2015
resulted into 1,801 articles/books, which was reduced
to only 194 after examining the titles; these were
further reduced to 75 after consideration of abstracts
or preface summary, as well as introduction and table
of contents in the case of books. Those that were not
included in the next stage were clearly related to
concepts that had a better fit with a different
discipline ‐or a different context‐ and did not comply
with the specific combination. The literature review
from an author‐centric approach is presented in Table
III which follows next. In accordance with the type of
contributions from the results, eight categories were
selected to further study the topic and used for
developing the literature review. These categories are
the following:
 Concept 1= Terrorism (at sea or maritime
terrorism).
 Concept 2= Counterterrorism
 Concept 3= Port Facility Security Plan
 Concept 4= International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code
 Concept 5= Maritime Security
 Concept 6= Safety
 Concept 7= Oil Spill & Environmental Protection
 Concept 8= Resilience plan –In the sense of
prevention & response & to emergencies
(preventive and reactive measures to emergencies)
As it can be observed in table III that follows, in
various research efforts (mostly books), the focus
includes the analysis of different concepts in relation
to the eight categories selected above. A significant
number of books focused on port and maritime
security, addressing the ISPS Code and PFSP.
However, it is noteworthy that safety issues, as a
result of security incidents were also addressed in
these books. Within this category, the issue most
commonly identified was marine pollution caused by

In addition to two counted and repeated in CRC‐net database.
Mexico, terrorismo, instalaciones portuarias petroleras, plan de protección.
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oil spill associated with security incidents. The
complete list of the references related to these

research items is presented in Appendix I.

Table
3. Author‐centric literature review
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Author
Type
Methods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
114 (Schulz, 2011)15
CH
1 (Pilewsk & Pilewski, 2012)
CH
1 (Norman, 2012)
CH
1 (Bolz, Dudonis, & Schulz, 2012)
CH
1 (Hesterman, 2013) Pages 295‐300
CH
1 (Doro‐on, 2014)
CH
1 (Perdikaris, 2014)
CH
1 (Kenneth, 2009)16
Book
1 (T. & Tweedy, 2014)
Book
17
1 (Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman, 2008) Book
1 (Badiru & Racz, 2013)
Book
1 (Rogers, 2007)
Book
1 (Neumann, 2013)
Book
1 (Pinkowski, 2008)
Book
1 (Mythen, 2014)
CH
1 (Lutchman, Maharaj, & Waddah, 2012)
Book
1 (Bahr, 2014)
Book
1 (Park, 2013)
Book
1 (Theodore & Dupont, 2012)
Book
1 (Spurgin, 2009)
Book
2 (Cullen & Berube, 2012)
Book
2 (Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, 2009)
Book
2 (Tuerk, 2012)
Book
2 (Weintrit & Neumann, 2013)
Book
2 (Bragdon, 2008)
Book
2 (Tanaka, 2012)
Book
2 (Martínez Gutiérrez, 2009)
Book
2 (Weintrit & Adam, 2009)
Book
2 (Tan, 2005)
Book
2 (Ringbom, 2007)
Book
3 (Papa, July)
Article
3 (Safford, Ulrich, & Hamilton, 2012)
Article
3 (Jaradat & Keating, 2014)18

Article

3 (Lichterman, 1999)
3 (Piètre‐Cambacédès & Bouissou, 2013)19

Article
Article

7 (Phillips, 2008)
7 (Aronica, Mukhtyar, & Coon, 2001)
7 (Mugarura, 2014)

CH
Article
Article

7 (Goede, 2013)20

Article

7 (Haynes, 2000)
7 (Hoti & McAleer, 2005)

Article
CH

8 (Singha, Bellerby, & Trieschmann, 2012)
8 (Middleton, Glosec Ltd., Day, & Lallie, 2012)

Article
Article

8 (Crook, 2010)
9 (Giroux, 2010)

Article
Article

9 (Ibrahim & Allen, 2012)

Article

9 (Gregory, 2011)

Article

9 (Fabiano, 2012)
9 (Haimes & Yacob, 2011)

CH
Article

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Number corresponding to database
Pages: 4, 164,307, 311, 323.
Repeated in ProQuest
Repeated and fully available at ProQuest
Critical oil infrastructure.
Safety and security in several disciplines
Organized Crime.
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Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book

x x

x x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x x x x x x x x
x
x x x x x x x x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x x
x
x
x
x
x x
x x
x x
x
x x
x x x x
x
x
x
x
x

Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Book
Comparative Approach/ Doc. Analysis
Empirical. Tele‐phone Surveys
& Interviews
Literature review and conceptual
analysis of “critical infrastructure”
Reflective analysis
x
Literature Review Cross conceptual
analysis
Terror Attack Identification & Analysis
x x
Analysis of case law.
x
Qualitative. Secondary Data Analysis.
x
Doc. Analysis
Qualitative. Exploratory comparative
x
case analysis
Qualitative Comparative case analysis
x
Apply Risk Assessment model to
x
evaluate security of 120 countries
Sensitivity analysis of oil spill.
Use Nmap and Nessus to test network
vulnerabilities in offshore In 7 countries.
Magazine article
Risk Analysis on Natural and
Human‐caused Threats
Qualitative, interpretative methodology
with Activity Theory as a conceptual
framework
Qualitative literature review with a
x
comparative approach for three borderlands
Analysis on International Threats
x
Multidimensional Risk Analysis
x
on Terrorism

x
x
x x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

9 (Brown, Coté, Lynn‐Jones, & Miller, 2010)
9 (Vlcek, 2013)
9 (Crenshaw, 2010)
9 (Zabyelina, 2013)
9 (Stoney & Scanlon, 2014)
9 (Weinberg, 2008)
9 (Burgherr & Hirschberg, 2009)
9 (Lewis, 2006)
9 (Woodward & Pitbaldo, 2010)
9 (Bekefi & Epstein, 2011)

Book
Article
Book
Article
Article
Book
Book
CH
Book
Article

Book
x x
x
Procedure Analysis
x x
Book
x x
Book
x
Reflective / exploratory analysis
x
x
Book
x
x
x
Book.
x x
x x x x
Book
x x
x
x
Book
x x x
Descriptive / Narrative of best practice &
x
suggest a risk assessment method to
integrate risk into the financial analysis
9 (Speight, 2011)
Book
Book (Describe all the process of
x x
petroleum production and respective
problems and security challenges)
9 (Vaggelas & Ng, 2012)
CH
CH in a book
x x x
x
10 (Maldonado, 2009)
Article Essay
x x x x
10 (Garcia, Monosalva, Rezende, & Sgut, 2004)
Book
Multi‐methodology for different stage
x x x x x
analysis. ISPS Code Implementation
in South America from CEPAL
10 (Enríquez, 2007)
Article Analysis of the SUA convention
x
x
x
10 (Sgut, 2006)
Book
Book
x
10 (Preciado, 2009)
Article Reflective Analysis of the Security
x x
x
and Prosperity Partnership of North
America (SPPNA)
10 (Arias, 20014)
Thesis Case study
x
10 (Zamora, 2008)
Doc. Thesis Conceptual Analysis
x
10 (Castán, 2008)
Article Essay Historical analysis of literature
x
10 (Elizalde, 2012)
Doc. Thesis Analysis of documents, concepts
x x x x x x x x
and literature
10 (Taylor, 2009)
Book
Book
x
x
10
(Ferreirós, 2011)
Article Reflective Analysis
x
x
__________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table
4. Concept Matrix
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concept
Matrix
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concept
Articles included in the analysis Books included in the analysis Total
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
1. Terrorism (at sea or maritime terrorism)
14
27
41
2. Counterterrorism
2
15
17
3. Port Facility Security Plan
2
4
6
4. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
2
4
6
5. Maritime Security
16
19
35
6. Safety
1
17
18
7. Oil Spill & Environmental Protection
4
9
13
8.
Resilience plan
5
20
25
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table
5. Geographic dimension of selected literature
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Book/Article
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Kenneth (2009). This book is mainly about maritime security in the US, however the author also analyses several maritime
security incidents in other countries and devoted some chapters to the study of maritime security worldwide from a
historical perspective, written in English. North‐America: United States, Mexico. Central and South America: Brazil, Peru,
Ecuador, Chile. Europe: United Kingdom, Greek, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Mediterranean Sea, Greece,
France, Turkey. Asia: Indonesia, Malacca Strait, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, the Red Sea and
Arabian Sea, Suez Canal, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Japan. Africa: Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea, Namibia,
Senegal, Liberia, Guinea, Angola, Sierra Leone, South Africa
Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman (2008). Editors of a book that encompasses several scientific articles related to
maritime security & implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code from 31 authors. Note: It does not necessarily means
that each of the countries listed are related to a specific study, but often security incidents at some countries are referred to
in the study of another one, written in English. North‐America: United States, Canada & Mexico, (This last one was briefly
commented in an article addressing drug trafficking). Central and South America: Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia & the
Caribbean Sea. Europe: England, Germany, France & Italy, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Mediterranean
Sea, Asia: North Indian Sea, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Arabian Gulf and Malacca Strait Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines,
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Laos,
Vietnam, Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq, East Timor, Suez Canal. Africa: Somalia, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria & Algeria. Oceania:
Australia & New Zealand
Vaggelas & N (2012). Article with a comparative study about the implementation of the ISPS Code between the Piraeus and
Hong Kong ports. North‐America: United States. Europe: Piraeus, Greece. European Union’s implementation of IMO
instruments. Asia: Hong Kong, China
Maldonado (2009). This is an article on operative safety and security related to foreign trade in Mexico, written in Spanish.
North‐America: Mexico, United States.
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(Garcia, Monosalva, Rezende, & Sgut, 2004) This is an article from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEPAL; in Spanish), with a Multi‐methodology for different stage analysis about Implementation of the ISPS
Code in South America, written in Spanish. North‐America: Mexico. Central and South America: All South American
States and the Caribbean.
Elizalde (2012). Doctoral thesis about the maritime security and its normativity. North‐America: Mexico, United States,
Central and South America: IMO & UN instruments applied in the Caribbean Region. International Agreements from the
Organization of American States against maritime drug traffic Europe: IMO & UN instruments applied in the European
Union,
Spain Africa: Somalia
__________________________________________________________________________________________________

In order to make the conversion from the author‐
centric approach towards the category‐centric
approach and synthesize the relevant literature, table
4 that follows is providing a summary of a category
matrix in relation to the number of articles and/or
books that were identified during the search.
Then, the items that included in their analysis the
categories three, four and five “Port Facility Security
Plan; International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code and; Maritime Security” were further studied
under a geographical dimension, including five
subcategories that covered North‐America, Central
and South America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The
complete details of this analysis are illustrated in
Table 5.

5 DISCUSSION
The original purpose of this review, which was to
examine the state of the art of implementation and
compliance of the ISPS Code in México, had to be
adjusted since there was only one article that met the
search criteria; and which actually falls outside the
framework of this literature review, as it is about
military law. The results about this objective are clear:
the state of the art concerning implementation and
compliance of ISPS Code in Mexico is quite poor. The
topic really need to be researched and, in general, it is
observed that research within the maritime domain in
Mexico is limited. Even when it was used some
subcategories to get a wider number of research
items, it is discovered that those academic efforts that
mention Mexico, they do it in a connection to isolated
cases of drug organization, proliferation of crime or
smuggling of drugs and weapons, but not in direct
connection to compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico.
Yet, the research contributions were deeper explored
and divided into geographical areas to examine their
allusions to the country in the analysis and studied
according to eight selected categories, it make it more
evident the lack of research in the maritime real in the
referred nation. In a previous study Nordfjeld‐Avila‐
Zúñiga & Dalaklis (2018) have already addressed “the
necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and
protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore [of
Mexico] in the national agenda that would provide
for future research directions in the maritime security
domain and contribute to the establishment of a
national maritime security policy”.
Therefore, at this stage of the study the scope gets
another dimension, since even the search queries
were conditioned to the word of Mexico, the research
items that have brought connections to this country
were for isolated cases, and the contributions that
were found are mainly addressed to other parts of the
world. Thus, the discussion shifts focus to the eight
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selected categories; based on the contributions on
general bases, rather than the country.
Even though the concept of “terrorism” has been
discussed by several authors in the past, there is not a
sole definition. Tuerk (2012) pointed out that there is
not an authoritative definition of this term, but that all
definitions have several features in common: “first,
there must be actual or threatened violence; second a
political motive is necessary; finally, the acts must be
directed at and intended to influence a targeted audience”.
To emphasize this, the author cites to note 393, from
Power, Maritime Terrorism: “A new Challenge” and
further explains that the overall side of the common
aspect is arguably that an act is not terrorism unless it
has a deliberate political motive. Kenneth (2009),
coincides with Tuerk that there are many definitions
of terrorism and says that it is simply “the use of force
or violence against people and places to intimidate and/or
coerce a government, its citizens, or any segment thereof
for political or social goals”. The author expands his
explanation by arguing that terrorists try to coerce the
adversary to obtain a goal without having to face the
risk of a direct confrontation, fighting an
asymmetrical war, which is an strategy used by the
weaker side in the conflict to compensate for the
strengths of the enemy.
Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman (2008),
have similar views to the above mentioned authors.
They further discuss maritime terrorism21, by arguing
that despite the hysteria surrounding, acts of
maritime terrorism are by no means frequent, because
maritime terrorism requires a certain degree of
familiarity with the sea. These researchers also noted
that “terrorists would also need a kind of maritime domain
awareness (MDA) to even think about including maritime
attacks into their modus operandi –and the availability of a
special set of knowledge and skills”. Even so, they
correctly pointed out that acts of maritime terrorism
targeting ships, ports and oil terminals occur and that
therefore it is necessary to be prepared with
appropriate countermeasures. Kenneth (2009) defines
“counterterrorism” in his glossary, as “offensive
strategies, tactics and plans used by government agencies,
military forces, law enforcement agencies, and private
sector organizations to mitigate the threat of terrorism by
reducing the chances that individuals or groups can
successfully wage campaigns of terror in pursuit of their
organizational goals”. Finally, in the context of
maritime terrorism and maritime security, discussed
by
Klein,
Rothwell,
&
Mossop,
(2009),
counterterrorism may be understood as the capacity
of a state to respond to sudden and unanticipated
threats.
21 Terrorism at sea or terror actions against vessels, port and off‐
shore installations.

Counterterrorism capacity is one of the objectives
of any PFSP, which is an instrument embodied in
the ISPS Code to ensure the application of security
measures deliberated to protect the port facility and
its serving vessels, their cargoes, and persons on
board at the respective security levels. According to
Kenneth (2009), a port facility is required to “plan and
effect security at the levels identified in the risk assessment
process and as established by the governmental entities
with statutory responsibilities for port security oversight”.
This author also emphasized the need of
standardizing the terms used in the plan since a term
like security, for instance, may have a different
meaning for different people in different
environments. For the purposes of developing a port
facility security plan, he correctly identified that a
working understanding of the security should include
a set of measures aimed to:
 “Neutralizing vulnerabilities for criminal activity
within the port,
 Identifying and responding to safety issues,
 Minimizing the threat of terrorism,
 Reducing opportunities for internal criminal
conspiracies,
 Disrupting links between corruption, terrorism
and organized crime,
 Sharing intelligence and investigative information,
with appropriate law enforcement agencies,
 Promoting opportunities for the exchange of best
practices in port security”.
Kenneth (2009) criticised that very often the PFSP
exists only in paper, but it is rarely tested for
effectiveness and emphasized that “the key to
successful port security management in terms of the
PFSP is to understand it as a living document”.
Vaggelas & Ng (2012), noted that based on the
requirements of the PFSA (Port Facility Security
Assessment), a PFSP has to be developed for each
facility which has provisions for addressing changing
security levels for every security operation and that a
PFSP may cover more than one facility only provided
that the operator, location, operation, equipment and
design of those facilities are very similar to each other.
As mentioned before, the PFSP is a requirement of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS Code), which came into force on July 1st. of
2004 and it is a part of the amendments to the 1974
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
Kenneth (2009) defined the ISPS Code in his glossary,
as the “comprehensive set of measures implemented in
2004 to enhance the security of ships and port facilities,
developed and agreed to by member countries of the
International Maritime Organization in response to the
perceived threats to ships and port facilities after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States”.
Vaggelas & Ng (2012) simplify that the Code has
mainly two major components; part A that illustrates
the minimum mandatory requirements that ships
(represented by their firms) and ports (represented by
the contracting government) must follow; while Part
B provides more detailed, but not compulsory,
guidelines for the implementation of security
assessments and plans.
For Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman
(2008), the ISPS Code is a security regime formulated
under the auspices of the IMO to strengthen the
maritime security in general, and prevent and supress

acts of terrorism against the maritime realm. These
authors clarify that passenger ships, including high‐
speed passenger craft, cargo ships of 500 gross
tonnage and above, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
(MODUs) and all port facilities serving ships engaged
in international voyages are required to comply with
the ISPS Code, according to the established in the
SOLAS Chapter XI‐2. They also correctly identified
that the ISPS aim is to provide a standardized
consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling
governments to offset according to changes in
different threat levels affecting the vulnerability of
vessels, port and offshore facilities.
Furthermore, in an article written by J. Urbansky,
W. Morgas and M. Miesikowsky (2009) included in
the book edited by Weintrit A. (2009), the authors
stated that maritime security “is the security from the
terrorism, piracy and similar threats, as well as effective
interdiction of all the illicit activities on sea, such as
pollution of the marine environment; illegal exploitation of
sea resources; illegal immigration; smuggling the drugs,
persons, weapons and other matters that can be used for
terrorist activities”. All the above also explain why
concepts number 1 and 5 are the ones most commonly
presented in the research items, since interest on the
issue of terrorism and the respective maritime
security framework is high. On the other hand,
concepts 3 and 4 are rather low in representation. This
translates into the fact that implementation issues and
related practicalities are clearly lagging behind.
On a different direction, but in similarity to the
term of maritime security, there is not a sole and
universal definition for the concept of maritime
safety, although concepts such as protection of life
and property at sea, risk assessment and prevention
of hazards are standing out. Piètre‐Cambacédès &
Bouissou (2013, p.111‐112), analysed the similarities
and differences between the two domains, safety and
security. The authors pointed out that while security
is connected to risks originated or exacerbated by a
malicious action, independently from the nature of
the related consequence, the concept of safety is
linked to accidental actions i.e. without a malicious
intention, but with potential impact to the related
environment. They further clarify that in the security
discipline it is common the use of the term threat,
while in the safety discipline the tendency is to use
the term hazard, even though they are used to
describe identical concepts in several standards. An
example provided by these authors is the use of the
term incident, as an event with minor consequences in
safety, while it means an infringement or breach with
regards to security.
On this context, Kenneth (2009 p.223‐224) cited the
U.S. Department of Labor 2001 par.2, to emphasize
that: “The core function of any work place safety and
health program is to ‘find and fix’ hazards that endanger
employees and to implement systems, procedures and
processes that prevent hazards from recurring or being
introduced into the work place. This element of a worker
protection program has the most immediate and direct
effect on injury and illness prevention”. The author also
noted that port facilities present some unique and
extraordinary challenges with respect to safety
management because of the variation of operations
and its interaction with the vessels, cargo and land‐
based people, as well as conveyances.
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The issue of marine oil pollution is also considered
a part of maritime safety and maritime security and it
is included in the standards of training and
certification as an important part of oil spill
prevention. It is addressed as a possible consequence
of security incidents. Oil spill has also been addressed
several times within maritime security regarding
possible terror scenarios. Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert,
& Bateman (2008 p.57), argue that one of the
considered terror scenarios in United States is the
floating bomb scenario, “that is, a hijacked liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker
driven into a major port and exploded there, with the intent
of disrupting seaborne global trade”. The authors also
refer to the “momentum weapon” scenario, which is
about a large ship such as an ultra‐large crude carrier
or a chemical tanker, where the terrorists would
attempt to drive the vessel into the harbour at a high
speed to ram either other ships with vulnerable
cargoes or oil terminals and similar and then detonate
the ship. The last cited authors clarify that even if
such scenarios as the called “momentum weapon”
has been developed, for the port of Singapore, where
the largest of Southeast Asia’s oil refineries is located,
all of them belong to the realm of fiction. However, it
is necessary to be prepared to respond to large terror
attacks at port and offshore installations and to
mitigate eventual oil spills, protecting the marine
environment. It is therefore no coincidence that
concepts number 6 and 7 are represented in 18 and 13
occurrences respectively. The fact that there is a rather
close correlation in these two numbers is attributed to
the fact that oil pollution is widely considered
nowadays as the main safety risk.
Regarding resilience’s plans, also known as
emergency management plans, Kenneth (2009) refers
to the National Response Framework from the U.S.,
and affirms that this document defines the principles,
roles, and structures that frame how the United States
will respond collectively in terms of a “national
response doctrine” of coordination, specific
authorities, and best practices. By citing to U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (2008), the author
points out that the National Response Framework
establishes five key principles that reflect the
overarching approach to incident and emergency
response, which are: first, engaged partnerships;
second, a tiered response; third, scalable, flexible, and
adaptable operational capabilities; fourth, unity of
effort through unified command; and fifth, readiness
to act. He further explains that when developing port
specific emergency operations and response policies
and procedures; port security managers must take
into consideration that each facility plan would be a
component of the larger national plan and stresses
that “planning for emergency must be managed
collaboratively with those port users and government
agencies that have interests and concerns in the stability of
the port environment”. He further added that it is
imperative to have a coordinated response to port
incidents (including hazardous materials incidents)
and emergencies; additionally, to ensure that these
events will be managed competently and in concert
with national security priorities. As a result, the total
number of occurrences for concept 7 is convincing,
since potential safety risks must be addressed via the
“right” resilience plans.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
The results about the state of the art concerning
implementation and compliance of ISPS Code in
Mexico are clearly poor. The subject should be further
studied and, in general, it is observed that academic
contributions within the maritime domain in Mexico
are quite limited. The lack of research in the maritime
realm in the referred nation might have a connection
to the constricted attention of the issue in the national
agenda, which then again, is possibly related to the
absence of a national maritime security policy in
Mexico.
Concerning the wider domain of maritime security
at ports and offshore installations encompasses
directly or indirectly all the concepts included of table
IV. However, even if they are considered as different
concepts, they cannot be seen as isolated, because in
one way or another they are interdependent of each
other. Furthermore, safety and security issues can be
highly interdependent and also influencing one the
other at the same time. In a similar direction, the same
interdependency could be argued between oil spill
and environmental protection; on the positive side,
resilience’s plans (also called emergency management
plans) can provide the necessary mitigation toolbox.
Likewise, the concepts of terrorism and
counterterrorism are (directly or indirectly) related to
both the maritime safety and security domains,
because of the severe consequences that are resulted
from a successful attack as well as the need the
necessary detailed preparation to avoid these
“unpleasant events”. In any case, these are various
important concepts addressed via the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (the ISPS Code),
which establishes guidelines and recommendations
for the development of the Port Facility Security Plan
(PFSP). In the long run, the ISPS is a toolbox that sets
out processes and procedures to cope with the risks
within the maritime security domain.
As it can be seen in the concept matrix, the
category of “terrorism at sea or maritime terrorism”
was the most studied according to findings of this
literature review, with 41 different articles or books
examining this topic; the topic of maritime security
followed with 35 instances. The fact that “terrorism”
and “maritime security” were most commonly
presented in the research items could be attributed to
the recent terror attack threats worldwide, a situation
that has brought global interest on the issue of
terrorism at sea and the respective maritime security
framework for managing the risk of maritime
terrorism and improve maritime and port security.
As already highlighted, the most important set of
regulations addressing that subject is the Chapter XI‐2
of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS
Convention), encompassing the ISPS Code; this Code
requires the establishment of PFSPs at port facilities
with specific characteristics. It is also noteworthy that
studies approaching the categories concerning the
ISPS code and PFSPs were the lowest represented,
with only six instances. This can be interpreted into
the notion that ISPS Code implementation issues and
related practicalities are still worldwide lagging
behind in terms of investigation and examination.

As it has been demonstrated in this literature
review, research efforts focused on the ISPS Code and
the development of a Port Facility Security Plan
(PFSP) have an integrated perspective, where the
concepts of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as
maritime security management and the issue of port
security have a strong interaction and dominant
status. Additionally, the safety issue is quite often
addressed, with oil spill and environmental
protection being included in the consequences of
security incidents. Closing with a positive note, after a
total of fourteen (14) years after the approval and
implementation of the ISPS Code, there have been
identified quite a few different approaches to security
risk assessment methodologies as it can be observed
through the currents literature review. On the other
hand, more emphasis on the implementation issues of
the ISPS Code is evidently needed to ensure that apart
from theory, field results are resulting into an
acceptable security risk level.
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ABSTRACT: After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015
involving the private sector. This auction‐round offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the continental
shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant
challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to
pipelines is estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive
research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The
development and establishment of policies prioritizing maritime security and protection of critical offshore
infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the
national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage
to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to
the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port’s security program and establishes
the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilities, it has not been fully
implemented in several important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack many of the
core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly
reviews the situation of the oil industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime
security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil
infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime
security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.

1 INTRODUCTION
Mexico amended its Constitution and energy law to
open the oil industry to the private sector. This was a
priority for the actual government because since 2008
the government of the United States of America
started to lease blocks close to the border line, where
the bi‐national oil reservoirs from the “Perdido Folt
Belt” are located and in consideration to the USA Rule
of Capture; pursuant to, “the owner of an area of land
acquires title to the minerals produced from wells

drilled thereon, even if it is proved that part of such
minerals migrated from adjoining lands. This is
known in the oil industry as the straw effect.” (Avila,
2008).
On August 12th 2014 the new Hydrocarbons Law
and the new Hydrocarbons Revenues Law became
effective. These are part of a set of new laws and legal
amendments to implement the Constitutional Energy
Reform that became effective on December 21st 2013.
After 75 years of monopoly in the oil industry; the
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country performed the first oil business round and
offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the
continental shelf to private companies. Whereas, this
first round was not as successful as it was expected by
the Mexican Government and only two bids were
received by international companies for a total of 14
blocks; in the round one second tender the National
Hydrocarbons Commission of Mexico (CNH)
awarded three of five shallow‐water blocks (Comisión
Nacional de Hidrocarburos, 2015).
Diverse factors may affect the interest of
international investors in the oil industry in Mexico
when participating in the oil fields blocks auctions,
like the low international oil prices during the last
two years or the fact that the first offer was of
exploration fields while the second one was of
production fields, which gives more security over the
investment.
However, another factor that may affect the
interest of international oil companies is the security
of the oil installations both onshore and offshore. A
total of 4 thousand, 298 illegal connections to
pipelines have been discovered by Pemex and
authorities during the period of January 1st. to
October 27th 2015.
Even though the security challenges in the oil
industry are by now more evident ashore, it is
necessary to include maritime security in the national
agenda as well.
The development and establishment of policies
that enhance maritime security and the protection of
offshore installations would increase the trust of
international investors in the national oil industry.
Maritime security is a topic that has been
discussed for several decades at the International
Maritime Organization, yet some significant issues
remain in discussion and unsolved. The focus of
extensive research regarding maritime security has
been on piracy at sea, while terrorism at offshore
installations, port maritime security and protection of
critical infrastructure has not got the same attention.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code) was implemented in Mexico since it
entered into force on 1st. of July, 2004, following the
requirements
and
recommendations
of
the
International Maritime Organization. Nonetheless,
some of the most important ports of Mexico have not
fully implemented the ISPS Code yet. A set of
information that according to the requirements of the
ISPS Code all the port and port facilities are obligated
to keep in logs was missing when such information
was requested to the port authorities through the
National Institute of Access to Public Information,
which reveals a difference between the formal
statements of the port regarding the security program
purpose and the actual implementation of the ISPS
Code. This puts in evidence the urgency of the review
of national policies and national legislation in order to
enhance maritime security both, at the port and at sea.
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2 METHODOLOGY
For the purposes of this study the authors have used
the method of document review to analyse the actual
situation of the oil industry in Mexico from the
security perspective. The data was gathered from
different sources that included official information
from Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the Mexican oil
agency and different authorities published on their
webpages. In addition some relevant information was
requested to Pemex and other different institutions
through the National Institute of Transparency,
Access to the Information and Protection of Personal
Data (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la
Información y Protección de Datos Personales in
Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI).
Once the documents relevant for this topic were
gathered, they were further selected and classified
according to their relevance to analyse what the
security challenges of the oil industry in Mexico are
from a strict security perspective.

3 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this paper is to review the situation of
the oil industry in Mexico from a security perspective
and discuss key elements of port and maritime
security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of
port and maritime security and the protection of
critical oil infrastructure located in the Continental
Shelf in the national agenda, which would provide for
future research directions in the maritime security
domain and contribute to the establishment of a
national maritime security policy.

4 RESULTS & GENERAL DISCUSSION
The security of the oil industry in Mexico has been
seriously affected during the last years, which has left
significant not only loss of civilian life, but also huge
economic losses to Pemex, the Mexican government
and the Mexican society as a hole.
The results of this document analysis show that
there is an inconsistency between the requirements of
the ISPS Code and its actual implementation at some
of the most important ports with oil facilities. These
factors need to be improved to enhance maritime
security and to avoid serious security deficiencies that
could result in loss of life, oil spill and environmental
damage. Other important security challenges for the
oil industry, like the increasing tendency of theft of
hydrocarbons were also found.
On September 19th 2014, the general director of
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Emilio Lozoya Austin,
presented the problematic and challenges of Pemex,
before the Commission of Energy of the LXII
Legislature‐group of the National Congress
(Parliament). In this presentation, the mentioned
director of Pemex said that “In the year 2014, up to
August, it is estimated that the volume of crude oil
subtracted trough illegal connections to pipelines
amounted to 7.5 million barrels, which equivalent cost
is 15 thousand, 300 million pesos. That is what is

stolen to the Mexican Government, at least up to this
presentation”.
The textual wording in Spanish of the director of
Pemex is as follows: “En el año 2014, al cierre del mes
de agosto se estima que el volumen de combustible
sustraído ilícitamente a través de las tomas
clandestinas ascendió a 7.5 millones de barriles, con
un costo equivalente a 15 mil 300 millones de pesos.
Eso es lo que le roban al Estado mexicano o, por lo
menos, a la presentación del informe”.
According to the figures published by the National
Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics the
annual average of oil prices for 2014 is 86.5 USA
Dollars per barrel, whereas the average for 2015 and
up to September that year, the oil price average is
46.6, as figures illustrated in table I.
Table 1. Oil Price Indices per Barrel (Mexico), 2014‐2015.
Source: Elaborated with data from the National Institute for
Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI); price indices
series.
_______________________________________________
Period
Price Oil Barrel
Annual Average
_______________________________________________
2014/01
90.65
86.5
2014/02
93.09
2014/03
93.48
2014/04
95.68
2014/05
96.79
2014/06
98.79
2014/07
94.65
2014/08
90.8
2014/09
85.82
2014/10
75.23
2014/11
71.39
2014/12
52.36
2015/01
41.7
46.6
2015/02
47.26
2015/03
47.36
2015/04
50.69
2015/05
54.06
2015/06
53.87
2015/07
46.56
2015/08
39.87
2015/09
38.82
_______________________________________________

Therefore the estimated number of stolen barrels
from January to August, 2014 amounts to 7.5 million
barrels; the economic loss amounts to 648 million, 750
thousand US dollars.
With this information the total economic loss
caused by theft of hydrocarbons for 2014 may be
estimated; considering that 7.5 million barrels from
January to August gives a monthly average of 937
thousand 500 barrels; multiplying this figure for 12
months, it gives a total of 11 million, 250 thousand
barrels, which can be multiplied by the average price
of crude oil barrel for the year 2014; which is 86.5 US
Dollars. Therefore the total economic loss for theft of
hydrocarbons for the year 2014, for Mexico, can be
estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollars.
The total number of illegal connections to
pipelines discovered by Pemex and relevant
authorities for 2014 was 3 thousand 635, while this
figure increased to 4 thousand 298 for 2015 and only
up to October 26th. This figure means that the
number of illegal connections to pipelines increased

with 18.24 per cent from 2014 to 2015, which can be
observed in table 2.
Table 2. Nr. of Illegal Connections Discovered by Pemex or
Authorities, 2000‐2015. Source: SISI12857200255215, from
INAI
_______________________________________________
Year
Nr. of Illegal connections discovered
_______________________________________________
2000
155
2001
132
2002
159
2003
152
2004
102
2005
132
2006
213
2007
324
2008
392
2009
462
2010
691
2011
1361
2012
1635
2013
2613
2014
3635
2015
4298
_______________________________________________

If this figure is applied to the loss of barrels for
2014; in this case 11 million, 250 thousand barrels, the
increase would amount to 2 million 52 thousand oil
barrels, giving a total of 13 million 302 thousand oil
barrels for the year 2015. If the estimated amount of
loss of barrels for 2015, in this case 13 million, 302
thousand barrels is multiplied by the average price of
crude oil barrel for the year 2015 (In this case the
average was calculated with figures from the period
January‐September, as presented in table 1); which is
46.5 US Dollars, the estimated economic loss for 2015
amounts to 618 million 543 thousand U.S Dollar;
under the condition that the production remain
unchanged and the average loss of barrels per
incident remains the same from 2014 to 2015.
The fact that the estimated economic loss caused
by theft of hydrocarbons from 2015 is less than the
estimated loss for the year 2014, even considering that
the number of incidents of illegal connections to
pipelines was larger in 2015 than in the previous year;
is because the dramatic fall of the oil prices in 2015.
It was requested to Pemex to provide information
about how many clandestine connections where
found to pipelines, warehouse tankers, oil terminals,
refineries and other oil installations, but this
classification had not been registered in the files.
However, the discovery of such illegal connections to
Pemex installations to steal hydrocarbons have
resulted in 14 thousand 547 legal claims, only for the
period 2006 to 2015, (Pemex unidad de enlace a travez
del INAI 2015, SISI 12857200255215) from which a
total of 324 persons have become sentenced with a
guilty verdict, as observed in table 3.
According to the same document from the INAI,
clandestine connections to pipelines and other oil
installations have led to explosions, which have
caused the dead of two civilian and serious injuries to
other four persons in 2014, while in 2015 an
individual lost his life by the same cause.
The consequences of illegal connections to
hydrocarbon’s pipelines have also caused severe
damages to the environment polluting diverse rivers
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and valleys because of oil spill. During the period of
2006 to 2015 a total of 571 legal claims for oil spill
pollution have been presented as illustrated in table 4.
Table 3. Nr. of Persons Convicted for Theft of
Hydrocarbons, 2006‐2015. Source: SISI12857200255215
_______________________________________________
Year

Nr. of Persons Convicted

Guilty Verdict Acquittal Verdict (No Guilty)
_______________________________________________
2006
19
13
2007
36
16
2008
55
35
2009
30
19
2010
34
31
2011
35
52
2012
68
69
2013
35
46
2014
12
12
2015
0
5
_______________________________________________
Total
324
298
_______________________________________________
Table 4. Legal Claims for Oil Spill Pollution, 2006‐2015.
Source:
SISI12857200255215
_______________________________________________
Year
Nr. of Legal Claims for Oil Spill Pollution
_______________________________________________
2006
130
2007
101
2008
65
2009
52
2010
24
2011
46
2012
46
2013
35
2014
54
2015
18
_______________________________________________
Total
571
_______________________________________________

To connect illegal pipelines to Pemex’s
installations network requires a high degree of
expertise. Several employees and ex‐employees from
the Mexican oil agency have been investigated for
participating in these crimes against the nation.
Information from another document also from the
INAI, with register number SISI1857200171515 (2015),
establishes that a total of 136 employees from Pemex
had been investigated in relation to theft of
hydrocarbons, as illustrated in table 5.
Table 5. Nr. of Employees and Ex‐employees investigated
for
theft
of
hydrocarbons,
2006‐2015.
Source:
SISI1857200171515
_______________________________________________
Nr. of Employees and Ex‐employees involved and
investigated
in theft of hydrocarbons 2006‐2015
_______________________________________________
Year

Nr. of Employees
Nr. of Ex‐employees
investigated for theft investigated for theft
of hydrocarbons
of hydrocarbons
_______________________________________________
2006
10
0
2007
7
3
2008
19
0
2009
10
0
2010
14
2
2011
5
2
2012
11
2
2013
15
1
2014
33
1
2015
12
1
TOTAL
136
12
_______________________________________________
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There are other important aspects of security that
reflect the urgency of implementing measures to
improve security within the oil agency. From 2006 to
2015 several employees were arrested and put under
investigation for other type of law‐breaking including
possession of cocaine, cannabis, falsification of
company’s card, terror attempts and murder, as
illustrated in table 6.
Table 6. Pemexʹs employees investigated for other crimes,
2006‐2015. Source: SISI1857200171515
_______________________________________________
Pemex’s employees investigated for other crimes
(2006‐2015)
_______________________________________________
Crime
Nr. of employees
_______________________________________________
Possession of Cocaine
9
Possession of Cannabis
25
Falsification of company’s card
1
Possession/bearing of fire weapons
7
Violence with weapons
8
Explosion Threat
1
Theft of production material, ferric material,
115
working tools, machinery, cable, pipes, car
parts, cooper and cranes among other Pemex’s
property items.
Murder
1
Kidnapping
2
Fraud for selling working positions
4
Improper (unmoral) Behaviour at work
2
Psychotropic medicine drugs
1
Stealing other employees properties
4
Falsification of fuel tickets
1
Car accident
1
Fraud
1
Attack/assault & Violence
2
Being member of the “Z” narcotic organization
1
Alcohol
at work
3
_______________________________________________
TOTAL
189
_______________________________________________

Pemex also function as the operator of several oil
terminals. The crimes made by some employees of
Pemex like falsification of the company card put
unacceptable risk to the company and measures to
stop these actions are essential regarding security,
since this type of actions could be required for terror
attacks in a terror scenario. On the other hand, crimes
like possession of weapons and drugs can lead to
serious accidents putting in risk the safety of the
personnel; the installations and the marine
environment because of oil spill pollution. It is
important to mention that even though maritime
security and maritime safety are two different
concepts, they are directly connected.
Piètre‐Cambacédès & Bouissou, (2013) analyses
the similarities and differences between the two
domains, safety and security. The authors wrote that
while security is connected to risks originated or
exacerbated by a malicious action, independently
from the nature of the related consequence; the
concept of safety is linked to accidental actions i.e.
without a malicious intention, but with potential
impact to the related environment (p.111). They
further clarify that in the security discipline it is
common to use the term “threat”, while in the safety
discipline the tendency is to use the term “hazard”,
even though they are used to describe identical
concepts in several standards. An example given by
the cited authors is the use of the term incident, as an
event with minor consequences in safety, while it

means an infringement or breach with regards to
security (p.112).
Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, (2009 p. 242), states
that one of the main characteristics of maritime
security is that there are two different dimensions in
terms of response to external threats faced by a
coastal state. The author establishes that the first
dimensions is the fact that exists a core set of threats,
values and responses, which any state will bring to
bear in seeking to secure its maritime security; which
is reflected in the national and international outlook
of a state, its geographical location and maritime
domain, as well as its bilateral and regional
relationships. These are factors that even if they may
slightly vary over time, they will remain fairly stable.
The authors explained that the second dimension is
the “evolving and emerging threats to maritime security”.
They further clarified that some of those threats could
periodic or temporary, while others may suddenly
arise with little or no warning at all. Therefore,
planning and organizing maritime security requires
not only ongoing attention to the core values of a
state, but also the capacity to respond to sudden and
totally unexpected threats with diverse scenarios from
oil spills to terror or nuclear attacks, as well as
transnational crime against the port or offshore
installations (Klein, Rothwell, & Mossop, 2009 p. 242‐
243).
By citing to Ng and Gujar (2008), Vaggelas & Ng,
(2012 p.674) established that port security includes all
security and counter‐terrorism activities within the
port’s domain, including the protection of port
facilities and the security of the activities during the
interaction of the ship with the port.
In an article written by J. Urbansky, W. Morgas
and M. Miesikowsky (2009) presented in the book
edited by A. Weintrit (2009 p.3), the authors wrote the
following about maritime security: “is the security from
the terrorism, piracy and similar threats, as well as effective
interdiction of all the illicit activities on sea, such as
pollution of the marine environment; illegal exploitation of
sea resources; illegal immigration; smuggling the drugs,
persons, weapons and other matters that can be used for
terrorist activities”.
Maritime
security
regulative
framework
encompasses several international conventions like
SOLAS 1974 and respective protocols up to date,
MARPOL 73/78 with respective protocols, and the
SUA convention from 1998 and 2005 with respective
protocols, among others. The International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) came into
force on July 1st of 2004 and it is a part of the
amendments to the 1974 Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS). The amendments to the SOLAS
Convention included a new chapter XI‐2, about
special measures to enhance maritime security.
Kenneth (2009) defines the ISPS Code as the
comprehensive set of measures implemented in 2004
to enhance the security of ships and port facilities,
developed and agreed to by member countries of the
International Maritime Organization in response to
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities after
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United
States.
Vaggelas & Ng (2012 p.677‐678) simplify that the
Code has mainly two major components, whereas the

first part illustrates the minimum mandatory
requirements that ships and ports represented by the
contracting government must follow, the second part,
which is not compulsory, provides guidelines and
recommendations for the implementation of security
assessments and plans with more detail. The authors
clarify that even if certainly the ISPS Code includes a
standardized guidance on maritime security for both,
ships and ports, it focuses mainly on how terrorist
attacks can be deterred and mitigated, while detailed
procedures on how to deal with the consequences of
such security events, like crisis management or
recovery are not addressed. Resilience plans or plans
for crisis management are instruments that should be
considered as a part of any security program. By
citing Sarathy (2006) Zhang, Payam, & Ekwall (2011)
expressed that a system of this type should be “a
robust, resilient, and flexible that will require extensive
coordination both at national and international levels”.
Robustness and resilience are different features. By
citing to Husdal (2008), Zhang, Payam, & Ekwall
(2011) wrote that whereas resilience is the ability to
survive, robustness is the ability to rapidly recuperate
the stability.
A security plan must rapidly respond to events
that threat security from a proactive perspective
rather than a reactive. However, it should include a
resilience plan to reduce consequences of a terror
event in a properly reactive way.
Espin‐Digon, Burns‐Herbert, & Bateman (2008
p.4), says that passenger ships, including high‐speed
passenger craft, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and
above, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) and
all port facilities serving ships engaged in
international voyages are required to comply with the
ISPS Code, according to the established in the SOLAS
Chapter XI‐2.
The Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is a legal
instrument embodied in the ISPS Code to ensure the
application of security measures to protect the port
facility and its serving vessels, their cargoes, and
persons on board at the respective security levels.
Kenneth (2009 p.99), said that a port facility is
required to plan and effect security at the levels
identified in the risk assessment process and as
established by the governmental entities with
statutory responsibilities for port security oversight.
The author adds that the development of a PFSP shall
include measures aimed to neutralize vulnerabilities
for criminal activities within the port; identify and
respond to safety matters; minimize the threat of
terrorism; reduce opportunities of internal criminal
conspiracies; disrupt the connection between
corruption, terrorism and organized crime; share
intelligent and investigative information, with the
respective and correct law enforcement agencies; and
promote opportunities for the interchange of best
practices in port security (p.100) .
Vaggelas & Ng (2012), clarified that based on the
requirements of the PFSA (Port Facility Security
Assessment), a PFSP must be developed for each port
facility which has authorization for changes according
to the different security levels for every security
operation and highlight that a PFSP may be extended
to more than one facility only provided that the
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operator, location, operation, equipment and design
of those facilities are very similar to each other.
Requirements of the port facility security plan
establish a number of security records that must kept
updated as a part of the specific security plan.
Some of the information required to keep in logs
was requested to some important ports of Mexico
through the INAI. This included the number of oil
spills by vessels under operations at the port; number
of accidents at the port/port facilities, number of
fatalities that resulted in loss of life at the port
installations; number of dead and seriously injured
persons in accidents at work at the port; number of
employees arrested by committing crimes related to
their working duties or against the interest of the port
and the type of crime. However, the answer was that
the port agency does not have such information and it
was suggested to further require it to the terminal
operator. Since the terminal is directly connected to
the operation of the port, the port shall also keep this
type of information. This reflects deficiencies in the
implementation of the Port Facility Security Plan at
the specific ports.
The ISPS establishes that the port and port
facilities should keep security records including
security threats and incidents; oil spills, changes in
the security levels and internal audits and reviews,
among others. When the appointed authorities, in this
case the Ministry of Communications and Transport,
discover deficiencies in the implementation of the
PFSP their approach should be at a first stage to
advice the port or port facility in correcting the
deficiency; the second stage is the persuasion of the
port or port facility on the need to correct the
deficiency; the third stage is the formal notification of
the requirement to correct the deficiency; the next step
is the commencement of proceedings to impose
sanctions for the failure to correct the deficiency;
while the last step is the imposition of sanctions for
failing to correct the deficiency, according to the
provisions established in the ISPS code (International
Maritime Organization, IMO 2012).In case of serious
security deficiencies that put in risk the ability of the
port or port facility to continue to operate at security
levels 1 to 3 the authority is able to suspend or restrict
specified activities at a port or port facility and
cumulative security failings at a port or port facility
could lead to the suspension or withdrawal of the
approved Port Facility Security Plan and the
respective statement of compliance (IMO, 2012).
Furthermore, once the statement of compliance
and approval of the PFSP have been withdrawn, the
national authorities can demand completion of a full
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and a
revised PFSP before reinstating the approval and
statement of compliance (IMO 2012). Kenneth (2009 p.
116) criticises that very often the PFSP exists only in
paper but rarely is tested for its effectiveness. The
author emphasizes that the key to achieve a successful
port security management in terms of the PFSP is to
understand it as a living document. He adds that the
PFSP should not be written as a one‐time effort, but
should really be a working document addressing the
security threats twenty‐four hours a day, seven days
at the week, the whole year.
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To avoid that port and port facilities stop the
compliance of the PFSP, the government through the
Designated Authority shall perform PFSP inspections.
The frequency of inspections may be programmed
and announced in advance could be totally without
warning. Inspections may be performed in connection
with the initial, intermediate and renewal verification
of the port facility’s Statement of Compliance,
investigating a security incident or concerning the
assessments of the port facility with the Maritime
Security Measures (IMO, 2012). The Government
through the Designated Authority has the
responsibility to ensure the compliance of the
provisions of the ISPS Code, as well as other
requirements
established
in
International
Conventions from which Mexico is signatory to
enhance maritime security.

5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Maritime security is an area directly connected to
several issues that vary from immigration at sea, to
smuggling of drugs, weapons; theft of hydrocarbons;
terrorism and piracy. All of these are areas have
research potential within the context of the case of
Mexico. However, the compliance of international
conventions and national legislation should be
reviewed to ensure that the international obligations
of Mexico are properly reflected in national law.
Another area is the examination of the
implementation of the ISPS Code in the Mexican ports
and port facilities, including case studies from ro‐ro
terminals, container terminals, chemical terminals and
oil terminals. It is also suggested to study the case of
Pemex concerning security and safety systems to
improve security within the organization and to
reduce the theft of hydrocarbons. Research about the
penalties for theft of hydrocarbons from a holistic
perspective, including the social and environmental
aspect is also suggested.

6 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
According to the results of this document review, the
conclusion is that the oil industry in Mexico faces
substantial security challenges. The losses are not
limited to economic factors, but also to loss of civilian
life and the marine environment.
Even though the oil companies as private entities
are responsible for implementing effective security
systems within their own property and responsibility
areas; national authorities must cooperate to ensure
the operation of these business activities and to
improve the security of vulnerable infrastructure like
pipeline networks, offshore installations and port
facilities.
Maritime and port security is an issue that should
be included in the national agenda for the
development of analytical instruments that should
provide the fundaments for an effective and proactive
maritime security program and the establishment of a
national maritime security policy.
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CHAPTER 3
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Privatization, Militarization, or a combination of
both?
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Résumé : La présente analyse examine trois options / solutions différentes que le
Mexique a mis en œuvre dans ses ports et ses installations offshore afin d’améliorer
le cadre de sécurité maritime du pays et d’assurer le respect du Code international de
la sécurité des navires et des installations portuaires (ISPS), privatisation, militarisation
et enfin leur combinaison. Les conclusions d’un travail de recherche en cours incluent
des incohérences dans les données des dossiers d’incidents de sécurité nécessaires
ou même leur absence totale. Les compétences et la formation inadéquates des
agents de la sûreté de l’installation portuaire (PFSO) se distinguent également. Une
autre question importante était l’utilisation de procédures différentes parmi les ports
faisant l’objet d’une enquête pour traiter exactement les mêmes problèmes de sécurité.
La conclusion claire est que, après douze ans de mise en œuvre du Code ISPS, le
Mexique, qui dirige la Commission portuaire interaméricaine de l’Organisation des
États américains (OEA), ne respecte pas les exigences du Code ISPS à un niveau
acceptable. L’absence d’une politique nationale de sécurité maritime a entraîné une
culture appauvrie de la sécurité maritime, malgré les graves problèmes de sécurité
auxquels ce pays est confronté. Il est également vrai que le pays discute actuellement
de la réorganisation de son appareil de sécurité maritime, avec des résultats positifs.
Des outils et recommandations pour améliorer le cadre opérationnel de la sécurité
maritime mexicaine sont donc envisagés, ainsi que les domaines potentiels de
recherches futures.

1) p1501@wmu.se
2) dd@wmu.se
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Abstract: The current analysis examines three different solutions that Mexico
implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country’s
maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): privatisation, militarisation and,
finally, their combination. The findings of an on-going research effort include
inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records, or even
their total absence. Inadequate competence and training among the Port Facility
Security Officers (PFSO) also stands out. Another important issue was the use of
different procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the
same security incidents. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS
Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Interamerican Port’s Commission
of the Organisation of American States (OAS), does not comply with the requirements
of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the lack of a national maritime security
policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security)
challenges that this nation is facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is
currently reorganising its maritime security apparatus, with some positive results;
tools and recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security operating
framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential future research.
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Introduction
After the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) developed a set of maritime security regulations for managing the risk of maritime
terrorism, as well as improving security status at sea and the various port locations
around the globe. These provisions were established in the new Chapter XI-2 of the
Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS Convention), comprising the new
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
The IMO defines the ISPS Code as "the comprehensive set of measures to enhance
the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats
to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States".
Compliance with the ISPS Code and submission of related information to the IMO is
not mandatory for all IMO member states, but only for those Contracting Governments
to the SOLAS 1974 Convention. However, there is no penalty mechanism in place
for states that fail to effectively comply with the ISPS Code. The overall concept is not
to impose penalties, but to rely on market forces and economic factors to ensure
compliance (official website IMO, SOLAS 1974). However, after 12 years of
implementation of the ISPS, market forces and economic factors had not been powerful
enough to result in full compliance in Mexico, where serious deficiencies were detected
by an on-going research effort.
The SOLAS 1974, Chapter XI-2 establishes special measures to enhance maritime
security, while Regulation XI-2/3 of this chapter addresses the ISPS Code. Whereas
part A of the Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the not mandatory
("recommended") part B encompasses guidelines about how to comply with the
mandatory requirements of part A. This set of regulations only applies to passenger
ships, including high speed passenger vessels; cargo vessels of 500 gross tonnage
and over; Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in transit and at ports (but not fixed
and floating platforms and MODUs on the oil field); and all type of port facilities serving
vessels offered for international voyages. In any case, the extent to which the guidelines
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its cargo and number of passengers,
as well as its sailing routes and the features of the port or port facilities visited by that
specific ship. Regarding the application of guidelines to port facilities, it will depend on
the type of carriages and vessels visiting that particular facility and its "ordinary" trading
routes.
In Mexico there are 16 Federal Integrated Port Administrations (FIPA)3 where the
ISPS Code applies; they are operating under concessions given by the Ministry of
Communications and Transport (and called thereafter MCT4) and are the following:

3) Administración Integral Portuaria, in Spanish, also known as APIs.
4) Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes in Spanish, and represented with the abbreviation SCT.
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Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Dos Bocas, Progreso,
Ensenada, Guaymas, Topolobampo, Mazatlán, Puerto Vallarta, Manzanillo, Lázaro
Cárdenas, Salina Cruz and Puerto Madero, (SCT, 2016). The principal requirements
of the ISPS Code for ports and port facilities cover the development and implementation
of the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) respectively,
as well as the designation of the Port Security Officer (PSO) and Port Facility Security
Officer (PFSO). Other provisions cover control of compliance with maritime security
measures and registration of security incidents.
According to the mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code, contracting governments have
to appoint the Designated Authority to carry out certain maritime security duties/
responsibilities established in the Code. This Designated Authority holds the
responsibility of ensuring compliance with the maritime security measures at all ports
(where the ISPS Code apply) through the Port Security Assessment (PSA) and Port
Facility Security Assessment (PFSA). The revision, approval and control of compliance
of the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be
based upon the PSA and the PFSA, are also included. In Mexico the Designated
Authority is the MCT through the General Direction of Merchant Marine (GDMM).5
A very important function within the ISPS code is the setting of security levels, which
is performed by governments through the Designated Authority. It focuses on the
alert for the perceived risk of terrorist attacks, but governments may include other
type of threats in their risk evaluation like pirate-type attacks against vessels and oil
platforms, or even the possibility of kidnapping port(s) and terminal(s) personnel.
These security levels apply both to ships sailing within the respective territorial sea,
as well as into port facilities. The Designated Authority can decide on the
implementation of different security levels for different ports, port facilities and different
areas of their territorial waters. It is necessary to point out that the change of security
levels must be clearly communicated to the associated port(s), port facilities and
vessels transiting or attempting to transit those areas (IMO, 2012).
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels, where Security Level
1 is considered normal and requires the minimum appropriate protective security
measures at all times. Its priority is the normal conduct of commercial operations and
facilitation of trade. Security Level 2 requires additional protective security measures
for the specific period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened. Its
priority is the allowance of continued commercial operations, but with increased security
measures and its consequent restrictions. Security Level 3 requires specific protective
security measures which shall last only for a limited period of time when risk for a
security incident is probable or imminent, even when it is not possible to identify the

5) Dirección General de Marina Mercante, in Spanish.
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target. It encompasses the strictest security measures and its priority is the security of
the port, port facilities, vessels and society that may be affected by a security incident
and can result even in the suspension of commercial operations.
The control of security response under Level 3 is transferred to the Government or
other organisations responsible for dealing with significant incidents (IMO, 2012). In
Mexico it is the President of the Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security6 (hereafter
UCMAR), who is responsible for port security and coordinates all operations under
Level 3. As established by Regulation of the UCMAR published on the Official Diary
of the Federation7 on 21 April, 2014, provision 6: "a UCMAR shall be established at all
the 16 ports (FIPAs) designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage"; known
as "Puertos de Altura", in Spanish. Additionally, provision 8 of this regulation establishes
that it shall be the Commander the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where an
UCMAR is established who shall be the President of that respective UCMAR.
According to the Law of Ports Article 19 SECOND, the UCMAR is a group of
interinstitutional coordination between the Ministry of Marine (hereafter MMAR8) and
the MCT for the application of maritime security measures; effective prevention and/
or dealing with security incidents is the aim. Article 19 THIRD, paragraph II of this law
puts forward that the UCMAR shall apply all the terms and response measures within
the framework of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the
ISPS Code and ensures the establishment of a series of functions and actions for
each of the respective three security levels. Also, paragraph III states that the UCMAR
shall function as the coordinator for all actions of the three different levels of government
(municipal, regional and federal) in relation to maritime security.
The key instruments and concepts related to maritime security are addressed in the
ISPS Code, with the aim to ensure security at ports and within an acceptable risk
level. Some of these key instruments are the PSA and PFSA,which encompass the
evaluation of security risks of the port or port facility. This risk evaluation must be
done to develop the PSP or PFSP in the case of terminals, which then must be
approved by the Designated Authority. The PSP is designed to ensure the compliance
of measures and procedures aimed to protect the port, persons, cargo, port equipment
and machinery and the vessels serving or buying services to that port from threats,
security risks, and security incidents. The PFSP has the same objectives as the PSP,
but limited to the terminal. The PSO and PFSO are the bodies responsible for ensuring
that the risk evaluation (PSA/PFSA) is carried out according to the principles and
guidelines of the ISPS Code, submitted and approved; to establish the respective

6) Centro Unificado para la Protección Maritíma y Portuaria and represented with the abbreviation
«CUMAR» in Spanish.
7) Diario Oficial de la Federación, in Spanish.
8) Secretaría de Marina, represented with the abbreviation «SEMAR» in Spanish.
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PSP/PFSP based on its PSA/PFSA and get it approved as well. Once approved, the
PSO/PFSO is also responsible for implementing and maintaining (or even improving
via formalised procedures) the plan at all times.
Once the Designated Authority performs the necessary inspections to verify the
development, implementation and compliance of the PSP/PFSP, it may issue the
Statement of Compliance (SOC) for a specific period, which shall not exceed five
years, the maximum period of validity. After the SOC is issued, the PSO/PFSO is
also responsible for ensuring compliance with the necessary training, exercises and
practices; coordinating the inspections in scene in cooperation with the respective
authorities; performance of internal security audits and liaison with the Designated
Authority’s representatives for external audits. PSO/PFSO must attend security
incidents and keep incident security records updated. Security incidents themselves
must be considered in the evaluation of risk and integrated into the security plan to
achieve a constant reduction of risks and the continuous improvement of port (and
maritime) security.
In the case of Mexico, even if the GDMM of the MCT is the Designated Authority
responsible for the revision, approval and control of compliance of the PSP(s) and
PFSP(s), the UCMAR is co-responsible according to its Regulation, Article 7, paragraph
II, which states that: "[UCMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime
and port security, previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose
the necessary modifications and updating to those plans". Paragraph III of this article
also adds that, once the plan has been approved, the UCMAR shall participate in the
verification and control of the compliance of such plans to ensure their effective
implementation.
In recent years, Mexico experienced a period of extreme violence, where "extortion
payments"9 were demanded of owners and operators of port terminals, in order not to
kill them personally or damage their installations, as denounced by the Federal Deputy
from the Deputy Chamber of the Federal Congress, LXII Legislature, Germán Pacheco
Díaz, before Parliament, Chamber of Deputies on 5 November 2013. This led to the
reorganisation of maritime security in the country, amendments to several laws and
the approval of new regulations since 2014, including the Law of Ports, the regulation
in relation to the UCMAR, and the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade, among
others. Additionally, the creation of the military navy unit for port security (hereafter
NAUPPRO10) was decided.

9) «Cobro de Piso» in Spanish.
10) Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria, represented with the acronym UNAPROP in Spanish.
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Research Methodology
The research methodology includes the use of an extended questionnaire with 71
open questions concerning maritime security, sent to eight ports of Mexico; Altamira
and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos Bocas (Tab.),
Progresso (Yuc.) and Madero (Chiapas), through the National Institute of
Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data (called National
Institute of Access to Information (NIAI)11 hereafter). A questionnaire of 70 similar
questions (but specifically addressed to oil maritime terminals) was also sent to "Pemex
Exploración y Producción" through the NIAI to acquire information for the following
terminals: Dos Bocas (Tabasco), Terminal Maritima de Pemex Puerto Isla del Carmen
(Camp.), Arbol Grande (Tamps.), and Cobos (Ver.); as well as the following terminals
from "Pemex Transformación Industrial": Madero (Tamps.), Tuxpan (Ver.), Pajaritos
(Ver.), Guaymas (Son.), Salina Cruz (Oax.), Veracruz (Ver.), Lerma (Camp.), Progreso
(Yuc.), Acapulco (Gro.), Lázaro Cárdenas (Mich.), Manzanillo (Col.), Mazatlan (Sin.),
Topolobampo (Sin.), La Paz (B.C.S.) and Rosarito (B.C.).
An inquiry into the establishment of the NAUPPRO at the different ports of Mexico
was sent to the MMAR, while another request for information about the total number
of persons employed at private security companies that have got the courses 18.2
and 18.3 as required in the ISPS Code was sent to the FETNAMM12, also through the
NIAI. The NIAI was created to comply with the provisions of the General Law of
Transparency promulgated in 2012. This law establishes that information from public
institutions operating with money from national resources shall be open to public
scrutiny with exceptions related to national security. The information delivered through
the NIAI is official and publicly available.
These actions were combined with a six-day visit by the researcher to one of Mexico’s
three largest ports with oil terminals conducted in April 2016, where she conducted
interviews and "participant observation." The questionnaire that was sent to the other
ports through the NIAI was also answered by respondents at that specific port. Several
employees, the PSO and PFSO(s), the Director of the port, the Master of the harbour
(referred to as Regional Captainship of the Port in Mexico), the Director of the Port
Customs Unit and the Commandant of the maritime police (NAUPPRO) were
interviewed. In doing this, the researcher covered the four pillars for the operation of
the port. The pool of data is deemed sufficient, based on the fact that nine out of
sixteen ports where the ISPS Code applies (representing a coverage of 56% of them

11) Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales in
Spanish, and represented with the acronym INAI.
12) «Fideicomiso de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional», and
represented with the acronym FIDENA in Spanish, which may be translated to «Fund of Education and
Training of the National Merchant Marines», and called FETNAMM thereafter.
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and seven out of seven FIPAs situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration
and production activities take place, covering 100% of them) were included in the
study; 100% of Pemex’s terminals are also included, creating valid representation for
the case of Mexico (see figure 1).

Figure 1 Federal Integrated Ports Administrations (FIPA) in Mexico.
(Ministry of Communications and Transport, 2016).

The results from the questionnaire were further analysed through "document analysis"
with an exploratory approach, to confirm or reject the inexistence of security incidents
at the selected ports and oil terminals in national newspapers and media sources,
using Google to have a wider coverage within the period of 2004-2015. Data was
classified using codes and categories for the overall analysis to present the results
and its respective discussion.

Results & Findings
According the results of the questionnaire, six ports and the maritime terminals from
both "Pemex Exploración y Producción" and "Pemex Transformación Industrial" have
had no security incidents at all in the course of 2010-2015. Furthermore, they officially
replied that until now, there has never been any security incident; the seventh port
reported that "at least five security incidents of low-impact were registered during the
period 2010-2015", while the port of Tuxpan wrote that "they have the antecedent of
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five maritime incidents, highlighting that it is the duty of the GDMM to classify them as
low, middle or high impact". "Only one" low-impact security incident was registered at
the visited port during the same period, following the questionnaire, but the fieldfindings from the interviews and participant observation at this port proved the existence
of at least three security incidents classified as with high impact.
To each of the specific questions about security incidents concerning armed attacks
for robbery at the port/port facility; confiscation and smuggling of weapons and drugs
or other dangerous restricted substances in the cargo; cargo theft at the port/ port
facility; theft of material and other items or machinery on the part of employees,
property of the port/ port facility; personnel working under the effects of drugs and
psychotropic substances; situations of vandalism and sabotage; and kidnapping of
port/terminal personnel, with the exception of one port, where a weapon was
confiscated, the respondents from the other eight ports and Pemex terminals replied
that there has never been any security incident of that nature. This significantly differs
from the findings of the document analysis through Google, as summarised in tables
1 and 2 respectively.
Table 1 Security Incidents at the Elected Ports
Security incident (Ports)

Date

Reference

Confiscation of 11,720 kilos of Tampico
cocaine in a container and arrest
of seven persons that were "protecting" it. This confiscation of
cocaine was the biggest of the
Mexican history up to that date.

7th October, 2007

JCM, 2007.

An oceanic patrol ship, confis- Madero
cated 2,479 kilos of cocaine
from the fishing boat "Charamusca", which was navigating in
the proximity to Port Madero in
Chiapas.

27th April, 2010

SEMAR, 2010.

Confiscation of 32 tons of mo- Veracruz
nomethyl-amine, in a ship coming from China.

30th April, 2012

Univision Noticias,
2012.

Confiscation of 900,928 litres of Coatzacoalcos
stolen hydrocarbons, transported in the vessel "Havnor", with
flag from San Vicente.

May, 2012.

Derecho, 2016 citing
Sinembargo.mx

Confiscation of 395,343 litres of Dos Bocas
stolen hydrocarbons from the
vessel "Capitán Kenny", with US
flag, and arrest of nine persons
with Honduran nationality and
the vessel, about 172 kilometres

25th July, 2012

Diario Libre, 2012
and Fierro, 2012.

Port

89

Cap III libro 3.pmd

89

22/07/2017, 13:11

ADRIANA ÁVILA-ZÚÑIGA-NORDFJELD AND DIMITROS DALAKLIS

from Port of Dos Bocas, Tabasco.
Confiscation of 2,360 litre of di- Progreso
lute cocaine in a container sent
from Argentina.

28th April, 2014

Armed attack against a naval Altamira
vessel resulted into one officer
dead and another seriously injured.

11 th November, Milenio.com, 2014;
2014
Narco Violencia,
2014 and Huerta,
2014.

Confiscation of 169 kg. of cocai- Altamira
ne in a container downloaded
from the ship "Monte Oliva" with
German flag.

21 st . September Letra Roja, El Co2015
lor de la Información, 2015.

Confiscation of 15,800 litters of Veracruz
dilute cocaine, from a container
unloaded from the ship "Monte
Verde" coming from Panama.

1st of March, 2016 Salinas, 2016.

Confiscation of the fishing ves- Frontera
sel "Tuxpan" with 1,800 litres of
stolen hydrocarbons. The combustibles had been stolen some
days before to another vessel,
property of Pemex, which had
sailed off from the Port of Dos
Bocas, Paraiso, in the Southern
state of Tabasco.

1st of March, 2016 Ortíz, 2016.

Arrest of the fishing vessel ca- Coatzacoalcos
lled Vikingo II with register number 28040150232 from Tampico Tamaulipas, carrying 12 tons
of stolen hydrocarbons.

2nd March, 2016

Veracruzanos.info,
2016 and Imagen
del Golfo, 2016.

A kidnaped Pemex’s worker Altamira
was rescued and liberated by
the police.

29 th July, 2016

Zona de Guerra sin
Censura, 2016.

Extortion Payment was given in Several Ports and Several events
with reference to
order to ensure the life of direc- oil terminals.
period 2010-2013
tors, employees, terminal operators and Pemex’s contractors
towards crime ring organizations.
Increase in confiscation of we- Several ports
apons, drugs and stolen hydrocarbons at marine ports with the
establishment and activation of
UNAPROP(s) and higher participation of the SEMAR in the administration of ports.

Ángel, 2014.

Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, LXII
Leg., 2013.

Several events Cámara de Diputawith reference to dos del H. Congreperiod 2010-2013 so de la Unión, LXII
Leg., 2013 and
Gaviña 2016.
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129% Rise in confiscation of National level
methamphetamines from 2008
to 2012 in Mexico.

Several events United Nations
with reference to Office on Drugs
period 2008-2012 and Crime, 2013,
cited by Montalvo,
2014.

Table 2 Security Incidents at Oil Terminals
Security incident (Pemex Terminal
terminals, Offshore Tabasco)

Date

Plundering and dismantling Yaxche Bravo
equipment from the (new) platform Yaxche Bravo, including
theft of very costly materials.

15 th September, Pérez, 2010.
2008

Plundering of the platform Kab- Kab-A
A

11th October, 2008 Pérez, 2010.

Plundering of the platform Kix-2 Kix-2
where the offenders took even all
the navigation lightening signs.

14th October, 2008. Pérez, 2010.

Plundering of the platform Si- Sinan-SO
nan-SO

8th March, 2009

Pérez, 2010.

Plundering of the platform Yax- Yaxche Bravo
che Bravo again, stealing the
whole heliport. The outcome of
this official investigation GPDMSCO-D8-190-2010, has not
been published yet.

4th May, 2010

Pérez, 2010.

Reference

Kidnapping of 45 employees of Pemex (National 2013
Pemex during the year 2013.
level).

24 Horas, El Diario
Sin Límites, 2013.

Kidnapping of several directors Several States
and leaders of the worker’s
union as well as owners of companies giving services to Pemex
in different cases (reportage)

2010-2013

Pérez,
Voltairenet.org,
2010.

Pemex confirms the kidnapping Several States
of 16 employees during the period 2007-2010

2007-2013

El Economista,
2013.

Gasoline is stolen inside Pemex Tuxpan

22nd August, 2016 (Martínez, 2016)

Regarding ships or small boats without the required authorisations to infringe into
restricted areas of navigation, the reply from the Port of Tampico was that "the Port
Security Plan does not consider any restricted area of navigation and therefore there
are not any register about security incidents of such situation". Altamira, Coatzacoalcos,
Dos Bocas, Port Progreso and the visited port admitted to having had such situations,
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while ports of Tuxpan, Veracruz and Madero as well as all the terminals from Pemex
answered that they have not had such situations.
During the field visit of the researcher to the port of interest and travelling towards the
open sea on board an oceanic patrol vessel, a small group of boats similar to those
commonly used by smugglers was observed; the boats were located just a few meters
besides the main sea passage towards the container terminal. Also, this event was
noticed while a large container vessel was approaching the port facility: nothing was
done to send them away and prevent a dangerous situation. The officials’ reply was
that: "they are just fishing; we have taken them off many times before, but they always
come back". Additionally, it was noted that the average time for inspecting persons
and vehicles in the access/exit control zones was just 45 seconds, a very short period
of time and an indicator of low-quality inspections.
It is also interesting to consider that a small glass containing cannabis was personally
noticed at the office of the PFSO from one of the terminals; he said that a few years
back, they caught a person from a construction company working inside the port, with
about 300 grams of cannabis: "it was like 300 grams and that is not for personal use,
but for trade". The person was forced to resign, but because of time-consuming
paperwork related to an official investigation, the case was not brought to court and
the PFSO just kept the cannabis in a small glass container with alcohol to cure muscular
damage. In an interview to another employee, it was revealed that the Pemex’s oil
terminal in the specific port was operating without a formally appointed PFSO since
early October 2015 (almost six months before the time of the visit), when the person
holding that position had retired.
With personnel from the Navy mastering the harbour since November 2013 and the
creation of the NAUPPRO, the status of maritime security improved substantially at
the visited port in practical terms. Other measures to improve maritime security were
also implemented, such as the use of two different private security companies: one
for the operation of the video vigilance system, and the other for control and vigilance
of access and exit zones, to avoid security incidents at the control zones being erased
from the video records. Security measures were reflected in an increase of confiscation
of drugs and dangerous substances, though this improvement in performance was
not reflected in incident security records (mismanagement practices prevailed). Last
but not least, terminal operators, directors and employees gradually recovered the
feeling of safety when the extortion payments from crime-ring organisations
disappeared.
Other findings from the questionnaires, as well as other information acquired from the
MMAR and the FETNAMM, through the NIAI include the following:
• Different proceduesand allocated periods across the country for keeping and
maintaining security incident records.
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• Inexistence of security incident registers at certain ports and Pemex terminals.
• Failure to classify risks and threats at ports and oil terminals.
• Poor performance of PFSA for the 15 oil terminals of "Pemex Transformación
Industrial." PFSA are the fundament of the PFSP, which have not been amended
since its original approval in June 2004, despite the incidents reported by the
media and a double recertification.
• Wide use of private security companies to perform specific security duties at
the ports, whereas Pemex has its own security employees with support from
the Navy.
• Misunderstanding of responsibilities and duties on the part of the PSO(s),
PFSO(s).
• Lack of awareness of the duty for registering items’ confiscation in incident
security logs.
• Establishment and activation of 14 NAUPPROs from September 2014 to August
2015, with an average of 43 elements per unit at fourteen ports, including
Altamira Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos, Ciudad del Carmen and
Progreso.
• PSO limited training to various elements of the NAUPPRO during the period
2014-2015.
• Arrangement of 369 courses for "personnel of the port/port facility with specific
security duties" (18.2 ISPS Code) and 93 courses for "security knowledge that
must have the port/port facility personnel" (18.2) by the FETNAMM (established
by the Designated Authority); where the total number of participants hired by
private security companies amounted to 4,573 and 1,274 respectively, during
the period 2010-2015.
• Deficiencies reported from Designated Authority’s audits to some ports covered
improving maintenance of security equipment, providing more security training,
construction of walls along the port area and reinforcing surveillance and lighting
equipment.
• The certificate of compliance with the ISPS and approval of PFSP of two Pemex
terminals (Terminal Marítima Árbol Grande and Terminal Marítima de Cobos)
were originally issued in 2006 and have not been recertified, but they are under
normal operations.
• The certificate of compliance with the ISPS and approval of PFSP for the port
of Tuxpan expired in 2014, but is under normal operations during "the
recertification process".
• Inadequate performance of Designated Authority’s audits and inspections, since
they audited these ports and terminals every year during the period 2010-2015
without reporting serious deficiencies; lack of security incidents records and
inadequacy in the classification of security risks.
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• Testing of the "militarisation" model at the visited port, where the port
administration and the Regional Captainship of the Harbour were given to
personnel from the Navy.
• Improvement of interinstitutional communication and coordination at the visited
port.

General Discussion
The situation illustrated in tables 1 and 2 forced the authorities to initiate the
reorganisation of maritime security mechanisms in 2013, including justice reforms to
provide juridical support to those changes. In addition to traffic of drugs and weapons,
theft of hydrocarbons is affecting the economy of Mexico as well as the overall maritime
security status. The assessment for theft of hydrocarbons amounted to 11,250,000
barrels, with an estimated economic loss of 973,125,000.00 U.S. dollars, only for
2014 (Nordfjeld & Dalaklis, 2016). Before the NAUPPRO was created in 2014, port
security was mainly provided by private security companies, which increased the
vulnerability and risk of port installations. Given its political significance related to
national security, maritime and port security should be the responsibility of the
government and international organisations, covering strategic installations, including
offshore platforms. However, the level of security challenges in Mexico relating to a
combination of terrorism13, organised crime, marine piracy and poor performance on
the part of the Designated Authority, showed that the government was not able to
meet its responsibilities and provide satisfactory physical protection to port and oil
installations, forcing port administrations to rely on private security companies.
As expressed by Kerr (2010), private security companies can provide a security
package quicker than governments because they have less bureaucracy and can
operate with a lower profile than most government forces. On the other hand, they
are limited by the regulatory framework, concerning the use of firearms and are more
exposed to corruption and dispersion of sensitive information as a result of constant
personnel rotations, which increases the risk of uncertified employees and poor training
standards. Ports included in this research outsourced the "specific security duties"
service to private security companies for covering vigilance access control zones,
guarding of vigilance towers and inspections of cars and baggage at the access/exit
control zones. Terminals have their own security management. On the other hand,
Pemex choose to have its own security force for its terminals, with extra support from
the Navy when necessary; this resulted into avoiding external worker rotation and the
risk of spreading sensitive information concerning security routines.

13) Theft of hydrocarbons and plundering of oil and offshore installations is considered terrorism, following
the new Federal Law to Prevent and Sanction Crimes Committed Concerning Hydrocarbons.
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Excepting Dos Bocas, and other ports not included in the study where the respective
naval unit has not yet been activated, the Navy and the NAUPPRO have taken over
the security of strategic installations, including offshore and port facilities. The
agreement for the creation of 19 NAUPPROs, which function as maritime police,
including duties of vigilance, inspection and control within the port and ocean port
roadways, was published on 31 Mars 2014. These units are additional to the elements
from private security companies and are responsible for special security duties to
detect trafficking of drugs, weapons and other restricted substances during the
uploading and downloading operations from vessels as well as the presence of
unauthorised persons. This implies a combination of the initially established security
management, "privatisation of security services" and definitely some "militarisation".
As expressed by Germán Pacheco Díaz, representative from the national congress
(2013), confiscation of drugs and restricted substances in cargo increased in the port
of Altamira with the establishment of this maritime police. However, the kidnapping of
port personnel and extortion payments to crime ring organisations remained. There
are several benefits in the combination of military forces and private security companies,
including the economic aspect. Regarding cooperation, private firms need to integrate
their operations with relevant stakeholders (such as naval, coastguard, customs and
police forces) to reduce the chances of "blue on white" incidents, maximise the
opportunities to receive support, and ensure the standards of skills and professional
knowledge of its work force (Kerr, 2010). When outsourcing port and maritime security
to private security companies, it is still the responsibility and duty of the Designated
Authority to conduct periodic and random audits and inspections at the ports to examine
the compliance of the PFSP as well as security service providers, to ensure that they
have the required certification and security training.
To apply a proper response to maritime security incidents, it is crucial to ensure a
regional solution that includes the cooperation of international forces in a specific
geographical area if necessary, particularly when the consequences of a maritime
security incident will go beyond maritime boundaries, as is the case of oil spill pollution
caused by safety and security incidents. As Cordner (2011) points out, major security
incidents are likely to have severe environmental consequences that will transcend
national boundaries; this highlights the need for government, industry and regional
consultative entities to adopt a strategic risk management approach. There is simple
explanation why: "No single Agency or jurisdiction currently maintains the capability,
capacity or resources necessary to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from
an armed takeover of an offshore facility. Rather, collaboration with regional partners
at the local, state and federal levels ensures that an effective and safe response
capability is maintained" (Applegate & Hill, 2014). But, challenges related to a regional
solution implies that while strategic plans exist to identify frameworks and guidelines
for command and control, they do not operationalise response architecture to
implement and sustain coordinated training programmes and integrate planning and
resource coordination efforts (Applegate & Hill, 2014).
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The government is testing the militarisation model at the visited port where, in addition
to private security companies and the NAUPPRO, the Director and the Master of the
harbour are Rear Admirals from the Navy, while the President of the UCMAR is the
1st commander and Rear Admiral from that naval zone. The only civil authority in this
equation is the Director of the maritime customs unit, who said that the coordination
between the authorities and the port has improved substantially since the arrival of
the Navy. The respondent added: "At the beginning we didn’t know how it was going
to function, if trade would be affected, if it would be closed, but here at this port, the
external factor of security improved the trade operations and (…) the coordination is
very good; we have systematic security meetings, where all the organisations involved
participate." The original scepticism towards a military discipline on the part of port
employees was transformed into a feeling of safety and satisfaction with the military
leadership. As a result, the shipping companies recovered the trust to transport their
carriages through Mexican ports, as expressed by Francisco Orozco Mendoza,
Chairman of the Mexican Association of Shipping Agents,14 Mundo Portuario (2014).
The director of the port emphasised that the main risk at the port today is related to
hurricanes and stormy weather.
Additionally, during the interview with the Master of the harbour at the visited port, he
pointed out that: "why am I working here, even I belong to the Navy? Yes, I am
working in another Ministry. Well, in 2013 the insecurity situation at this province
continued, especially at the Port. Therefore, the President ordered the MMAR that
Naval Officers should be brought in to support and control the port administration and
the captainship of the harbour, because the status of security was at a clearly
unacceptable level. Criminals even exporting illegally extracted minerals. There was
not a security plan for level 3 which should be implemented by the Navy, because in
order to create a plan for level 3, there should be measures established for level 1
and level 2 in advance, but that was not achieved." It is true that Mexico signed the
protocols for the ISPS Code, but the MCT did not perform an effective job and many
points towards this direction were already mentioned. As a result, the law changed
and the UCMAR(s) were established and now the MMAR is a co-responsible entity to
address security level 1, level 2 and level 3 and more elaborated plans are now in
place.
Ports and port terminals must have their own PSO and PFSO, as established in the
ISPS Code. But, in the case of Mexico they were not fulfilling the requirements
concerning security incident registers, which should have been created by them
concerning the numerous security incidents that were identified, including confiscation
of drugs, weapons and hydrocarbons made by the Navy. More importantly, this failure
took place despite the fact that these events are classified as high security risks

14) Asociación Mexicana de Agentes Navieros, represented with the acronym Amanac, in Spanish.
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involving confiscation and transportation to official warehouses for future destruction.
Kidnapping of port personnel and terminal operators strongly affects port operations
and should be handled as security incidents, even when they happen outside the
port. Statistics and analysis of maritime security incidents illustrate past actions and
shall be open to public scrutiny, ensuring that the government implements barriers to
avoid that such events happen again; on the contrary, procedures for how to deal
with such incidents in the future are included in the PFSP and must be confidential.
Handling of confiscation of drugs and other restricted items is clearly the duty of the
NAUPPRO and customs’ authorities, but it is the duty of the PSO/PFSO to register
them accordingly in the respective security incident logs and consider them during
the risk evaluation and if needed to amend accordingly the PFSP. The analysis of the
root causes of security incidents is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of
the PFSP, but if a new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary.
Therefore it is crucial to keep security incident records updated. Furthermore, all the
above-mentioned deficiencies were not detected during the Designated Authority’s
audits and inspections and no matter that they went through a second filter, the MMAR,
which performed the final revision of the PFSA and PFSP and should require
amendments (when necessary) upon their approval. Additionally, authorities of the
Tampico Port did not establish a restricted navigation area according to their answer
in the questionnaire. A restricted navigation area for the port roadways and within the
port proximity area should be established, not only to mitigate security risks, but also
for maritime accident prevention.
It is necessary to highlight that it is recommended for the process of recertification of
port and terminals to start at least a year before the expiration date of the Declaration
of Compliance with the ISPS Code, to avoid that port and terminals continue operating
without the required certifications, which could give grounds for suspension of port
and terminal operations. Finally, as Kerr (2010) argues, the responsibility for assuring
maritime security lies firmly with governments, but private security companies can
attend a niche market in support of these official bodies.

Conclusions
Maritime security incidents in Mexico are numerous and involve extraordinary and
complex threats such as the plundering of oil platforms, kidnapping and extortion of
port personnel and terminal operators and even pirate-type attacks. The government’s
security strategy of combining justice reforms and providing more power to the Navy
through the formulation of maritime police (NAUPPROs) and UCMARs, as well as
including community engagement and the participation of different organisations from
the three levels of government is functioning and has improved the overall situation.
Mechanisms in place are gradually recovering control of an unacceptable situation,
particularly in ports where the military model is being tested. However, this strategy
must be followed along with ensuring compliance of the ISPS Code, with the issue of
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record keeping standing out. It is true that the lack of a national maritime security
policy has resulted in constant breaches of the ISPS Code provisions and different
security procedures at the ports under examination. After twelve years of ISPS
implementation, Mexico still does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code
at an acceptable level, although some improvement is recorded because of the recent
security reforms. One pressing need is to introduce a quality system that ensures the
proper registration of security incidents: updating these incident records will help in
the future improvement of the maritime security framework and the creation of a
sustained security culture focused not only on incident prevention, but also on response
to and recovery of a major security incident, including resilience plans.
In any case, in order to avoid duality and misunderstanding of security duties due to
the recent involvement of the military and the difference in culture, it is recommended
to set up a clear division of duties and responsibilities; the establishment of a "noblame culture" must be considered to ensure the proper registration and thorough
analysis of all respective security incidents. It is also recommended to re-evaluate the
PFSPs of the ports and all Pemex terminals by considering threats that were not
included in the initial creation of those documents; it is also necessary to consider the
establishment of a restricted navigation area at the Tampico Port. Last but not least,
it is essential to standardise the notion that the process of re-certification shall start in
due time (maybe at least a year) before the period of validity of SOC expires to avoid
suspension of port and terminal operations. Finally, an extensive study covering the
satisfaction level in locations where the militarisation model is already in place (and
how this affects trade operations and maritime security) should be performed before
its further implementation throughout the country.
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Mexico’s Reorganisation of Maritime
Security Regime: A New Role for the Navy
and Emphasis on Energy Related
Infrastructures
Adriana Avila-Zuñiga Nordfjeld and Dimitrios Dalaklis

1 Introduction
Previous research efforts have already pointed out that the current state of implementation and level of compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) in Mexico is rather poor (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016).
This chapter will also investigate in a similar direction. It will ﬁrst provide a
summary of the latest reform to Mexico’s national legislation dealing with various
important issues of the maritime domain. Then, it will identify the contradictions in
the relevant laws, in relation to effective implementation of national legislation and
international instruments, with special focus on the ISPS Code. Subsequently, it will
study the acceptance of the transferral of the National Maritime Authority from a
civil institution (MCT) towards a military one (MMAR) within the four different
authorities directly related to the maritime industry’s operations/activities. Finally,
ﬁndings in relation to ﬁeld research activities in main Mexican ports and especially
important energy hubs are presented, followed by the associated conclusions and
recommendations with the aim to improve their security status.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) communicates via its web site
the information that thirty-ﬁve (35) different countries located in the American
Continent have signed and ratiﬁed the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; Mexico is included in the aforementioned group. The
SOLAS 1974 Convention includes Chapter XI-2 concerning special measures to
enhance maritime security, and especially Regulation XI-2/3 that enshrines the
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code). Apart from the
ISPS Code, the SOLAS 1974 Convention is used to “operationalize” a very inﬂuential safety instrument for shipping operations: the International Management Code
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for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety
Management (ISM) Code). Furthermore, in its Chapter XI-1, there are special
measures to enhance maritime safety that provide the basis for carrying out inspections of foreign ships in national ports under Port State Control (PSC); the latter can
also be described as an exercise of the right of protection of the coastal State, as
established in Article 25 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). In the case of Mexico, there is a confusing situation after the country’s
last major legal maritime reform, where it was established that the National Maritime
Authority shall be executed by the Ministry of Marina (MMAR), and it transferred
all Master of Harbours to MMAR; however, the Port Authority remained with the
Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT).
Implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code is a topic studied extensively
in the United States and Canada. The US has, indeed, been a pioneer in port security.
Already in 1997, 7 years before the ISPS Code entered into force, the US Department of Transportation launched the “Port Security National Planning Guide”,
which was “intended to be used by port directors and ofﬁcers of port security
departments in fulﬁlling their responsibilities toward the development of an effective
port security program” (US Department of Transportation 1997). The guide included
requirements of a “Security Survey and Risk Assessment” and the development and
implementation of a “Security Plan”. Kenneth (2009) pointed out that “the evolution
of organized security processes in the maritime sector can be understood as a
product of increasing governmental and commercial concerns about the criminal
exploitation of seaports, [. . .] and the rising threat of global terrorism”. In the case
of Canada, the ISPS Code has been implemented since it entered into force in July
2004. Rudner (2009) included maritime ports as part of the “Critical National
Infrastructure” that must be protected from terrorism and provided emphasis on
ports serving the energy sector. The author highlighted the need for “a national
strategy/plan for the protection of Canada’s critical national infrastructure against
exogenous risks and threats”.
Mexico, similarly to Canada, is one of the largest producers of oil and gas and has
a signiﬁcant number of critical infrastructures, including numerous maritime ports
linked to the energy sector. Mexico’s State owned company (Pemex) reported that,
as of 1st January 2014, the proven reserves of Mexico’s crude oil were calculated to
be 9812 million barrels (MMb), whereas the proven reserves of natural gas were
calculated to be 16,549 billion cubic feet (Pemex, Petroleos Mexicanos 2014). This
report also mentioned that the biggest volume of proven reserves of crude oil,
equivalent to 70%, are located in marine oil ﬁelds and only 30% of them are located
in terrestrial ﬁelds. At the same time, 56% of the proven reserves of natural gas are
located in terrestrial ﬁelds, with the remaining 44% in marine ﬁelds. It must also be
highlighted that most of the Mexican ports are directly or indirectly serving the oil
energy market for developed marine oil ﬁelds.
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2 Mexico’s Maritime Reform
To better understand the latest developments in Mexico in relation to the maritime
domain, it is important to consider that a few decades ago, the MMAR held the
control of ports and the merchant marine; but in 1977 the ex-President José López
Portillo reformed the “Law of Public Federal Administration” transferring to the
MCT all the activities related to the development of merchant marine, as well as the
construction of port infrastructure and the respective administration/operation. However, the MCT and particularly the Harbour Masters (also called Port Captains in
Mexico) were never equipped in a satisfactory manner to deliver the functions of
maritime safety and security, such as port state control and inspection of vessels.
Almost 40 years later, all these functions are (again) reallocated to the authorities of
MMAR, with the latest maritime legal reform.
For a rather prolonged period, drug cartels in Mexico were conducting a wide
array of illegal activities that resulted in extremely high levels of violence. Considering these implications, as well as less unforeseen crimes such as the theft of
hydrocarbons and demands of “extortion payments” to owners and operators of
port terminals (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016), the Mexican government attempted
the reorganization of its maritime security regime. Not only is efﬁcient use of energy
resources important, but “losing” tremendous quantities of oil due to theft is totally
unacceptable and must be addressed via the right types of policies. Several existing
laws were revised; a new set of regulations was introduced in 2014 that included
amendments to the “Law of Ports”, the regulation in relation to the establishment of
the “Uniﬁed Centre for Port and Maritime Security” (called “UCMAR” thereafter),
and the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade”, among others. However, the
Parliament focused on port security and port installations; it did not include in the
regulation the part related to maritime security and the requirements for ships,
established in the ISPS Code, such as the Ship Security Ofﬁcer (SSO), Ship Security
Assessment (SSA), the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and the International Ship Security
Certiﬁcate (ISSC). From April 21st 2014 to June 2017, when the last updates to this
chapter were made, there was no institution appointed responsible for maritime
security conforming Mexico’s national legislation. Additionally, the creation of
the “Military Navy Unit for Port Security/Protection” (“Unidad Naval de Protección
Portuaria” and represented with the acronym UNAPROP, in Spanish, called
NAUPPRO thereafter) was decided, covering only the part of the ISPS Code related
to protection of ports and port installations.
Concerning maritime security, as already mentioned, an important legal instrument is Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, (SOLAS
Convention) which relates to the ISPS Code. This Code is deﬁned by the IMO as
“the comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States” (International Maritime
Organization 2012). Whereas part A of the Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory (“recommended”) part B provides guidelines about how
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to comply with the mandatory requirements of part A. After numerous years of ISPS
Code implementation, Mexico does not yet comply with its requirements at an
acceptable level, although some improvement is lately recorded, mainly because
of the 2014 security reforms (Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2016).
As highlighted previously, the mandatory Part A of the ISPS Code introduced the
obligation for contracting governments to appoint a Designated Authority to carry
out certain maritime security duties/responsibilities established in the Code. This
Designated Authority holds the responsibility for setting maritime security levels
and ensuring compliance with the maritime security measures at all ports (where the
ISPS Code applies) through the Port Security Assessment (PSA) and Port Facility
Security Assessment (PFSA). The revision, approval and control of compliance of
the Port Security Plan (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be
based upon the PSA and the PFSA, is also included in the respective responsibilities.
The development of PSP/PFSP is also related to the activities of the Port Security
Ofﬁcer (PSO) and Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer (PFSO).
As established by IMO, there are three different security levels: Security Level
1 (normal) requires the minimum protective security measures at all times; Security
Level 2, which requires additional protective security measures for the speciﬁc
period of time that the risk of a security incident is heightened; and Security Level
3, which requires speciﬁc protective security measures and may result in the
suspension of commercial operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred
to the Government or other organizations responsible for dealing with signiﬁcant
incidents (International Maritime Organization 2012). In Mexico, it is the “Uniﬁed
Centre for Port and Maritime Security” (UCMAR) that is responsible for coordination and execution of all security operations under Level 3 and it is the Commander
of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction where an UCMAR is established who
shall be appointed as the Chairman of that respective UCMAR, as established in
provision 8 of Regulation of the UCMAR published on the Ofﬁcial Diary of the
Federation, on 21st of April, 2014. This provision also includes the notion that the
Harbour Master shall be nominated as the Vice-Chairman of the UCMAR, and, in
addition, three employees of each of these institutions shall be selected as advisers. A
UCMAR shall be established at each of the 16 Federal Integral Port Administration
(s) (FIPAs) designed to receive vessels of over 500 gross tonnage, or which receive
vessels sailing international trading routes, according to Provision 6 of the referred
regulation.
According to the “Law of Ports” Article 19 SECOND, the UCMAR is a group of
inter-institutional coordination between the MMAR and the MCT for the application
of and compliance with the ISPS Code. This part was not amended with the Decree.
However, since MMAR obtained control of both Master of Harbours and the
UCMAR itself, the “inter-institutional character” of this group should be
re-evaluated, keeping in mind that MCT will maintain control of the “Fideicomiso
de Formación y Capacitación para el Personal de la Marina Mercante Nacional”
(represented with the acronym “FIDENA” in Spanish, which may be translated to
“Fond of Education and Training of the National Merchant Marine”, and called
FETNAMM thereafter). This is the authorized institution for giving the IMO’s
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model courses 18.1, 18.2 and 18.3 concerning the ISPS Code, and the only authorized foundation so far, for performing Port Security Assessments (PSA) and Port
Facility Security Assessments (PFSA).
Article 19 THIRD, paragraph II of this law highlights that “the UCMAR shall
apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework of the
Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code and ensure
the establishment of a series of functions and actions for each of the respective three
security levels”. This is part of the maritime security reforms that took effect on the
21st of April 2014. However, because of lack of knowledge about the reform itself,
the MMAR did not fully exercise its authority and the Harbour Master was erroneously recognized as the authority (for the ISPS Code) by the PFSOs and port
agencies. The UCMAR is responsible for the revision of PSA/PFSA, which covers
the security risks evaluation for ports or port facilities, which shall be the base for
developing the PSP/PFSP, submitted and approved by the Designated Authority.
The responsible person for developing the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP is the Port
Security Ofﬁcer (PSO) or Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer (PFSO), including compliance with all requirements established in the ISPS Code and reﬂected in the
PSP/PFSP as training, exercises, practices, inspections audits and modiﬁcations
via formalised procedures to the plan.
In another research of Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017), it was rightly pointed out
that the PSO/PFSO must attend security incidents and keep incident security records
updated, which must be considered in the risk evaluation and integrated into the
security plan to achieve a constant reduction of risks and continuous improvement of
port and maritime security. UCMAR shall verify, among other aspects, that security
incidents are properly recorded in the security incidents register; even with MCT
supervising the port authority, the UCMAR is responsible for control of compliance
with the ISPS Code and co-responsible for the revision and approval of PSA/PFSA
and PSP/PFSP, according to its Regulation, Article 7, paragraph II, which states that:
“[UCMAR] shall participate in the evaluation of risks of maritime and port security,
previous to the elaboration of the security plans and it shall propose the necessary
modiﬁcations and updating to those plans”. Paragraph III of this article, mentions
that once the plan has been approved, the UCMAR shall participate in the veriﬁcation and control of compliance with plans, ensuring their effective implementation.
Findings of the above mentioned study included inconsistencies within the data of
the necessary security incident records, or even their total absence. Neither the
MMAR nor the MCT has effectively addressed the issue of security incident record
keeping.
The UCMAR is currently performing the responsibilities of a Port Security
Committee, a committee recommended by the ISPS Code to coordinate security
procedures and measures. Under the UCMAR, there is also the Port Security
Assessor Committee, which is normally integrated by the UCMAR and customsimmigration authorities operating at the port; the management of the port operator
and port terminals is also included. Additionally, municipal and regional Governments with associated interests in that jurisdiction are part of the committee. However, it is important to consider the need to balance the openness of an advisory
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committee with the need to protect the conﬁdentiality of sensitive security information (International Maritime Organization 2012).
In 2016, the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, presented a law initiative
to amend and improve diverse provisions of the “Law of Public Administration”,
“Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and the “Law of Ports”. The aim was to
transfer the control, inspection, vigilance and other activities related to the merchant
marine and the maritime industry, including Harbour Masters from a civil authority
(MCT) to a military one (MMAR). However, a signiﬁcant exclusion was port
development and administration apparatus, including the port authority, which was
previously exercised through Harbour Masters. This law initiative was approved by
the National Congress without any change and published as a Decree on the Ofﬁcial
Diary of the Federation (ODF) on the 19th of December 2016.
This legal document establishes the new attributions of the Ministry of Marine,
which entered into force on the 17th of June, 2017. Every authorized port shall have
a Master of Harbour, which will be administrated by MMAR with a delimited
maritime territorial jurisdiction, which, according to Article 9 of the decree, shall
have attributions to authorize bear away and bear off as well as customs clearance of
naval craft; ﬂag and register Mexican vessels and naval artefacts; grant permissions
for offering maritime passenger transport services and nautical tourism within the
waters of jurisdiction; regulate and monitor that the nautical routes meet the required
conditions for safety, depth, marine signs, maritime trafﬁc control and nautical
assistance; and inspect vessels, among others.
The duties and responsibilities of the NAUPPRO should also be (re-)evaluated
and conﬁrmed. This unit currently has the functions of a coast guard. It is under the
control of the Commander of the Navy Zone at each port, who is the President of the
UCMAR. However, its guidelines concerning duties and responsibilities are not
clear enough with respect to its duties under the UCMAR. Yet, these units have the
responsibility of port protection under the control of the Commander of the Navy
Zone, and they must ensure control and compliance with ISPS Code requirements at
the port and give all necessary information to the Commander, who holds the role of
Chairman of the UCMAR, may inform the rest of this group of actions taken by the
NAUPPRO. The actual Guidelines of NAUPPRO are currently too general and
rather vague. Due to their military discipline, they do not take actions to ensure
compliance with ISPS Code requirements if they do not receive concrete and speciﬁc
orders or if it is not clearly established and requested in their procedures. The
development of rules/protocols with speciﬁc and concrete duties for this unit is
recommended. Security duties performed by the NAUPPRO may include, among
others, considering that currently they only attend the ISPS Code section related to
port installations:
• Control/veriﬁcation that all maritime ports and terminals are operating with an
updated Statement of Compliance (SOC).
• Revision and control that all ports and terminals have employed a certiﬁed
PSO/PFSO with an updated and valid certiﬁcate.
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• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals with security
duties have been certiﬁed with the necessary training concerning the required
course 18.2 as established in the ISPS Code.
• Revision and control that all personnel from ports and terminals without speciﬁc
security duties have been certiﬁed with the necessary training concerning the
required course 18.3 as established in the ISPS Code.
• Develop and keep the ofﬁcial register of maritime security incidents for that
speciﬁc port.
• Revise and control that all PSO/PFSO keep their own registers updated for
reporting maritime security incidents.
• Participate in the revision and analysis of Port Security Assessments (PSA) and
Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), for terminals.
• Participate in the inspections for approval of PSA/PFSA.
• Participate in the revision and analysis of Port Security Plans (PSP) and Port
Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and make observations for necessary modiﬁcations to those plans.
• Participate in inspections and audits for approval of PSP/PFSP before the issuance of the Statement of Compliance (SOC).
• Carry out random inspections on scene and general inspections to verify the
compliance of PSP/PFSP.
• Plan, coordinate and carry out security drills (level 3) at a minimum interval of
once a year with no more than 18 months between them.
• Participate in the evaluation of security drills (level 3).
• Participate in and make the necessary observation for the external security audit,
which shall be performed with a minimum interval of once a year.
• Develop and keep updated the register of approved PSA/PFSA; PSP/PFSP; drills;
inspections and other relevant operations for availability to IMO, in the case of
mandatory audits.
Agreement number 039 for the creation and activation of 19 NAUPPROs at the
main maritime ports of Mexico was published on the 31st of March, 2014, on the
Ofﬁcial Diary of the Federation. However, only 14 in total have been created and
activated up to this point. The activation of NAUPPROs at the ports of La Paz,
Puerto Vallarta, Puerto Chiapas, Matamoros and Dos Bocas is still lacking; at this
last port, the ofﬁcial creation of the UCMAR is also lacking.
The Presidential Decree recently reformed the country’s legal framework and
allowed the complete shift not only of maritime security, but also of the safety aspect
(including the port-state control function) from a civil authority (MCT), to a military
one (MMAR). The previous failures of the Mexican Designated Authority are
associated with a large number of security incidents and various accidents which,
through poor inspections, have contributed not only to loss of property at sea, but
also to human casualties and signiﬁcant marine pollution. Aranda (2016) pointed out
that while the Chamber of Senators analysed the initiative of law, three maritime
accidents that occurred that summer can be used as evidence of deﬁciencies in the
system under MCT. The Harbour Master of Tampico Port has also been denounced

dd@wmu.se

102

A. A.-Z. Nordfjeld and D. Dalaklis

for corruption and abuse against ﬁshermen. More speciﬁcally, MCT employees were
accused of corruption by the owners of the ﬁshing vessels “Rastreador”,
“Banpesca”, “Fenicio”, “Astur” and “Tampico Star”. All these argued that they
were forced to hand over a shrimp carriage quota to personnel from that institution,
to be able to work (Vergara 2016).
The initiative emphasized the convenience of deﬁning one National Maritime
Authority to comply with national and international obligations and the need to
delimitate and redistribute the attributions that are exercised by both institutions, the
MMAR and MCT. However, several duties and responsibilities are still “shared”.
While the MMAR is responsible for implementation and compliance with the ISPS
Code, the MCT holds the port authority role and is responsible for imposition of
sanctions related to violations of the Code. On the positive side, the new legal regime
emphasises that MMAR currently has the human and material resources necessary to
comply with the exercise of the national sovereignty and authority in the Mexican
marine zones, as well as to guarantee the compliance of the port with the national
(maritime) legal framework.
In summary, the reforms to Article 8 SECOND of the referred “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” established the new attributions of the Ministry of Marine,
and empowered MMAR to approve licenses for passenger and tourism maritime
transport services with small boats, authorize vessels to bear away and bear off as
well as customs clearance. Flag and registration issues of vessels, administration of
the national registers of maritime crews and ships, as well as inspection and
veriﬁcation of national and foreign vessels are included in those tasks. Additionally,
compliance with international conventions as well as national legislation and ofﬁcial
Mexican norms related to maritime safety and security is another of its tasks.
At the same time, the Decree reformed Article 8 of the “Law of Navigation and
Maritime Trade”, concerning the new attributions of the MCT, conﬁrmed that MCT
will continue to lead the administration of ports, as well as the training framework of
the merchant marine. A signiﬁcant inconsistency is that the decree modiﬁes Article
7 of the “Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade” and establishes that the “National
Maritime Authority” is exercised by the Federal Executive Power through MMAR
for the exercise of national sovereignty, dealing with maritime safety and security
issues, as well as exercising the Right of the State to be applied at the Mexican
marine zones, while Article 9 B establishes that MCT will exercise its functions at
the ports through the Ofﬁces of Services to the Merchant Marine. Additionally, the
“Law of Ports”, Article 16, clearly establishes that the Port Authority is exercised by
the Federal Executive Power through MCT, which will be exercised through the
“Ofﬁces of Services to the Merchant Marine” established at all ports.
Vessel inspections are currently performed at the dock in the ports of Mexico,
while according to common practice this should be done outside in the open ocean
between 12 and 24 miles, in the contiguous zone. MMAR should evaluate the
allocation to Harbour Masters of a certain number of the interceptor-patrols they
already have or assess the acquisition of some Ocean Patrol Vessel(s) Defender II,
which is a relatively small naval vessel designed to perform coastal defence duties,
but large and seaworthy enough to patrol offshore areas in the open ocean.
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Concerning the offshore area of Campeche, the control centre for maritime trafﬁc
was formerly managed and operated by Pemex, a private company. To ensure the
proper exercise of the maritime authority in this area, MMAR should recover the
control and operation of this centre.

3 Research Methodology of Field Activities
The research methodology of the current study includes semi-structured interviews
with Harbours Masters, Directors of Customs Maritime Units, Directors of ports,
PFSOs from ports and certain number of hydrocarbons terminals, Presidents of
UCMAR (1st Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station) and
Commandants of the port and maritime police (Naval Unit for Port Security, also
called NAUPS) and the Gulf’s Navy Force. Additionally, participant observation at
the terminals and Harbours Master’s installations and ports, including not only the
land areas but also the maritime passages took place; visits were made on board
oceanic patrols of the Mexican Navy. The visits to the mentioned ports in Mexico
had an average duration of a week at each port.
The poll of data included the leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports
of Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.), Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.),
Dos Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen (Campeche), and Progresso (Yuc.) as well as
another Hub Port from the Paciﬁc in Mexico. By doing this, the researcher covered
the four pillars for the operation of the port. The pool of data is deemed sufﬁcient,
based on the fact that it includes eight out of sixteen FIPAs in Mexico where the
ISPS Code applies, representing 50% of them and seven out of seven (100%) FIPAs
situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and production activities take
place. One State-Owned Integrated Port Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil activity is concentrated was also included in the study.
Two loose interviews with top directors from MMAR were performed on key
themes identiﬁed from issues prevalent in the analysis of the interviews with
Presidents of the UCMAR and Federal FIPAs. From the total number of persons
invited to participate, representing Master of Harbour ofﬁces at these nine cited
ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The same ﬁgures correspond to
representatives from the maritime customs units (one) and directors from FIPAs
(one) as well as the PFSO from that same port, who due to extreme work volume had
to decline the interview.
The purpose of the study was described to the participants via an information
cover-sheet letter where the research objectives were explained, clarifying that their
participation was voluntary, conﬁdential and without any economic contribution, or
gifts. The Research Ethics Committee of the World Maritime University approved
the study. The total of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all of whom worked
in areas of maritime safety and security. Interviews were carried out in the participants’ workplaces by the researcher, tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data
was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and themes were identiﬁed and
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coded using thematic analysis and constant comparison of data. The researcher
searched thoroughly for all divergent views to form a rich description of different
factors.

4 Results
From the interviewed subjects with functions of Master of Harbour, 75% expressed
their approval to be transferred to the MMAR and supported the law decree, while
25% strongly disapproved of the transfer between the institutions. An important
conclusion is that the people interviewed were either very much in favour or very
much against the change. 87.5% of Directors of maritime customs units and 75% of
Directors of FIPAs supported the law decree; at the same time, 100% of Presidents of
UCMAR held a positive view. The same ﬁgures correspond to Commandants from
the NAUPPRO (coast guard-navy), whereas 87.5% of Port Security Ofﬁcers (PSO)
supported the transfer of Master of Harbours to MMAR; and 80% of the interviewed
subjects functioning as Port Facility Security Ofﬁcers (PFSO) from hydrocarbon
terminals supported the transfer.
Twelve categories were identiﬁed that either prevent or promote the transfer of
Harbours Master from MCT to MMAR: (I) poor performance of Harbours Masters
from the MCT; (II) acute lack of human and material resources available for
Harbours Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory
manner; (III) high exposure to corruption on the part of Harbours Masters related to
Mexican crime ring organizations due to death threats against them or their families;
(IV) fear on the part of Harbours Master of losing their jobs in a late stage of their
productive life; (V) uncertainty on the part of Masters of Harbours with respect to
their salary level, working rights and pension schemes; (VI) improvement of salary
and working rights for Masters of Harbours and their personnel with the transferral
to MMAR; (VII) already high participation of the Mexican Navy performing duties
that correspond to Harbour Masters; (VIII) fear on the part of directors of port
administrations of lack of knowledge, stubbornness and unwillingness/inﬂexibility
to negotiate on factors related to business issues with respect to authorities from the
Mexican Navy; (IX) security improvement for offshore installations and vessels
serving the oil market; (X) trust in a signiﬁcant improvement of maritime safety and
security on the part of directors of maritime customs units with the transfer of
Harbour Master ofﬁces to the Ministry of Marine; (XI) bigger and better capabilities
to combat crime ring organizations that are using port installations for transport of
drugs, weapons, money laundering and transport of stolen hydrocarbons, and ﬁnally;
(XII) need to provide juridical support and attributions to the MMAR for activities
already performed by the Navy and which are currently outside their juridical
attributions.
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5 General Discussion
A number of participants’ quotes are used to better illustrate the associated data.
Concerning category (I) poor performance of Masters of Harbours, one of the quotes
that best illustrates the situation is taken from participant number 6 who said:
“unfortunately, the master of harbours have lost a lot of authority and it is very
sad that nobody takes them seriously anymore”. This situation might be explained
with category (II) acute lack of human and material resources available for Harbour
Masters to comply with their duties and responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. The
statement that best explains this aspect is from participant 1-G, who claimed that:
“the Maritime Designated Authority somehow is suffering a separation of attributions and material resources, because since 1940 the Mexican Navy; [. . .], used to
give all the required support to Harbours Masters [. . .] but when they were
transferred to MCT, [. . .] all the naval craft and necessary equipment was left
with MMAR, including navy vessels, ocean patrols, boats for search and rescue
operations and helicopters. Then, with these limitations the MCT started to function
since 1976 and until today”. Interestingly enough, 100% of the participants pointed
out the acute lack of resources for Harbour Masters to carry out their duties in an
adequate manner.
Another reason for the loss of authority of Harbour Masters, can be explained
with category (III) high exposure to corruption on the part of Harbour Masters
related to Mexican crime ring organizations due to death threats against them or
their families; as the case of participant 36 who afﬁrmed “I have one year and seven
months that I am working under death threats. Constant threats by phone [. . .] I
have moved my home and my family out of the city. There is no other way. And what
can I do? I have the need to work. But tell me, where is not the same”?
Participants highlighted the already high participation of the Mexican Navy
performing duties that correspond to Harbour Masters (category VII). Yet, several
directors of ports manifested their fear of lack of knowledge and inﬂexibility to
negotiate on factors related to business issues with the Mexican Navy (category
VIII). To illustrate this aspect, one of them (26) is quoted: “I believe that the marina
has given courses to their people but I do not think that they have much experience
and knowledge concerning the operation and administration of merchant marine”.
This was a view was shared by a few Harbour Masters. One of them (18) afﬁrmed:
“[. . .] one of our functions [. . .] is the ﬂuidity of the port. They are accustomed to
command, and to apply correctness regardless of the problem, here everything is
about ﬂexibility and judgment. They do not have it”. On the other hand, 75 per cent
of as FIPAs’ directors were very positive about the transferral. To illustrate their
attitude, respondent 49 quoted: “[. . .] I believe that the objective of this project is to
strengthen the Harbour Master to be able to do their duties in an efﬁcient and
effective way concerning vigilance and control of ports.”
Category number (X) envisions a signiﬁcant improvement of maritime safety and
security on the part of directors of maritime customs units with the transfer of
Harbour Masters ofﬁces to MMAR; this can be explained with a quote from
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participant 6: “I have had the opportunity to work in the ports where the control of
the Harbour Master was already been taken by the Ministry of Marina and it has
been immensely positive. There was a huge leak of information that could only be
controlled with the interference of the Navy. It has been very good. [. . .] I am
waiting for them to do so, here too”. In the agreement between MMAR and the MCT
(2009), it is stated that the ﬁnancial and operative capacity of crime ring organizations has allowed them to access strictly conﬁdential information. Therefore, it is
important that MMAR implement an anti-corruption programme for the transfer of
MCT employees to Marina to stop old corruption and leaking of information
practices.
A statement from respondent number 36 reﬂects category (XI): bigger and better
capabilities to “ﬁght” crime ring organizations using port installations for criminal
activities: “the infrastructure to properly exercise the maritime authority is in
MMAR through the Navy. The international conventions originally signed by the
MCT are already taken by the MMAR, why? It may be because we do not have the
equipment and human resources that they have”.

6 Conclusion and Recommendations
It is a rather self-explanatory fact that the Presidential Decree under discussion has
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the Mexican legal maritime framework; it allowed the shift
of maritime safety and securities responsibility, from a civil authority (Ministry of
Communications and Transport, MCT) to a military one (Ministry of Marine,
MMAR). The very high level of acceptance between the four pillar institutions
involved in maritime safety and security operations (both at port and at sea) such
as Maritime Customs Units, Military Navy Zone-with its respective UCMAR,
Federal Integrated Port Administrations, maritime police-represented by the Navy
Unit for Port Protection (NAUPPRO), and ﬁnally the Harbour Masters themselves is
a very strong indicator.
However, Mexico has to signiﬁcantly improve the current level of performance;
even if the change of the designated authority may contribute to the achievement of
this goal, the MMAR must ensure the application of integrity and anti-corruption
programs during the transferral process, to disconnect from the main causes of past
failures. Further reforms to the Law of Navigation and Maritime Trade, Law of Ports
and the regulation of the UCMAR shall be enacted with regard to appointing the
institution responsible for implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code, with
respect to maritime security, in relation to the security requirements for the operation
of vessels. The transfer of the Port Authority from MCT to MMAR should be
evaluated to avoid triangulation of the activities related to the maritime authority,
such as imposition of sanctions. Most FIPAs are under the control of MCT and the
simultaneous execution of both roles (acting as the performer and evaluator) should
be avoided.
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Strengthening the maritime security regime and especially its interface with
energy resources remains an action of priority in order to “avoid unnecessary
casualties” as a result of illicit activities and theft. Similarly, in order to enhance
the level of maritime domain awareness (MDA) in Mexico, as well as introduce a
forward way of thinking about conducting maritime security operations, the MMAR
could also recover control of maritime trafﬁc centres (which are currently operated
and administrated by Pemex, including the offshore and oil production area of
Campeche). Better information is a prerequisite for the optimal allocation of
resources. The allocation of offshore patrol vessels or “Deterrence” patrols, as well
as the required personnel to operate them at the disposal of Master of Harbours could
allow the latter to perform vessel inspections at the contiguity zone if they consider
so necessary. Additionally, tailor made training will also be needed to build the
necessary human capacity and expertise that it is not yet available; the introduction
of a “no-blame” culture could also be considered. Finally, MMAR must also avoid
misuse of high security trained resources in duties that are outside their competence
and especially avoid allocating to the maritime police (NAUPPRO), duties and
responsibilities that must be performed by staff belonging to Harbour Masters.
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Abstract
This paper aims to improve port security measures in developing countries via integrating
the procedures of incident reporting and the associated follow up investigation, hinging on
the Mexican experience. The analysis examined port security at Mexican ports, where
stakeholders were interviewed on the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities
for security incident reporting, updating of security incident records and facilitation of the
follow up investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this new
framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the re-assessment of security threats
through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and the necessary modifications to
the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) were all integrated. These subjects were all
incorporated into a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was
implemented at all ports in Mexico, where the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code) applies, by the National Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a
real case through “action research”, the improvement of port security framework in the
country. Measurements were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the
incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase from absolutely
nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success. In addition, 56% of those
reported maritime incidents were also associated with recommendations to be integrated
into the PFSA and respective PFSP. Collecting accurate and immediate information/
evidence material while reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident
investigation and continuous improvement of the PFSP.
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1 Introduction
Concerning port (and maritime security), one of the most important instruments of
international law is the set of maritime security regulations developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that are formulating the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code); the ISPS Code is “the comprehensive set of
measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the
United States” (International Maritime Organization 2012). Whereas Part A of the
Code establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory (“recommended”) Part
B comprises guidelines about how to comply with the mandatory requirements of Part
A (International Maritime Organization 2017). In any case, core instruments of the
ISPS Code are security incident reports and security incident investigation.
The ISPS Code Part A establishes in section 17 that a Port Facility Security Officer
(PFSO) shall be designated for each port facility. Section 17.2 establishes the duties and
responsibilities of the PFSO; from these, it is noteworthy that according to paragraph 8,
this person is involved with “reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining
records of occurrences which threaten the security of the port facility.” Therefore, it
is the responsibility of the Port Security Officer (PSO) or Port Facility Security Officer
(PFSO) to deal with security incident reporting and keep the associated records
updated. Furthermore, security incidents must be considered in the evaluation of risk
for the Port Security Assessment (PSA) or Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA)
and integrated into the Port Security Plan (PSP) or Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) to
constantly reduce risks and continuously improve port (and maritime) security. AvilaZuñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017a) have already pointed out that “the analysis of
security incidents’ root causes is the cornerstone of the PFSA, which is the base of the
PFSP; but, if a new security threat is identified, adjustments are necessary. Therefore, it
is crucial to keep security incident records updated.”
In addition, it must be well documented within the respective PFSP the procedures
for reporting security incidents. Port facility security incidents are normally divided into
two categories: (1) those considered sufficiently serious/grave that the PFSO/PSO must
report to relevant authorities for their official investigation. These include, but are not
limited to, unauthorized access to restricted areas within the port facility; unauthorized
carriage or discovery of drugs, weapons, or prohibited items within the port facility
(including those found in ships’ carriage); incidents for which the media is aware; bomb
warnings and unauthorized disclosure of the PFSPs, among others; (2) those security
incidents of less serious nature. These events require updating of the security records,
but they might be investigated directly by the PFSO/PSO to discover the causes and take
the corresponding actions to implement measures in order to avoid their repetition in the
future. These may include breaches of screening points, inappropriate uses of passes or
terminal identification cards, suspicious behavior in or near the port facility, and
unsecured access points (International Maritime Organization 2012). In any case,
security threats, breaches of security, and security incidents, including date, time,
location, response to them, and the person-authorities to whom they were reported,
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must be recorded and documented in the security incidents records. In certain countries,
the maritime designated authorities have specified the type of maritime and port security
incidents that must be immediately reported to them for official investigation. Indicative
examples include terror attacks; bomb warnings; hijack, armed robbery against a ship;
discovery of firearms, drugs, weapons, and explosives; and unauthorized access to port
facilities and restricted areas (International Maritime Organization 2012).
After almost 14 years from the ISPS Code’s implementation, Mexico does not comply
yet with its requirements at an acceptable level. On the positive side, some improvement is
recently recorded because of the maritime reforms of 2014 and the latest maritime and port
reform of December 2016, when the National Maritime Authority was transferred from
the Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT) to the Secretariat of the Navy1
and called SEMAR hereinafter (Avila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis 2017a). AvilaZúñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017b) explained that in Mexico, it is the Centro
Unificado Para La Protección Marítima Y Portuaria (CUMAR),2 which is responsible
for the port and maritime security. According to the Law of Ports Article 19 SECOND, the
CUMAR is a group of inter-institutional coordination between the SEMAR and the SCT
for the application of maritime security measures; effective prevention and/or dealing with
maritime and port security incidents is the primary aim (Cámara de Diputados del H.
Congreso de la Unión, México 2017b). Article 19 THIRD, II paragraph establishes that
the CUMAR shall apply all the dispositions and response measures within the framework
of the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, comprising the ISPS Code.
According to its Regulation, provision 6: “a CUMAR shall be established at all the 16
ports (FIPA3s, where the Code applies.” Additionally, provision 8 of this regulation
establishes that it is the Commander of the Navy Military Zone of each jurisdiction,
where a CUMAR is established, who shall be the President of that respective CUMAR
(Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, México 2017a).
Additionally, serious maritime incidents must be officially investigated as required by
the Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (the Casualty Investigation Code–CI
Code). The CI Code was adopted by IMO on 16 May 2008 through resolution
MSC.255(84), establishing diverse provisions in Chapter XI of the SOLAS Convention,
making several parts of the Code mandatory (International Maritime Organization 2008).
The Code establishes the State obligations, responsibilities, and different techniques of
casualty and incident investigation. Concerning the State obligations, it must be highlighted
that IMO Resolution A.1070 (28) imposes an obligation on Flag States to implement
mandatory instruments (IMO 2013). In the case of Mexico, the CI Code was adopted and
published in the Official Diary of the Federation on 21 November 2013 (Código de
Normas Internacionales y Prácticas Recomendadas para la Investigación de los Aspectos
de Seguridad de Siniestros y Sucesos Marítimos–Código de Investigación de Siniestros, in
Spanish). Though the CI Code mainly focuses on safety issues, it also addresses maritime
security incidents in Chapter 19, which deals with “acts of unlawful interference.” In such
cases, authorities responsible for ISPS’s compliance must be involved. Provision 19.1 of
the CI Code states: “If in the course of a marine safety investigation it becomes known or is
1

Secretaría de Marina, in Spanish and represented with the acronym SEMAR.
Unified Centre for Port and Maritime Security in English, and referred to as CUMAR thereafter.
3
Federal Integrated Port Administration
2
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suspected that an offence is committed under articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quarter of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, the marine safety investigation Authority should immediately seek to ensure
that the maritime security Authorities of the State(s) concerned are informed.”
The safety or security official investigation in relation to a marine casualty or a port and
maritime incident, respectively, must run in parallel to the judicial investigation. The
objective of such investigation, following the purpose of the CI Code, is not to deal with
apportionment of blame or liability, but to learn the lesson and understand the causal factors
of why a particular incident occurred. Another objective is to prevent similar accidents/
incidents from reoccurring, via reporting them to IMO (in the case of serious marine
accidents is essential and mandatory), so that the entire maritime community can learn of
the specific event and avoid similar mistakes in the future. Of significant importance is also
the fact that in the case of very serious maritime security incidents, there must be a reassessment of the PFSA/SSA and adjustment of the PFSP/SSP, accordingly, as required by
the ISPS Code. Part II of the CI Code comprising chapters 4–14 contains mandatory
provisions, while Part III including chapters 15 to 26 contains recommended practices
regarding maritime accident and incident investigation. Chapter 6 provides the obligation
for Coastal and Flag states to conduct a marine safety investigation into every very serious
marine casualty/incident; with the understanding that every incident that results in “significant loss of life, severe damage or pollution with significant political implications” is
considered as a very serious one and, therefore, it must be officially investigated (IMO 2014).
Even though the official security incident investigation is not judicial (it runs parallel
to the judicial), official maritime and port security investigators from the Maritime
National Authority have the burden of proof. This means that they have the obligation
to prove their conclusions reached in an incident investigation, which must follow the
basic principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, as well as present evidence if
required. The Maritime Authority shall also ensure that other relevant authorities and
interested parties as terminal operators, ship owners, Flag Administration, P&I clubs
and other port and terminal insurance’s representatives, classification societies, salvage
organizations and lawyers representing cargo owners, crew members are properly
notified and that they are given instructions about how to handle of evidence material.
The ship’s master, crew, and personnel shall also be reminded about the prohibition of
removal of evidence and their right in respect of legal representation for interviews/
testimonies, as well as their right to be protected against self-incrimination, also for the
official maritime incident security investigation.
It is common that after a maritime incident, both the maritime security investigation
body and the judicial authorities attend the event simultaneously to investigate the incident
and collect evidence. In most cases, in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary, the
judicial body would have priority and would immediately start to conduct interviews and
collect testimonies for a possible prosecution. This deviates from the principles of incident
security investigation and, therefore, it is important that incident security investigators
conduct a separate analysis not directly based on the judicial proceedings. This, of course
with the override understanding that cooperation between authorities will allow to conduct
both judicial and security incident investigations in parallel, as IMO (2014) points out by
referring to the CI Code, chapter 9. Furthermore, Chapter 21 of that Code, provision 21.2
establishes the obligations for the marine safety investigating State(s), which shall ensure
the implementation of an appropriate framework within the State for, among other aspects:
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1. The designation of investigators to the marine safety investigation including an
investigator to lead the marine safety investigation;
2. The provision of a reasonable level of support to members of the marine safety
investigation from other authorities;
3. The development of a strategy for the marine safety investigation in liaison with
other substantially interested States.
These three aspects of Provision 21.2 of the CI Code concerning the obligation of the
State should also apply for port (and maritime) security incidents. The maritime
security investigation State should also provide every effort to facilitate the maritime
or port security investigation in order to improve maritime security at its own ports and
territorial sea and to protect its own national interests.
As mentioned before, in the case of Mexico, the institution responsible for the
implementation and compliance with the ISPS Code is the CUMAR; this institution is
also responsible for revision and approval of PFSA/PSA and PFSP/PSP (as well as the
Ship Security Assessment-SSA and Ship Security Plan-SSP for vessels bearing the
national Flag). Therefore, the CUMAR is also liable to investigate serious maritime and
port security incidents and ensure the re-assessment of PFSA/PSA and PFSP/PSP,
SSA/SSP (of national Flag) after a serious maritime or port security incident. The
CUMAR representatives are the first authority notified on a security incident and the
first to arrive at the place of the event. They should continue to cooperate with the
judicial authorities for the judicial investigation. In parallel, but separately, they shall
perform their own maritime or port security investigation of that particular event,
according to the principles of the CI and ISPS Code. Finally, they should provide
recommendations to PFSO/PSO (or Ship Security Officer-SSO) about how to prevent
such events from reoccurring and ensure that these Officers include those threats into
the PFSA/SSA and that PFSP/PSP/SSP are amended accordingly.
Recalling that there is a growing concern about maritime and port infrastructure as
targets of a terror attack, as well as factoring in the importance to keep high maritime
and port terminal security standards, investigation procedures of security incidents were
studied, along with the way of reporting those port security incidents. The issue was
examined from the unique perspective of Mexico’s coastlines and associated port
infrastructure and at the same time addressing the demands placed on the CUMAR
by international and national legislation. To facilitate this, a Model for Port and
Maritime Security Incident Investigation was developed. On the bases of this Model,
a new and “transparent incident-reporting tool” was created, building the bridge
between PFSA, PFSP, and port security incident investigation, as illustrated in the
paragraphs that follow. Due to its lengthy extent, the transparent incident-reporting tool
is presented in full detail as Annex I in the English version and within Annex II in the
Spanish one. Additionally, the crossovers of the respective research areas are depicted
in Fig. 1.

2 Research objectives
The first objective of this paper is to study the current situation of port security in
Mexico, with particular focus on the compliance of security assessments, security
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Fig. 1 Model for port and maritime security incident investigation

plans, incident reporting, and incident investigation to develop an analytical transparent
incident-reporting tool that integrates all the procedures of these ISPS Code
requirements.
The aim is that this instrument supports security incident reporting and improves
PFSA, its respective PFSP and port/maritime security incident investigation. Acquiring
all relevant information of a particular incident in this instrument will facilitate to learn
the lesson from that event and use it for updating of PFSA and respective Security
Plans. It would also provide all necessary information to official investigators to followup the event and instruct the implementation of measures to prevent its re-occurrence.
The second objective of this paper is to examine port security at Mexican ports from
an incident reporting and investigation perspective, by implementing this instrument at
all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies. This, with the support of the National
Maritime Authority, demonstrating in a real case through “action research,” the contributions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation, PFSA
and PFSP.
The third objective of this paper is to demonstrate the use of this tool for a multilevel
analysis of port security threats to identify the problem areas and contribute to set up the
strategies for the development of a national maritime security policy.

3 Research methodology
The research methodology includes semi-structured interviews conducted to Master of
Harbors, Directors of Customs Maritime Units; Directors of ports; PFSOs from ports
and certain terminals that are dealing with hydrocarbons; Presidents of CUMAR (1st
Commander of the Navy Zone, Navy Sector or Navy Station); Commandants of the
Unidad Naval de Protección Portuaria and called hereinafter UNAPROP.4 At the same
4

Naval Unit for Port Security.
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time, participant observations at Maritime Customs Units, Master of Harbors installations, ports, and port terminals—including not only the land areas, but also the related
maritime passages—were conducted; all these were visited on board patrol vessels that
were made available by the Mexican Navy. The visit to the mentioned ports in Mexico
was conducted from the 10th of October 2016 to the 9th of December 2016, with an
average of a week devoted to each port. Another 6-day visit to one of the three largest
ports of Mexico in the Pacific area was conducted in April 2016, where semi-structured
interviews and participant observation were performed. The poll of data included the
leaders of the mentioned institutions from the ports of Altamira and Tampico (Tamps.),
Tuxpan, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos (Ver.), Dos Bocas (Tab.), Ciudad del Carmen
(Campeche), and Progresso (Yuc.), as well as another hub port from the Pacific in
Mexico. By doing this, the four pillars for the operation of ports were covered. The pool
of data is deemed sufficient, based on the fact that it includes eight out of 16 FIPA in
Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, representing a coverage of 50% of them and
seven out of seven FIPAs situated in the Gulf of Mexico, where oil exploration and
production activities take place, achieving a 100% coverage of them. One State-Owned
Integrated Port Administration (Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche) where most of the oil
activity is concentrated was also included in the study.
From the persons invited to participate and representing Master of Harbor offices at
these nine ports, only one of them rejected the invitation. The same figures correspond
to representatives from the maritime customs units (one) and directors from FIPAs
(one), as well as the PFSO from that same port that due to extreme work volume had to
decline the interview. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were used to allow new
viewpoints to emerge freely, particularly about opinions and perceptions concerning the
participants. This method is valuable to study opinions and fears of people when
changing processes and systems, especially after the shift of maritime safety and
security responsibility, as well as port state control from SCT to SEMAR. The purpose
of the study was described to participants in an information cover-sheet letter where the
research objectives were clearly described, explaining that their participation was
voluntary, confidential, and without any economic contribution or gifts. The total
number of interviewed participants was 57 persons, all of them practicing in areas of
maritime safety and security, or customs units. Interviews were carried out in the
participant’s workplaces via taped recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and themes were identified and coded using
thematic analysis and constant comparison of data.
At that stage of the research and after the establishment of 15 different themes,
“Action Research” was integrated into the methodology with the aim to improve the
level of maritime security in the country under examination. Action research is a form
of interactive inquiry process that balances problem solving; actions are implemented in
an interactive context with data-driven and collaborative analysis. This approach allows
researchers and practitioners to evaluate their work and understand the underlying
problem causes, enabling organizational change by implementing solutions. It was
previously mentioned that based on the findings from the interviews and participant
observation, a new and “transparent incident-reporting tool” was developed; it was then
implemented at all ports in Mexico where the ISPS Code applies, by the National
Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research,” the
contributions of this instrument to improve incident reporting, incident investigation,
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Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP), as
the ISPS Code requires. Measurements were done every quarter throughout the year
2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly when incidents
without code were reported, adding new codes.

4 Results
On the basis of the interviews/observation, 15 themes were identified across the studied
groups (CUMARs & UNAPROPs, Port Administration Directors; Maritime Customs
Unit Directors; Port Security Officers (PSO) and Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO)
and Harbor Masters). These issues affect port security either in a negative or positive
way. It is also important to highlight that these findings were developed before the
transferal of the National Maritime Authority from the MCT to MMAR, which entered
into force on 17th of June 2017. However, the CUMAR was responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code since 21st of April 2014. These themes are
the following:
1. High discontent among Maritime Customs Units Directors concerning the rotation of customs authority agents between maritime customs units, airport units,
and cross-border units;
2. High reluctance by port administrations and PSO to allow port security authorities
from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real time;
3. High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to allow PSO and the
UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real time from port
terminals installations;
4. High reluctance by Maritime Customs Directors to allow port security authorities
from the CUMARs and UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real-time concerning customs warehouse and other vulnerable customs
areas;
5. Separate IT and CCTV systems rooms between Naval authorities and Customs
authorities;
6. High reluctance by port terminals managers and PFSO to share their PFSP with
the representatives from port security authorities from the CUMAR (responsible
for inspection and approval of PFSP) in order to inspect it, revise it, and approve it
and to develop the PSP details for MARSEC (maritime security) level 3, a
responsibility of the CUMAR;
7. Poor development of maritime security exercises (that relate to level 3). These
activities were performed without access to PFSP from port terminals [exercises
to be conducted once every calendar year, with no more than 18 months between
them];
8. Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope with the ISPS
Code duties;
9. Poor development of PSPs. They only consider risks and threats in the common
port areas, installations, and roadways within the port, but not within the port
terminals, neither analyze the impact of security incidents of the terminals against
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10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

each other and particularly, specific high risks terminals against other considered
of less risk.
Poor training of private security agents concerning port security risks and threats,
as well as use of fire weapons.
Satisfactory level of cooperation between the maritime customs unit authorities
and the UNAPROPs for inspection of goods and vessels at the customs warehouse with the ZVB system and other no intrusive security systems. The ZVB is a
mobile screening system using X-ray for screening of cargo and vehicles. It uses a
backscatter technology to provide photo—images of suspected objects within the
cargo such as explosives, currency, drugs, psychotropic materials, forbidden
chemicals, and trade-fraud items;
With the exception of one port, none existence of official records of port and
maritime security incidents (before the implementation of the “transparent incident reporting tool”);
Non-existence of PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port security authorities following port security incidents;
Non-existence of official re-assessment of PSA/PSSA requested by port security
authorities following port security incidents;
Non-existence of official investigation of port security incidents (other than the
judicial one) made by port security authorities.

Concerning the implementation and results of the “transparent incident reporting tool,”
the results demonstrate a significant improvement in reporting port security incident
records, which increased from zero to 57 during the first year of the tool’s implementation. During the first quarter of 2017, 20 port security incidents were reported. For the
second quarter of that year, the related figure was 9, which represented a decrease of
55.00%, compared to the first quarter. During the third quarter, a total of 17 port
security incidents were recorded, which represents an increase of 88.88%, compared to
the previous quarter. For the fourth quarter, 11 port security incidents were reported.
This represents a decrease of 35.29%, compared to the previous period. In addition,
56% of the reported maritime incidents followed recommendations to be integrated into
the PFSA and to be considered for improvement of PFSP. As it can be observed in
Fig. 2, the type of security incident that was reported most is the code IFP-007, which
relates to “confiscation of drugs, narcotics, or psychotropic material.” The second place
is shared by the classification codes IFP-006 (confiscation of weapons/firearms); IFP009 (unauthorized access to restricted areas, including fishermen and stowaways); IFP017 (vehicles abandoned in the port installations or its surroundings); IFP-019 (failures
in control areas); and the category “without code.” The last category served a special
purpose: this type of incidents was assigned a code for the new quarter in relation to the
period they were recorded (Fig. 3).

5 General discussion
A number of participants’ quotes are used to better illustrate the associated data.
Concerning category (I), one of the quotes that better illustrates this is from one of
the interviewed directors of maritime customs units, who pointed out that:
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Fig. 2 Graphic of port security incidents by quarter

The rotation that exists, if it is not made in an integral way and I will clarify some
points regarding the integral, the rotation is not very convenient; it can even be
harmful for us. I mean that we have the specialization that some agents may be in
a Border Customs Unit. Others may be entirely in an Airport Customs or a
Maritime Customs Unit, the way of working in each of the points is definitely
very different, huh! (…) But the frequency with which they are rotating the
people sometimes is inadequate, or the type of people which they are sending to
us in the rotations is also inadequate. There are some very special places, and I am
going to say it clearly: The Northern border. If they send to us, if they send me an
element of the northern border, since it arrives here, my hair starts to fall. I cannot
generalize it, but it is a high percentage, which implies that I supervise it, if I have
to supervise a person once, I have to supervise that particular person five times or
more, then the rotation generates some complication. A rotation from an Airport
Customs Unit to a Port Customs Unit is not so serious, the only problem is that it
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slower the processes. It is the people coming from the border units, which have
represented problems for us.
Regarding themes II, III, and IV, concerning high reluctance by port administrations and PSO, port terminals managers, and PFSO and Maritime Customs Units
directors, respectively, to allow port security authorities from the CUMAR and
UNAPROPs permanent interconnection to CCTV systems in real time, the following quotes illustrate the situation. “One representative from a UNAPROP said
regarding the access to the CCTV from the Federal Integrated Port Administration
(FIPA) installations,
We should have the management of the security cameras and CCTV systems,
here in the Port, but we do not. The complete management of the CCTV
system for the port is run by the port administration. We have something that
is supposed to be a mirror of the CCV system here; but we are not connected
to all the cameras; only to those that they allow us to have. In the case of a
security incident in the areas that we are not connected to, with cameras, we
get it recorded in DVR but that’s not in real time. It is after the event, so we
do not know with certainty if the DVR has been edited.
Another agent of the UNAPROP from another port lamented the following concerning
the PFSO collaboration to CCTV systems:
No, no, and no! In this case, when we made the last security exercise at level 3,
the only port terminal that cooperated with us was one of containers, all the other
ones denied us the access to their CCTV systems. Even that one, was very
reluctant and its cooperation was not in real time. They brought with them a
DVR with the records of the last week before the exercise (…). They did not give
us access to the CCTV system because since they are private terminals, their
general managers or CEO of the companies from Mexico City did not allow
them. That is what they said.
On the other hand, one of the directors of the Maritime Customs Units said about the
subject:
We are not allowed to do that. That would have to be negotiated in a higher level,
at a minister level, I think. But until now they (the CUMAR and UNAPROP)
have not requested access to our CCTV. However, I could not allow it, without
discussing with the General Director.
These arguments might also be the reason for a separate IT and CCTV systems
rooms between Naval authorities and Customs authorities at the ports, as represented
by theme V.
This pattern about high reluctance of sharing CCTV systems in real time with
the CUMARS & UNAPROPs was broadly shared across the studied groups and
only in one case, port security authorities reported to have fully access to this
system in real time for the common areas of port installations, excluding port
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terminals and its related berths. A similar approach [to that for CCTV systems]
was found regarding theme VI: “high reluctance by port terminals managers and
PFSO to share their PFSP with representatives from the CUMAR (responsible for
inspection and approval of PFSP). This in order to inspect it, revise it and approve
it, (their duty by law) and to develop the PSP for MARSEC (maritime security)
level 3 (responsibility of the CUMAR).” In the 100% of the cases, the port
security authority’s representatives from the CUMAR and UNAPROPs reported
that they did not have a copy of the PSP/PFSP for both the port and its terminals.
In this regard, one of the quotes that best illustrate the identified problem is the
following:
The Port Security Plan (developed by the PSO for the port), we have never
seen it, we have one, but it is made by us. About their plan (Port Security
Plan), I do not know if it is well developed, or which authorities do they
include to attend security threats. I do not know if they include us, because
they have never ever let me see it, and I have requested it many times. I
know it is our responsibility to review it and they know it too, but they have
their plan under four locks and they have not allowed us to see it. I have
been asking for the PSP for two years. Personally, I have written here the
Port Security Plan, but the one prepared by us for level 3, where I include
Customs authorities, the port administration with its entire people, as it
should be, and other local authorities; but until now, they have not let me
see their PSP. Even when I have let them see ours for the practices and
exercises in which we have participated, but they have not given me their
plan or let me see how it is integrated. We have participated in all the
practices they have done, but according to what they have requested at the
time, because they have their own plan.
Concerning theme VII, “poor development of maritime security exercises at level 3,
most performed without access to PFSP from port terminals”; another representative
from the UNAPROPs said:
In the last exercise at level 3 made by the CUMAR it was requested the PSP
to the PSO. He was also inquired in his character of PSO for the whole port,
to gather the PFSP for the port terminals operating in the port. But the PFSO
from the terminals denied to deliver it to him, I know it, because I saw when
he requested it and they said no, only one of them accepted to show it to him
but not to make a copy or to take it with him to the tactic room where the
exercise was planned and implemented. I do not know… but the exercise
was developed without any PFSP from the terminals.
Furthermore, all the interviewed representatives from UNAPROPs, the unit with
duties of coast guard coincided in pointing out the lack of personnel, regarding
theme VIII, “Lack of human and material resources at the UNAPROPs to cope
with the ISPS Code duties,” one of the interviewed persons from the referred
unit answered:
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We lack personnel. I believe that here, at this UNAPROP we are not operating at
100%. No, because we do not have the 100% of the positions authorized for this
unit, according to the organic personnel list. The organic list is for 43 elements
and I do not have them. I have only three and 33 commissioned from the Infantry
of Marina. In total, we are 36, but only half per shift.
Due to the high reluctance of the PFSOs to share their PFSP, the development of
PSP is rather poor, since Port Security Officers mainly focused on risks and
security threats for the common port areas, installations and roadways within the
port, as the port assets. However, they do not include the different port terminals
within their analyses, neither examine the impact of security incidents of terminals
against each other and the rest of the port installations and particularly, specific
high risks terminals against other considered of less risks (theme IX). Another
critical subject is the theme X. Since most of PSO/PFSO do not have a military or
police background, they lack training about use of fire weapons; as a result, they
do not include this aspect in the performance evaluation of security drills. It was
observed poor training of private security agents at 70% of the visited terminals
with armed personnel when they were asked to assemble and disassemble their
weapons and lock and unlock them. Therefore, it is necessary the cooperation with
personnel from the UNAPROP to execute this type of security drills under a
realistic approach. It is not a coincidence that according to the IMO, security
drills, in general, shall be conducted every 3 months, to test individual elements of
the PFSP, including the response to security threats, breaches of security and
security incidents, taking into account the types of operations, personnel changes,
the types of ships interfacing with the facility, and other relevant circumstances
(International Maritime Organization 2012).
A subject that created high concern was about theme XII, “none existence of
official records of port and maritime security incidents (before the implementation
of the “transparent incident reporting tool”). All UNAPROP personnel interviewed
concurred in the argument that there were no security incidents reported, because
those that occurred were not considered serious. Despite this, it was observed and
documented with photo-evidence through the visit to port installations and port
terminals, situations where fishermen were within the navigation channels of the
ports and at the berths of port terminals, as well as several unauthorized persons
selling food at one of the ports. Personnel from the UNAPROPs were questioned
about the issue and they answered that these people were not dangerous, so they
were just invited to leave the place without further enquires. Additionally, when
they were questioned about cases of stowaways in ships or in the rail wagons
within the port areas, one of them replied:
Yes, yes. But, it almost always has been by mistake, why? They usually do not
aim to enter the port. Normally they are from Central America and they just want
to go to the United States. They argue that they took the wrong train because they
thought it was going to the North and they did not know that it was to enter the
port. That they thought it was the “beast” and in that case, what we do is to
deliver them to the National Institute of Migration, so they do what they have to
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do according to their duties and responsibilities. There have been about four or
five of these cases in the time that I am here (two years).
The port security incidents occurred at the different ports and port terminals were
not considered serious enough to be recorded and therefore, there is an absence of
PFSP’s amendments officially requested by port security authorities following port
security incidents (theme XIII). Neither of official re-assessment of PSA/PSSA
requested by port security authorities following port security incidents (XIV).
Consequently, there is none existence of official investigation of port security
incidents (no the judicial one) made by port security authorities or by the National
Maritime Authority either (XV). To illustrate this theme, it was chosen the quote
of one of the participants that best illustrate the situation:
Mmm, how to say it? “We make an informative letter about the control and
situation of the port with the observations we have, in the sense of port security.
Like certain areas that can serve to hide so they are more protected; but it is sent
as an informative note, but officially request modifications to the port security
plan on the bases of our observations, or findings, no.
This instrument combined with the use of statistics by incident code and port/port
facility, at a macro level, provides the State with crucial information to set up
strategies for developing a National Maritime Security Policy. It allows the State
to clearly identify threats and allocate material, economic, and human resources
accordingly, as required at each port, applying a risk-based approach to port and
maritime security management. It bears emphasis that “the intangible security
assets and management of those assets or the way regulation is implemented that
can make the most difference” (Mileski et al. 2015) in the benefits that may accrue
to all concerned from effective port and maritime security.
Although this instrument was successfully implemented and tested at all ports
where the ISPS Code applies, in Mexico, with most type of port facilities, it can
easily be adapted to other countries facing the same problems worldwide, recognizing that the “safety and security of maritime domain are critical aspects for
sustainable development” (Chintoan-Uta and Ramos Silva 2017). It can also be
modified to include other type of incidents not considered in the format by adding
the type of security incident and allocating the respective incident code.
Edgerton (2013), cited by Kusi (2015), said that when security strategies and
measures are appropriately designed, functions as enablers, facilitating cost-effective
and reliable operations for all stakeholders.

6 Conclusions
The maritime security standards in Mexico, concerning security incident reporting,
inspections and revisions to PSA/PFSA, prior to the transferral of the Maritime
National Authority from SCT to SEMAR in June 2017 was rather poor. Yet,
SEMAR was responsible for maritime security since the 21st of April, 2014 when
the presidency of the CUMAR was transferred from Masters of Harbors to
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Admirals, Commanders of the Navy sector, zone or region for the specific port.
Commanders of the Navy at the zone in the different ports before this reform were
appointed as vice-presidents of this Unified Centre for Maritime Security, according to the Law of Ports. However, because of lack of knowledge and poor training,
they were not fully aware of the changes and their new responsibilities, which
resulted in the fact that port and maritime security duties (concerning the ISPS
Code), were rather neglected.
On the positive side, important solutions were implemented in 2017. ISPS Code
related training was provided by appropriate qualified people, to members of the
CUMARs and UNAPROPs; the National Maritime Authority also implemented
the “transparent incident-reporting tool” at all ports of the country. This brought a
significant improvement on reporting of incident security incidents and updating
of incident security records, during the first year of its implementation. Moreover,
56% of the reported incidents were followed with recommendations to be considered for PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP. Slowly but surely, the port and maritime
security in Mexico is improving in a significant way and the country is getting
ready to exploit in a safer and secure manner; it’s more of 11,000 km of coastline
both on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through its ports and related infrastructure.

7 Future research areas
Further research in this topic include examining the implementation of the
CUMAR and UNAPROPs recommendation to the PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP, as
well as the development of security incident-reporting in the country. This might
be done by developing statistics, using the 2017 figures as weight for next years.
Other areas include necessary law reforms to integrate the part of the ISPS Code
(SSO, SSA and SSP) that currently are not reflected in the CUMAR’s Regulation.
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